

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. XXIV, 3.

WHOLE No. 95.

---

## I.—FURTHER NOTES ON THE MOSTELLARIA OF PLAUTUS.<sup>1</sup>

### A. THE MOSTELLARIA AND THE TAMING OF THE SHREW.

The extent of the influence of the *Mostellaria* on the Elizabethan drama seems not to have been entirely understood. It is true that Thomas Heywood's *The English Traveller* is a well-known translation of the *Mostellaria*; and, interwoven as it is with an entirely different plot, it furnishes the younger student with a most admirable instance of 'contamination'. A second adaptation, Fielding's *The Intriguing Chambermaid*, which belongs to a later period, may be studied for the same purpose.

It is hard to say whether Ben Jonson's *The Alchemist* was consciously founded on the *Mostellaria* or not. Taken broadly, both plays turn on the misconduct of a servant during his master's absence from home. Of minute resemblances there are none: it is true, as Sonnenschein<sup>2</sup> says, that the line "Nothing's more wretched than a guilty conscience" (Act V, sc. 1) looks like a translation of *Most.* 544, *nihil est miserius quam animus hominis conscius*, but, after all, this sentiment is a commonplace, and a charge of direct imitation will not lie.<sup>3</sup>

It has been observed that in *The Taming of the Shrew* two of the characters have names borrowed from the *Mostellaria*,

<sup>1</sup> This paper is a continuation and supplement to Textual Notes and Queries on Plautus. I. *Mostellaria* in Vol. XVIII, pp. 168-188, of this Journal.

<sup>2</sup> Introduction to his edition of the *Mostellaria*, p. xiii.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also Reinhardtstoettner, *Spätere Bearbeitungen plautinischer Lustspiele*, p. 489.

but any further traces of imitation have been expressly denied,<sup>1</sup> or, if pointed out, seem altogether unconvincing.<sup>2</sup>

Very marked resemblances may, notwithstanding, be pointed out between the plays under discussion. Thus, in the beginning of *The Taming of the Shrew* (I, i, 1-47), it is clear that Tranio acts as tempter of his young master, Lucentio, who, having come to Padua to study, thus delivers himself:

Virtue and that part of Philosophy  
Will I apply that treats of happiness  
By virtue specially to be achieved;

whereupon Tranio, first commending Lucentio's virtuous resolves, adds:

Only, good master, while we do admire  
This virtue and this moral discipline  
Let's be no Stoics, nor no stocks, I pray;  
Or so devote to Aristotle's chicks  
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured.  
Music and Poesy use to quicken you  
No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en:  
In brief, sir, study what you most affect.

Lucentio quickly yields, resolving to

Take a lodging fit to entertain  
Such friends as time in Padua shall beget.

Lucentio's rôle of a virtuous young man reflects Philolaches's long monody in the *Mostellaria*, while Tranio is a prompter to coming vice in the *Shrew*, as he was in the *Mostellaria* the prompter to vicious courses already in progress, the young masters in each case being model young men.

The relation of man to master is pictured in the *Shrew* (I, i, 218-220) as follows:

For so your father charged me at our parting;  
'Be serviceable to my son', quoth he,  
Although I think 'twas in another sense;

with this compare *Most.* 25-28, in which a virtuous slave upbraids Tranio for seducing his young master to evil:

<sup>1</sup> Lorenz, *Mostellaria*,<sup>3</sup> p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Sonnenschein, l. c., pp. 5 and 10 (note on vs. 18).

haecine mandauit tibi, quom peregre hinc it, senex?  
 hocine modo hic rem curatam offendet suam?  
 hocine boni esse officium serui existumas  
 ut eri sui corrumpat et rem et filium?

In the same scene Lucentio stands aside, overhearing and viewing Bianca, with whom he falls suddenly and rapturously in love. This situation is very similar to the situation in the *Mostellaria* (I, iii), where the young master falls into raptures aside over his lately acquired sweetheart, Philematium. The only difference in the dramatic situation is the same temporal difference as noted above, viz., that in Shakespeare the situations are prophetic, in Plautus narrative.

In the second scene of the *Shrew* (Act I) the stage business consists in knocking at a door; and the servant of Petruchio, Grumio by name, gets a violent beating for not understanding his master's order,

Villain, I say, knock me here soundly.

In the *Mostellaria* the opening scene reveals Grumio pounding loudly at a door, whence Tranio suddenly emerges to give him a violent beating.

In the *Mostellaria* Tranio's chief rôle is to beguile his old master, who has unexpectedly returned home, and come into a violent altercation with him. Shakespeare puts Tranio in disguise as Lucentio, a disguise that is utterly futile and meaningless for the action, however elaborately justified (I, i, 200), until V, i, 42 fg., where his old master, coming to Padua, meets Tranio, disguised as his son, and falls into violent quarrel with him. His anger reaches its culmination in the outcry:

Where is that damned villain Tranio  
 That faced and braved me in this matter so?

This reminds, even verbally, of the situations in the *Mostellaria* (IV, iii, end, and V, i, 16 fg.), where the old master, after making every preparation to flog Tranio, cries out:

nunc ego ille ueniat uelim (1074).

A further dramatic correspondence is the begging off of Tranio from punishment at the hands of his old master. In the *Shrew* this action is performed by Lucentio, his young master, with the following entreaty:

What Tranio did, myself enforced him to;  
Then pardon him, sweet father, for my sake (V, i, 132-3).

In the *Mostellaria* Tranio is begged off by the chum of his young master in the following words:

quicquid fecit, nobiscum una fecit: nos deliquimus (1159).

In the light of the above correspondences it seems not too much to say that the rôles of Tranio and Grumio correspond rather minutely in point of dramatic business in both plays, and so do the rôles of Tranio's young and old masters.

#### B. TELL-TALE NAMES IN THE MOSTELLARIA.<sup>1</sup>

The extent to which the characters in the *Mostellaria* bear tell-tale names is surprising. The ironical Misargyrides, 'Hate-silver-son', we may pass over. The ironical significance of Theopropides, 'Prophet-son', is also clear. For Philematium, 'Kissy' is a most appropriate designation, and for Callidamates, 'Lady-Killer' (Beauty-tamer). Simo of the snub-nose represents a type, not an individual, and Delphium may be his female counterpart (cf. the gloss<sup>2</sup> *simones 'delfini'*), but with Callidamates to her lover, it is natural to suppose the name allusive to some more graceful attribute of the dolphins: at any rate the name has been curiously permanent in the form Delphine. Why one of the slave boys was named Sphaerio ('Ball') is not evident, but another bears the name Phāniscus, 'Little-Revealer', and Φᾶνός is the name of an Aristophanic sycophant (Eq. 1256). It is Phaniscus' explicit function in the play to reveal the plot and bring on the dénouement. His associate, of a very surly disposition, was probably named Pinacium, 'Tablet', and the *πινάκιον* was specifically employed in lodging a writ of *εἰσαγγελία*. In the *Stichus*, the slave named Pinacium has a corresponding nasty temper. There seems, accordingly, no good reason for interpreting Pinacium by 'Picture'. The name of Philolaches the 'hero' of the piece, perpetually suggests to me, as I study his lines, the rendering 'Happy-go-lucky', but I know not how to justify any such definition.

<sup>1</sup> See the Prolegomena to the critical editions of Ussing and of Schoell; also Sonnenschein's edition, p. 5. Lately, the article of Karl Schmidt in *Hermes*, 37, pp. 173 sq., 353 sq., 608 sq.

<sup>2</sup> Goetz's *Thesaurus Glossarum Emendatarum*.



The generally tell-tale character of these names has hardly been outdone by Bunyan in his *Pilgrim's Progress*.

Three characters yet remain. The characteristics of Scapha, duenna and maid to Philematium, are correctly indicated by the name Blanda, which Heywood has given to the corresponding character in *The English Traveller*. In Greek, λέμβος, a name for a boat similar to the σκάφη, meant outright a flatterer and parasite, cf. Anaxandrides, *Odyss.* 2. 7 ὅπισθεν ἀκολουθεῖ κόλαξ τῷ; λέμβος ἐπικέκληται, 'should a flatterer tag after us, we dub him trailer'. With this we may compare the definition in Nonius (535), scaphae sunt nauiculae quae maiores naues consecuntur.

But inasmuch as Menander uses the phrase συστομώτερος σκάφης, interpreted by Zenobius (*Cent.* v. 95,—in Leutsch's *Corpus Paroem.* Gr. I, p. 158) as 'scant of speech', Scapha, the much talking, might also be considered to have an ironical name.

Honest Grumio, a country slave who appears with Tranio in the first scene only, has a name that may be explained either as Greek or Latin. In Themistius 23, the words σαρφερός καὶ γρυμαία signify 'dirt, trash',<sup>1</sup> and Latin glosses<sup>2</sup> furnish the entry grumum 'congestio pulveris'. I would therefore interpret *Grumio* by 'Clod' i. e. 'clodhopper'. The correctness of this interpretation seems to be borne out by a surprising string of epithets in vs. 40 sq. applied by Tranio, the pampered city domestic, to Grumio, stable-boy and Clod, from the farm. This string of epithets is, in my amended text (see p. 263):

germana inluuies, rusticum hercus, hara sui,  
caulae caprum commixta.

"Thou native filth, thou stable-yard of the farm, pig sty | goat-pen—, all mixed:" cf. *Tempest*, I. 2, 314 "Thou earth, thou,—"  
ib. 346. "Filth as thou art". Before pronouncing these epithets for a farm-hand impossible, the reader is asked to note Shakespeare's names for a tailor (*Taming of the Shrew*, IV, iii, 106 fg.):

O monstrous arrogance! Thou liest, thou thread, thou thimble,  
Thou yard, three quarters, half-yard, quarter, nail!  
Away, thou rag, thou quantity, thou remnant.

It must have occurred to everyone that ever looked at the name of Tranio that it might be etymologically cognate with

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ussing's *Plautus* III, 2, 300, citing Ritschl.

<sup>2</sup> Goetz, l. c., s. v.

τετραίνω (with a by-form τετράω) 'pierces' and its derivative adjective τρανής, but no one has been able to derive from this etymological cognation a satisfactory explanation of the name. The tragedians, Euripides and Aeschylus, use the adverb τρανῶς in combination with verbs of saying, showing and learning in complexes that signify "to reveal" or "to have revealed to one"—the mysterious, the *mot de l'énigme*. Further, a by-form of τρανής was used as an epithet of Hermes, the revealer, the messenger of Zeus and the other gods. This by-form is τρανός, and it occurs in the mythological writer Cornutus in the following connection (N. D. 16): *πρῶτον μὲν διάκτορος κέκληται ἀπὸ τοῦ διάκτορος εἶναι καὶ τρανός*. Later Greek authors, as the most cursory inspection of the appropriate articles in Stephanus's Thesaurus will show, used the verbs τρανέω and τρανόω in the sense of *revelare*. From these data we would seem to be justified in defining Tranio by "Revealer." Our play will then contain a Revealer in chief, Tranio; a stupid contratype, Theopropides (Prophet-son) his master; and a slave, Phaniscus, who reveals the revealer.

The general appositeness of the name Revealer for Tranio must strike any one who has ever read the ghost-scene (455-531), wherein Tranio reveals to his master the secret of the ghost of the haunted house.

An examination of the play will reveal that this interpretation of Tranio's name is otherwise apposite. For instance in vs. 667:

quicquid dei dicunt id decretumst dicere,

Tranio speaks quite in the character of a Hermes. Again, in 514, it is a Hermes ψυχοπομπός that speaks:

nil ego formido; pax mihi cum mortuis.

When Tranio has taken refuge on the altar near the end of the play, he replies to his master's threat of burning him quite as though he were under the special protection of the gods (1113):

nunquam edepol hodie <di med> inuitum destinant tibi.

Only a few verses before, when urged to leave the altar, he replied (1104-5):

sic tamen hinc consilium dederō: nimio plus sapio sedens:  
tum consilia firmiora sunt de diuinis locis.

On this passage Lorenz's note is: "it is natural to think of the Delphic Pythia who, sitting on the tripod, gave her oracles therefrom. There is perhaps also a jesting allusion to the common practice of holding sessions of the Roman senate in temples."

Again, in 849 sq., where Tranio and his timid master, an anti-Herakles, pass by the house-dog, the situation recalls, in a burlesque fashion, Hermes' conduct of Herakles past Cerberus into Hades.

Also, when Tranio undertakes (523 sq.) to drive his master away from the door of the haunted house, *capite operlo*, the words:

caue respexis, fuge, operi caput

might be taken for a burlesque suggestion of the Hermes-Orpheus-Eurydice tale.

It would be only in the two last of these passages that Tranio poses outright as a Hermes; while in the rest he would be but jesting from time to time upon the etymological significance of his own name of "Revealer." But even if we should regard Tranio's rôle as retaining traits of a burlesque Hermes of Middle Comedy, it would not be transgressing the bounds of probability in literary heredity.

One purpose, we may call it, of the dramatist in giving his characters tell-tale names is to furnish opportunity for quips and puns. This may be an easy form of wit, but Shakespeare did not disdain it. Thus in *The Merry Wives of Windsor* there is a servant named Simple employed as a go-between. He has just been shut up in Doctor Caius's closet when the medical man, about to leave the house, says (I, iv, 64):

Qu'ai-j' oublié! dere is some simples in my closet ...

Villain! larron! [*Pulling Simple out*] ...

In the house inspection scene of the *Mostellaria* (783 seq.), which is full of equivoques (cf. Strong in *The Classical Review*, XI, 160), Theopropides says (825):

quia edepol ambo ab infumo tarmes secat.

The previous dialogue has put the audience in a position to understand by *ambo* (sc. *postes*) the two 'sticks' of old men, and to divine in *tarme*<s> 'woodworm' (which we should perhaps write *trami*<s>, with the manuscripts) an allusion, all unconscious on the part of Theopropides, to Tranio.

In 984 Phaniscus describes Tranio in the following language:

Tranio: is uel Herculi conterere quaes<i>tum potest.

Here *conterere quaesitum* means, by equivoque, 'to make a hole in (=squander) the hoard', and there is small room for doubt

that the real purpose in using *-terere* was to furnish a quip on the name of Tranio. If, further, Tranio is *qui teret*, quasi 'the Bruiser', then the fear expressed in 903:

ne huc exeat (sc. is?) qui male mulcet

may be rendered 'lest he come forth who bruises badly'. That *mulcere* may originally have had the sense of 'strike, beat' (later confined to *mulcare*), rather than the gentler sense of 'stroke', is perhaps attested by Ennius, Ann. 257 (Vahlen):

mulserat huc nauem compulsam fluctibus pontus,

for which the natural sense is 'the sea had buffeted (driven) hither the wave-beaten ship'. The propriety, however, of interpreting *mulcet* as a (purpose) subjunctive from *mulcare* is not to be gainsaid.

There is another group of passages in which the name Tranio seems to be played upon. In the scene with the old men already referred to (832-840) Tranio points out in the vestibulum a picture of two vultures, the two vultures being the two old men, pecked by a *cornix*, the *cornix* being himself (cf. Aristophanes, Eq. 1051, where *κορώναι* are charged with carping at a hawk). 'Vulture' is as common a metaphor in Graeco-Roman comedy for a greedy person as 'cormorant' would be with us, and seems applied here largely as a mere *epitheton ornans*, greed being a general characteristic of old men in comedy, rather than a specific characteristic of the two old men in the Mostellaria. But when Tranio calls himself a *cornix* one is tempted to believe that the epithet is explicit in its characterization. The cleverness of the *cornix* was proverbial, and when Tranio says:

quaeso huc ad me specta cornicem ut conspicere possies,

he may merely mean to draw attention to his own superior cleverness (cf. Otto, Sprichwörter . . . d. Römer, s. v. *cornix*); but if Tranio is a revealer, it makes the allusion much more pointed if we stress the prophetic character of the *cornix*.

The prophet bird is a well-known Greek conception, and Aristophanes (Aves 719 sq.) makes especial mockery of the use of the word *ὄρνις* in the sense of omen; while he introduces Euelpides and Peisthetairos as personally conducted in their expedition, the one by a prophetic jackdaw (*κολοιός*), the other by a crow (*κορώνη* = *cornix*): cf. also Epictetus, 1. 17. 2; 2. 7. 3.

Would an audience in the time of Philemon have been apt to appreciate the allusion when a character named Tranio, a burlesque Hermes the revealer, suddenly referred to himself as a prophetic crow (κορώνη) or raven (κόραξ)?

The Hermes character of Tranio might be plain enough, it would seem, for ever so slight a hint in his make-up—like the wings of the burlesque Mercurius in the *Amphitruo* (143)—to betray it, supposing the name Revealer not perpetually to suggest it. The text of our play gives no hint, however, of Tranio's make-up, and the raven (κόραξ) belongs to Apollo, not Hermes.<sup>1</sup> In the Greek original, the connection might have been made, not by a make-up, but by a pun on κόραξ ('corvus') and κἄρυξ<sup>2</sup> 'herald', a standing epithet of Hermes, but the play bears no trace of such a pun. Accordingly, if *cornix* (which corresponds to κορώνη, not to κόραξ) here refers specifically to Tranio, the hint was probably conveyed neither by a make-up nor by a pun.

But the term *cornix* is here perhaps the name of another sort of bird, some one of the *cornidae*, a daw (κολοιός), say, or a magpie (κίσσα). The glosses define cornices by corniculae, aues lascivae, iocosae. Horace (Epist. 1. 3. 29) briefly synthesizes the Aesopic fable of the daw in borrowed plumage, agreeing with the later Aesopic tradition that the disguised bird put on the feathers of all the other birds, rather than with Babrius and Phaedrus, who clothe their daw in peacock's plumes. Horace calls his bird *cornicula*. That he had in mind thereby the jackdaw rather than the *cornix* proper seems clear from the words κολοιός κορώνης νιός of the later Aesopic tradition. The gloss already cited lends support to this idea. Either daw (κολοιός, the *corvus monedula* of Linnaeus), jay (κίσσα) or magpie (κίσσα?) suit well the description aues lascivae, iocosae. The thievish and chattering habits of the magpie are particularly well known, and these characteristics would fit Tranio very neatly.

It is obviously impossible, without the Greek original, to tell what bird-name originally stood there for *cornix*. The field of

<sup>1</sup> There is a tale (see Thompson's *Greek Birds*, p. 93) to the effect that Apollo sent his raven (κόραξ) to fetch water, and had to punish him for dallying by the way: a possible allusion to this occurs in vs. 789, where Tranio's master chides him with the words: antiquom optines hoc tuom, tardus ut sis. Note the pun in *Tranio* / *tardus*, and see below on vs. 362.

<sup>2</sup> The κόραξ was Apollo's κἄρυξ or Hermes; see last note.



conjecture is wide and airy. Recalling the habit of the smaller birds to fight hawks—as to vultures my knowledge permits me not to say—we might think of one of the *σπερμολόγος* flock, with the meanings of 'seed-eater' and 'babbler', noting Latin *cornicor*, defined in the glosses by *inepte loquor*. Linnaeus called the rook *corvus frugilega*, and *frugilega* approaches a Latin rendering of *σπερμολόγος*<sup>1</sup>; Epicharmus and Alexander Myndius (*αφ. Athen.* 398 C-D) mention a bird, the *tetrax*, with a name etymologically suggestive of 'Tranio', that was *σπερμολόγος*, (*σπερματολόγος*), *καρποφάγος*. The latter also comments on the noise of the *τέτραξ*: *ὅταν ὠσοκῇ δὲ, τετράζει τῇ φωνῇ*; while Athenaeus (398 F.) calls the voice of the *τέτραξ* harsh (*βαρεῖα*). Besides the *τέτραξ*—including besides one of the pheasant tribe (perhaps the Guinea fowl) a small bird—the Greeks had birds named *τετράων* (Lat. *tetrao*), *τέτριξ*, *τετράδων*, *τετράϊον*, *τετράδυσιν* (*ἀηδόνα*), cf. *τατύρας*, *τέταρος*, *τίτυρος* ('satyrus, colonus vel avis'): names for all of which the reduplication, as well as the syllable *tra* (*tar*, *tur*), suggests onomatopoetic origin. It is impossible to fix the precise species and nature of these birds. The *tetrax*, however, had been put upon the stage, so to speak, by Aristophanes (*Aves* 885), in a list of hero-birds (god-birds), to whom worship should be offered.

That it was easy to pun on the name of Tranio with any of these bird names is self-evident, and the susceptibility of Greek audiences to puns may be caught by observing that Aristophanes (*Acharn.* 725-6) plays on *Φασιανός* (pheasant?) and *συκοφάντης*. The connection of *τρανός* 'piercing' with *τορός* 'shrill', with *τορεύει* and *τορεῖ* 'shrills' (cf. Aristophanes, *Pax* 381 where *εἰ μὴ τετορήσω ταῦτα* 'unless I shall proclaim in shrill tones' is put in the mouth of Hermes) would hardly have occasioned difficulty to a Greek audience who would thus have bridged the way from Tranio, via the *τέτραξ*, to Hermes.<sup>2</sup>

But the *cornix* is not, if we may trust the glosses, the only bird with which Tranio identifies himself. In 823 he says:

atque etiam nunc satis boni sunt, si sunt inducti pice,

<sup>1</sup> Thompson (in his *Greek Birds* s. v.) defines *σπερμολόγος* by 'rook' and cites Hesychius for the gloss *σπερμολόγος· κολοῖωδες ζῆον*.

<sup>2</sup> It is probably only accidental that the lexica do not register an example of *τρανός* in the sense of 'shrill': cf. Antiphilus in *Anthol. P.* 9. 298. 6: *ὄργια Δηούς κηρύσσων γλώσσης ὁμμασι τρανότερον* with Aeschylus *Choeph.* 452: *ὁ δ' ὤτων δὲ συντέτρανε μῦθον* 'let the tale penetrate thy ears': a life of Demosthenes is cited for *τραῖνο-ποιέω* 'I pronounce clearly', and Empedocles for *τρανώματα γλώττης*.

where the subject of *boni sunt* is *postes* 'the posts' but by equivoque, 'the sticks of old men'; *si sunt inducti* means literally 'if they are overlaid'—but by equivoque 'if they are overreached.'

Strong (l. c.) interprets *pice* as an ἀπροσδόκητον, but *inducti* may better be regarded as equivocal if *pice* joins in the equivoque. This it does if we may follow the gloss *pica* κίσσα καὶ πίσσα 'jay (magpie) and pitch (sic).' The magpie and cornix are near enough kin to pass for identical on the stage,<sup>1</sup> and when Tranio's master says in 839

nullam pictam conspicio hic auem,

he may very well, unconsciously to himself, be combining for the audience *pice* (827) and *cornicem* (835) into *picam* (pictam auem), just as his *tramis* (*tarmes* 825) unconsciously suggests *Tranio*.

As to the stem-form *pic-*, Plautus may well have used for *pica* the noun *pix*, to be inferred as the source of Festus' gloss *picati*, appellantur quidam, quorum pedes formati sunt in speciem Sphingum: quod eas Dori ficas vocant. In early borrowings *πίξ* (= σφίγξ) would pass into Latin as *pix*, a form already recognized by some scholars for Plautus in Aul. 700, *pisis* (nom. by 'inverse attraction'), *diuitiis qui aureos montes colunt, | ego solus supero*. Nonius (p. 152, 6), who reads here *pici* (from *picus*) gives to the bird the character of the Greek mythological fowl, the γρύξ. That the syllable *pic-* might suggest, in this connection, to an audience of Romans, either the mischievous domestic thief, the *pica*, or the mythological *Picus*<sup>2</sup>, is hardly to be doubted.

A further passage, viz., 1104-5, cited above, may be interpreted as allusive to Tranio in his bird character of the *pica*, or rather, perhaps, the *picus* ('woodpecker'), if we may suppose Plautus to have identified these birds to the same extent as did Nonius (518, 30): *picummus et avis est Marti dicata, quam picum vel picam vocant . . . et deus qui sacris Romanis adhibetur*. The deified *Picus* was represented in sculpture as sitting, cf. Ladewig's note on Aen. vii. 187: "The statue of *Picus* differs from the statues of the kings previously mentioned in this respect, viz., that *Picus* is represented in a sitting posture." The sitting habit of the *picus* was perhaps regarded as characteristic, cf. Varro, cited by Nonius (l. c.): *P. Aelius Paetus cum . . . sedens in sella curuli*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Thompson, l. c., s. v. κίσσα.

<sup>2</sup> King Celeus was the deified woodpecker (κελεός, κολιός) of Greece.

ius diceret populo, picus Martius aduolavit adque in capite eius *adsedit*.

This interpretation of 1104-5 does not differ essentially from Lorenz's (cited on p. 250): the picus was also of the prophetic birds (oscines), cf. Asin. 260: picus et cornix ab laeua, parra ab dextera | consuadent . . . | sed quid hoc, quod picus ulmum tundit?

To the identification of Tranio with the pica (picus) or rather with the Greek *κολοιός* we shall return below.

A further allusion to the bird-character may be found in 1115, where Tranio says:

*elixus esse quam assus soleo suavior.*

It is at any rate a modern practice to stew tough birds and not to roast them.

Further indication of the bird character of Tranio is perhaps found in vs. 362, see p. 270.

There is nothing that surprises me so much, when after a careful reading I go to see a Shakespeare play, as to observe how different a thing the actors' make-up, the stage business and the *mise-en-scène* make of it. These elements must always be elusive to a merely literary study, however diligent, of an ancient drama. In the make-up of Tranio a mere hint of wings (as in the *Amphitruo* passage mentioned on p. 253) would indicate, not only his Mercurial character, but equally well his bird characteristics. But the archaeological evidence of vase paintings, accessible to me only in works of a somewhat general character, is not full enough to settle points of this kind. The Vatican does contain a vase with a burlesque Zeus-Hermes-Alcmena scene that had its literary source, perhaps, in the *Amphitryon* of Rhinthon, the Tarentine poet (cf. Helbig, *Führer durch die Sammlungen Klass. Alter. in Rom.* II<sup>2</sup>, 314), and the same subject reappears on a British Museum vase (4th Vase-Room, F. 150). The subject belongs to the Phlyakes, and Philemon, the probable Greek author of the *Mostellaria* (the date of which is subsequent to 289 B. C., cf. Schanz, *Römisch. Lit.-Geschichte*<sup>2</sup>, I, p. 49), might have been influenced in his old age by Rhinthon, whose *floruit* was 300 B. C. (cf. Barnett, *Greek Drama*, p. 47); for Philemon was a great traveller (cf. Christ, *Griech. Lit.-Geschichte*<sup>2</sup>, § 204).

Burlesque mythological scenes, probably suggested by dramas, occur much earlier also, e. g., the Cabiri vases (see *Guide to the Greek and Roman Antiquities of the British Museum*, p. 176, Case 7). Of special interest are the subjects of "two comic actors, dressed as birds, and a flute-player" (*ib.*, p. 183, No. B. 509), and "a dance of girls, imitating the flight of birds, under the instructions of a grotesque dancing master" (*cf.* also on this general subject Barnett, *l. c.*, p. 49).

But I am very far from the suggestion, on the ground of such evidence, that Tranio in the *Mostellaria* could have been made up as a burlesque Hermes, or as a bird; or even from supposing that some hint like a peaked cap, or a pair of wings on ankles or petasos, conveyed the suggestion of Hermes or of bird; but if burlesque filled a large place in Middle Comedy (*cf.* Christ, *l. c.*, § 200), and if bird rôles were common, as we might infer not only from the *Birds* of Aristophanes, but from the older *Komoi* (*cf.* Barnett, *l. c.*, p. 55); we need not wonder at the recurrence, in the subsequent comedy of Philemon, of traits of a burlesque Hermes, and of the stage-bird.

Such allusions, however, must have been intelligible to an audience, and if it seems improbable that Tranio's make-up suggested, by the use of wings, both his characters—as a Hermes and as a prophet-bird—it remains true that the name Tranio, if rightly interpreted by 'revealer', does suggest both characters; while it would be the easiest thing in the world for an actor, by gesture and voice-color, to indicate his bird characteristics, thus making clear to ordinary folk in the audience points beyond the reach of the probe of the scholar closeted with his books.

There is yet another way in which the name of Tranio might suggest a bird character. In the light of names like Mag-pie, Tom-tit, Jenny-wren, Jack-daw, Poll-parrot, Martin (*cf.* also Jack and Jenny, the donkey-pair, and Tom of a Tom-cat), Dicky-bird—Dick is a very common name for a canary bird—we might suppose that the name Tranio was commonly bestowed upon some domestic bird, say the Mag-pie, as conversely the slave-name Corax (Capt. 657) comes from the name of the raven (κόραξ). It is semantically attractive to imagine in Tranio a bird appellative, 'the shrill one'. But, on the other hand, our testimonia for the name Tranio are absolutely inadequate to prove any such thing. The supposed occurrence of the name Tranion

on a Campanian crater (cf. Klein in *Archäol. Zeit*, 37, pp. 31-33) applied to a boy extracting a splinter from one Hippomedon would be of value, but the certain part of the name is only  $\tau\rho . . \sigma\nu$ , with space for but two letters rather than three.

In nothing of what has been advanced would I seek to justify allusions in the play by an etymological interpretation of the name Tranio. We must, on the contrary, seek to establish the tell-tale significance of the name Tranio by the evidence of the allusions in the play, and this will lead us briefly to recapitulate the course of the argument which, with some shift and enlargement, is as follows:

Tranio's name is etymologically connected by Plautus with Latin *terit* (Gr.  $\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\iota$ ) 'bores, rubs' in the following verse (984):

Tranio: is uel Herculi conterere quaesitum potest.

This cognation is supported by an equivoque in which Tranio is called *tarmes* (or better, with the manuscripts, *tramis*) 'borer' (825):

quia edepol ambo ab infumo tramis secat,

words which the audience is to understand by 'a borer (a  $\tau\epsilon\rho\eta\delta\acute{\omega}\nu$ , i. e. Tranio) is undercutting the old men'.

The next step, after fixing the connection of the name Tranio with  $\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\omega$ , is to analyze the name morphologically; and the most direct derivation is from  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\varsigma$ ,  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  'piercing, shrill, clear, plain': cf. for the formation the Plautine names Euclio:  $\epsilon\upsilon\kappa\lambda\epsilon\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ , or Sceparnio:  $\sigma\acute{\kappa}\epsilon\pi\alpha\rho\nu\omicron\nu$ , Olympio:  $\omicron\lambda\upsilon\mu\pi\omicron\varsigma$ . Cornutus (68 A. D.) specifically applies the appellative  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  to Hermes, and in post-classical Greek verbs derived from  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  mean to 'reveal', while as early as Aeschylus the adverb  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\omega}\varsigma$  is used in connections that would justify for  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  the connotation of 'revealing'.

Quite independent of these morphological speculations whereby Tranio is derived from  $\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  and defined as 'Revealer' (a Hermes, to wit), the following passages strongly suggest the character of revealer for Tranio:

667: quicquid dei dicunt id decretumst dicere

1104-5: sic tamen hinc consilium dedero, nimio plus sapio sedens:  
tum consilia firmiora sunt de divinis locis.

The following passages admit of the same interpretation, though they may not demand it:

1113: nunquam edepol hodie di med inuitum destinant tibi:

514: nil ego formido: pax mihist cum mortuis.



As the last passage specifically suggests the mythological Hermes, so does the situation in 849 sq. where Tranio-Hermes escorts his master, an anti-Heracles, past a house-dog—Cerberus. Also, when Tranio (523) bids his master 'begone, to cover his head, and not to look back' a burlesque of the Hermes-Orpheus-Eurydice scene is suggested.

But certain verses suggest a bird character for Tranio: he points to himself in 835 as a *cornix*; in 827, in an equivoque, he uses the word *pice* (abl.) of himself, and the whole point of the equivoque demands the interpretation of *pice* as allusive to Tranio. If we apply to this passage the gloss *pica κίσσα καὶ πίσσα*, it would seem as if *pice* might, in a pun, suggest the magpie (*pica*, a sort of *cornix*), or the woodpecker (*pīcus*). In 839 Tranio's master uses the words 'pictam . . . auem', in what is again best regarded as an (unconscious) equivoque. It conforms to the character of Tranio as a *pīcus* (*pica*) if we interpret the relative clause in 903:

cautost opus | ne huc exeat qui male mulcet

by 'the bruiser' (*mulcet* indic.), or by 'to bruise us' (*mulcet*, subj.). Similarly, vs. 365

este, ecfercite uos, saginam caedite,

may, in view of the connotation, common for *sagina*, of 'feed for fowls', be interpreted by 'eat, stuff yourselves, peck your feed': this is to treat *caedite* as a rendering of κόπτete in its special sense of 'peck, gnaw'; cf. the gloss *caedo κόπτω ὃ ἐστι τέμνω*, which shows that κόπτω was the regular equivalent for *caedo*: and note the Lucilian word *cibicida*, a designation for slaves. We might suppose that *saginam caedite* is in some sort a Latin rendering of a pun on σπερμολόγος 'rook', *corvus frugilega*; cf. *cornix*. Or perhaps allusion is made to the κολοίος (see Thompson, s. v.) as a destroyer of crops.

Another mark of the bird character of Tranio is supplied by vs. 5:

exi inquam nido, †re cupi, nam quid lates?

It is curious how Tranio's more specific bird names, as well as their equivoques, lend themselves to transfer back to the Greek. He calls himself

*cornix* 'crow'  
[cf. *cornicula* 'daw']

*pix* 'pitch, cement'  
*pix*, equivocal with  
*pica* or *picus*,  
cf. *picta avis*.

cf. *κολοῖδς* (*κορώνης* υἱός) 'daw';  
*κορακίας*, a variety of *κολοῖδς*;  
*κορακῖνος*, rendered 'jack-daw' by  
Frere, Aristophanes, Eq. 1053.  
cf. *κόλλα* 'glue, cement'  
cf. *κολοῖδς* 'pica' (?)  
*κολῖδς* 'picus'  
*δρυο-κολάπτης* } 'picus'  
" -κόλαψ }

The gloss *pica* *κίσσα* ('jay' or 'magpie') καὶ *πίσσα* ('pitch'), for which the emendation *pix* is suggested in Goetz's Thesaurus, seems to confirm both the equivocal and literal meanings given above to *pix*. With these correspondences and the evidence of the gloss before us, is it too hazardous to guess that Tranio alluded to himself as a *κολοῖδς* 'daw' and a *κολῖδς* 'woodpecker'? And if Tranio was, by equivocation, a daw, it is in point to note the common name of the daw, *βωμολόχος* 'liar in wait at altars', thus explaining the situation in 1094 sq. (cf. particularly vss. 1104-5, already cited, p. 250, as apt for the characterization of Tranio both as a Hermes and a *picus*, the mythical king Picus, to wit), where Tranio, the *κολοῖδς βωμολόχος*, perches himself upon the altar.

If Tranio was a *κολοῖδς*, we must exclude the notion that a bird name like *τέρραξ* (see p. 254) made the electric connection for the passage of the sparkle of jest and pun, unless through the epithet *σπερμολόγος*; nor have we ground for supposing that his make-up was such as perpetually to furnish a key to the equivokes. Hence we are left, as the most probable solution, with the idea that the appellative Tranio, quasi 'Shrilly, Pecky or Prophet', was so commonly associated with the domesticated *κολοῖδς*—cf. Barnaby Rudge's raven, 'Grip'—as to suggest without more ado the Jack-daw.

#### C. TEXTUAL NOTES.<sup>1</sup>

##### Argum. 5,

et inde primum emigratum.

For *primum* I read *prōtinam*, a rare Plautine adverb = *statim*, for which the Plautine quantity was *prōtinam* (Cas. 959/960,

<sup>1</sup> This paper, in conjunction with my first paper (supra, p. 245, f. n.) on the text of the Mostellaria, is devoted to an explanation of the readings—whether emendations or defences of the MSS—adopted in my edition of the Mostellaria (Allyn & Bacon, Boston, 1902). Not every minute point is recorded, but

Curc. 363, Bacch. 374, Pers. 680, Terence, Phor. 190). So in Miles 1193 the first half of a trochaic Septenarius is *prórsum* A | thenas | *prōtīnūs* āb | ibo, while in Capt. 510 and Pseud. 587 the metre is too uncertain to enable us to fix the quantity of *protinus*. Obviously *protinus* is a compound of *pro* and *tēnus*, and Plautus shortens the final syllable of the first member of such compounds at will. The occurrence of Plautine words in the Argumenta is well attested.

If PROTINAM stood in a capital manuscript, it was easy to misread as PROIMAM; next would come a minuscule stage *simam*, *primum*.

5. The MS reading is

exi inquam nidore cupinam quid lates?

Ussing reads: *exi inquam nido, volturi, nam quid lates*, and *nido* and *nam quid* (so Ritschl) seem to me indubitable. Ussing seems not to have defended the reading *volturi* by any palaeographical argument, though one might now be tempted to appeal, in defense of *volturi* as a substitute for the *-re cupi-* of the MSS, to the glosses<sup>1</sup> *vulturinos* 'gypy', *vulturis* 'gyphi'.<sup>2</sup> He rather suggests *volturi* as an appropriate bird-name after *nido*.

I have myself put *Tranio* into the text instead of *volturi*. In vs. 1083 C and D read *re* in the text in place of the nota personae, TR. The same reading seems to have stood in B, but was subsequently erased. I assume that *Tranio* stood in our text; was then supplanted by the nota TR.; the latter being misread *re*. We are left to explain the intrusion of *cupi* into our text. I take it to be a gloss, either for (1) *nido*, or (2) for *Tranio*. If for *nido*, we may think of the Hesychian words *κύνη* 'hut' or *γύνη* 'a vulture's nest, hole'; cf. the gloss *vulturis* 'gyphi', already cited, to show that *γύνη* was a word known to the glossists. If a gloss for *Tranio*, which seems to me much the less likely, perhaps, in view of *Tranio*'s character as a *picus* (see p. 255), *cupi*

I have tried to record all the emendations and interpretations for which I accept a personal responsibility: without, however, laying claim to absolute originality and priority, as, in the quantity of dissertations I have read in the past few years, I may well have caught up suggestions whose sources I failed at the time to record. Mere ad sensum emendations are not noted.

<sup>1</sup> Glosses, mentioned without further notice, are always extracted from Goetz's *Corpus Glossarum Emendatarum*.

<sup>2</sup> One might surmise that *τόργος* 'γύψ' stood in the Greek original, and *τόργος* would approximately pun with *Tranio*.

may be regarded as a syllabic inversion for *picu(s)*; cf. Lindsay, Latin Textual Emendation, p. 36, and Housman in Cl. Rev. 3, 201 for examples.

382.

<Tr.> ecce autem hic deposi <u> it, etc.

It is a question whether we should correct the hiatus of *ecce autem* at all. Editors are extremely shy, however, about admitting the validity of "punctuation" as a justification for hiatus, and phrasing, like all the other purely musical elements of a dead language, seems unlikely ever to be so revealed to our knowledge, as to be capable of reduction to an unchanging uniformity, expressed in terms of 'rules' and 'laws.'

In view however of Mil. 207, *eccere autem capite nutat*, continued in 209 by *ecce autem aedificat*, one is tempted to read here also *eccere autem*, connecting the loss of *-re* with the loss of the nota Tr.: perhaps by assuming a stage *re eccere*; cf. the repeated *quidem* in 235 below.

580.

Da. Reddetur ne igitur faenus? Tr. reddetur: nunc abi.

This line becomes metrical if we read *dabitur* for *reddetur*. The repetition of a compound (verb) by its simplex is a phenomenon well attested for Greek and Modern languages (cf. Oertel, Lectures on the Study of Language, p. 314 who does not cite any Latin examples).<sup>1</sup> The intrusion of *re-* into the text may be attributed to the nota, Tr. So in 1083 B<sup>2</sup> reads Tr. *eho*, and B<sup>1</sup> (probably) *re eho*. In 580 the condition is as if Tr. *re eho* stood in a MS of 1083. If *re dabitur* stood in a MS *reddetur* represents a copyist's emendation. As a general parallel to this verse cf. Merc. 769: *mercedem cedo:: cras petito: dabitur, nunc abi*.

1091.

uel hominem iube aedis mancipio poscere. <Th>  
immo hoc primum uolo.

I have corrected this reading of the editio minor to u. h. tu aedis mancipio posce, etc.: *iube* for *tu* is perhaps a copyist's emendation to put *poscere* in construction, though *-be*, whether from an uncial *de* (dittography for *ae-*), or from *ue* (dittography from the *-u* of *tu* and *ē* of *aedis*), may be a palaeographical mistake. The phrase *mancipio posce*, 'demand in possession',

<sup>1</sup> But note Merc. 769, *cedo:: dabitur*; Truc. 276, *ne attigas me:: egon te tangam?*; and conversely Seneca, Med., 197 i:: *redeo*.

should be as normal as *mancipio da, accipe, promitte*, all in Plautus.

39.

. . . . Iuppiter  
dique omnes perdant < alii > : oboluisti alium.

I have inserted *alii*, with some inconsistency, it must be confessed, as the hiatus before *alium* is a sort I am in general prepared to admit. The falling out of ALII after -ANT is haplographic, cf. Poen. 314, where A reads PLELLI, it would appear, for PLENI. For the phraseology cf. Persa, 755: Iuppiter, iuuisti, dique alii omnes. Other passages in which Iuppiter, or another god or group of gods, are contrasted with the *di alii* (*ceteri*) are Trin. 944; Amph. 12; Poen. 460; cf. Livy, 26. 8. 5; 6. 16. 2; Cicero, Rab. perd. 2. 5.

An additional reason for the falling out of *alii* is that it is followed, after an interval of one word, by *alium* (*allium*).

40-41.

germana inluuies, rusticus, hircus, hara sui  
canem capram commixtam, etc.

I have corrected to g. i. rusticum hercus ('country stable-yard'), h. s. caulae caprum ('goat-pen') commixta.

The words rus|ticus hir|cus offend against the metrical law that two shorts, ending a polysyllabic word, cannot stand either in arsis or thesis. These words are, however, attested not only by the Plautus MSS but by Donatus on Terence, Phormio 709 (= 4. 4. 28), and an acceptable correction must be based on them; *hercus* (ἑρκος) for *hircus* carries with it *rusticum* for *rusticus*, thus not only mending the metre (to which Leo, Plaut. Forsch. 238 applies his 'elision of final s'), but furnishing a suitable step (cf. Leo, l. c.) in the climax from *germana inluuies* to *hara sui*.

The reading *canē* (C) *canē* (D) is a not difficult *ductus* perversion of *caulae*, particularly when *canem* is preceded by *sui* 'swine' and followed by *caprā* i. e. *caprū*: *caulae*, with its rich treatment by the glosses, and its rare literary occurrence in the sense of 'fold' ('sheep-fold', *par excellence*, cf. Aen. 9. 60, and the note of Servius)—here, with *caprum*, 'goat-pen'—continues the climax after *hara sui* 'pig-sty'. On the special applicability of these epithets to Grumio 'sordidus' see p. 249.

65.

. . . . saginam caedite.



See the interpretation of these words on p. 259.

73.

. . . . . nimio celerius  
venire < id > quod molēste < est > quam illud quod cupide petas.

I have inserted *id*: D would fall away easily before Q, and I after E; < *est* > was suggested in my first paper (p. 173). Two cases of iambic shortening in the same verse of words made dissyllabic by elision are not otherwise known to me in Plautus, but the type of sentence has a perfect parallel in Pseud. 281, *nimio id quod pudet facilius fertur quam illud quod piget*. Perhaps, with Bentley and Seyffert, we should correct *uenire* < id > to *uenit* < id >, assuming that *uenire* was a copyist's correction.

In Truc. 321 *conuenire etiam* has been corrected to *conuenit etiam*, making it look as if *-te* was read *re* (cf. *re* for the nota Tr., in vs. 5 fg.); accordingly, *uenit id quod* may have resulted in *venire(i) quod*.

84.

. . . . . adolescentī optimo.

I have printed *adulescente* with the long *ī* of the adjectival flexional type; it would have been as correct perhaps to print *-ē*: at least there is a certain number of consonant-declension ablatives with a long final (cf. Niemeyer's notes on Capt. 914, Miles 707). The hiatus seems better justified after a long vowel.

112.

tigna putrēfacit; < it > per operam fabri.

I have supplied < *it* >: the usual emendation is *per* < *dit* >, but unless we assume a torn manuscript, for which, *pace* Schoell, the evidence is insufficient, it is simpler to restore *it* (sc. *imber*). There is no reason to object to the idea in 'rain goes (runs) through (across) the carpenter's work': *ire per* is normal Latin for the diffusion of liquids over surfaces or through substances; cf. Aeneid 2. 173, *per artus | sudor iit*.

129.

ad legionem [comita] adminiculum eis danunt.

I have dropped *comita*, corrected in B to *comitum*, from the text, believing *comitū* (or *comitē*) to have been originally a gloss for the somewhat unusual word *adminiculum* 'assistant, squire'. Any copyist that knew his Aeneid might have made the gloss; cf. 9. 649, *tum comitem* (sc. Buten) Ascanio pater addidit. This

emendation converts 129-130 into an iambic octonarius, like 128 and 131.<sup>1</sup>

140.

deturbavit extersit detexitque, etc.

*Extersit* is my correction for *textit* in the MSS. We may assume a stage DETURBAVIT <T>EXTERSIT, with a loss of *-ters-* by haplography, or by skipping from the second TE past -IT. As to construction, *verecundiam mi . . extersit* is like Poen. 970, *mihi apsterserunt omnem sorditudinem*.

146.

atque edepol ita haec umide putent: etc.

I have emended to *umidā deputent*; *deputere* 'to rot down', though not found in the lexica, seems as natural a word for Plautus to use as the nonce-word *exputescunt* (Curc. 242). The reading *umide* <de> *putent* might also stand.

150.

quo neque industrior de iuuentute erat.

So I read with the editio minor, though the editors in general impugn this passage. But Rudens 675 b offers a perfect parallel (in the neuter) both for the omission of *quisquam* (*alter*), and for the single *neque*, to wit: *neque est melius morte in malis rebus*. A further parallel for the omission of *quisquam* with a *de-* phrase is Nepos, Cato, 3, *ut non facile reperiri possit, neque de Graecis neque de Italicis rebus, quod ei fuerit incognitum*.

171.

ut lepide omnes res tenet sententiasque amantum.

Editors have adopted Bergk's correction of *res* to *mores*, chiefly to avoid the hiatus with *lepide*. Stich. 104 has the phrase *imperitus rerum et morum mulierum*, and accordingly I have not disturbed *res*. The hiatus is easy to remove in other ways, e. g. thus, *lepide* <hec> *omnes* (the eligibility of *haec* for application to Scapha is proved by 279): hiatus is in fact so easy to remove in Plautus that it ought to render the wary suspicious of the surgical value of such plasters. There seems to be no musical reason—phrasing, elocutionary delivery—to qualify a hiatus between 'lepide' and 'omnes', but, unless we are to believe that in Roman speech elision was so complete that a listener would hear *lepid* omnes alike for 'lepidi,-do,-dum,-dē omnes', are we to suppose that the poetic convention regarding hiatus was so

<sup>1</sup> I take occasion in passing to ask users of my book to explain the metre of 131 by § 27. 4, instead of by § 27. 3.

strong that the distinctive vowel fragment that was heard could never have syllabic value?

The inversion, *res omnis* (this order in Stich. 362), will also mend the metre.

174.

ergo ob hoc verbum, etc.

I have not corrected *hoc*. Scapha's cleverness in 168-9 had been rewarded by a mere compliment; for her *present* (*hoc*) speech she is promised a more substantial reward: supposing an archetype ERGOHOCOB, a skip over HOC might easily have resulted, after correction, in the unmetrical order of the MSS.

186.

equidem pol miror tam captam, tam doctam te et bene doctam.

I have corrected this unmetrical line to e. p. m. t. catam, perdoctam, etc., on the supposition that the *p* of *captam* got in from supralinear *p*, the abbreviation of *per-*. Perhaps we should read *perdocte* for *-tam*, defending *perdocte* . . doctam by Miles, 258, docte . . perdoctam.

200.

nilo ego, quam nunc tu, amata sum atque uni modo gessi morem.

This verse, which had previously been pronounced corrupt by nearly all the editors, is retained by the editio minor. I interpret the verse, supplying *tam* with *nilo*, by "I sold my love (*amata sum*) <as> gratis (*nilo*) as you now <sell yours>, etc." For the omission of *tam* I compare Rud. 943, non edepol piscis (sc. tam) expeto | quam tui sermonis sum indigens; and Men. 968-9, ut absente ero rēm eri diligenter | tutetur quam si ipse adsit, aut rectius; for the construction of *nilo* I compare Naevius 105, eius noctem nauco ducere; for the use of *tam* and *quam* with *amari* I compare Mil. 1202, nunquam ego me tam sensi amari quam nunc ab illa muliere, noting also the correspondence of *quam nunc* with *quam nunc tu*. From Most. 36, lubet potare, amare, scorta ducere, we may defend the interpretation of *amata sum* by *passa sum me scortum duci*.

213.

illa hanc corrumpit mulierem malesuada uiti lena.

I have corrected to i. h. c. m. malesuadelā ('by evil promptings') viti lena. The adjective malesuadelā, might stand as well with lena agreeing. The reduction by the copyist of *malesuada* to *malesuada* is on much the same footing as the common writing of *custodia* for *custodela*.

235.

iam istaquidem absumpta [quidem] res erit, etc.

I read iam isti absumpta quidem, etc., believing that *quidem* in the second position constitutes the lectio difficilior; a parallel is Capt. 789, conlecto quidemst pallio, cf. also Miles, 634; Cicero, ad Fam. 5. 16. 2, ad Att. 15. 13. 5, Orat. 13. The change of *ista* to *isti* is not necessary, but seemed to me to improve the sense, without taking any palaeographic risk to speak of.

241.

edepol si summo ioui bo argento sacrificassem.

This is the reading of B (with *io* changed from *iu*), corrected by B<sup>2</sup> to

. uiuo r  
ioui bo agent o

D reads ioui uiuo argento, and C ioui ioui a. With *bo* in the archetype, for which *vo* would be a very normal variant, it is clear how ioui <ui>uo arose. But inasmuch as *b* and *d* are confused in both minuscule and capital manuscripts (see my first paper, p. 184, vs. 926), I have corrected *ioui* (*iuui*) *bo* to *ioui inuido*: for an interpretation and defence of *inuido* see my notes.

308.

qui inuidet, ne umquam eorum quisquam inuideat prosus commodis.

The definition of *commodis* by 'good fellows' (supported by Poen. 615, Pseud. 443) destroys all Langen's merely verbal objections to this verse. In thought it does not ill continue

306.

haec qui gaudent, gaudeant perpetuo semper bono.

A similar sententia in Persa 777; bene ei qui inuidet mihi et ei qui hoc gaudet. How Plautus might have gone on after qui inuidet, had he chosen to make a harsh antithesis, let Shakespeare witness (Tempest V. i. 214): Let grief and sorrow still embrace his heart | That doth not wish you joy.

The interruption of the moralizing of 304-306 and 308 by the practical directions of the hostess to her servants (307) is an experience any of us may have enjoyed, whether as speaker or as auditor.

319, 325, 331, 339.

hecquid . . . ma-m-ma-madere—ho-ho-ho-cellus—  
a-h-is ma-m-ma-madere—h-ec-quis.

As a warrant for accepting all this *aitch*-ing as a part of the drunken mimetic, I quote the following from a letter of Mr. F.

H. Sargent of the American Academy of Dramatic Arts, though his reply touches only the one case submitted to him (*ho-ho-hocellus*):

"I think that the 'ho' added to the word *ocellus* is without doubt intended to represent the sound a drunken man makes in attempting to get out words. It is exactly what we would do in the impersonation of drunkenness where the drunkard would take the easiest sound which he could produce, which would be approximately 'ho' or 'hah'. The organs of speech being relaxed by the alcohol the consonant sounds are difficult for the intoxicated man to give; he therefore makes expulsions of breath in the form of incomplete vowels, like 'ho'."

It is quite true that *hecquis* and *ahis* are common MS spellings, and it is accordingly impossible to claim a certain mimetic value for them in the drunken scene before us.

327.

quam illi ubi lectus est stratus coimus.

*coimus* is my correction for *coimus* (cf. Neue's Formenlehre III,<sup>3</sup> p. 448). This renders the verse metrical (see my text, § 31, 5); and perfect for future perfect is normal Plautine Latin. The reading *coimus* is perhaps attested by D's *cojm*'.

328.

Del.

sine sine cadere me. sino. f & hoc (B<sup>2</sup>) quod mihi in manust.

B<sup>1</sup> differs from B<sup>2</sup> in reading *sinof* & *hoc* etc.

My correction is s. s. *cadere me*; *desino*: *fetet hoc* | *quod mihi in manust*, interpreted as 'well, let me fall here; I give it up—it's sickening—my present undertaking'. The absolute use of *desino* seems pretty well justified by the examples cited in Harpers' Lexicon, and on the interpretations possible for *fetet* I refer to my notes.

358.

VBIALIQVIVELDENIS, etc.

This is my correction (*aliqui* is dative = *alicui*), printed in capitals. The MSS read *ubi* (B<sup>1</sup> uel) *aliqui quique denis*, which may easily have arisen from a haplography of *VIVE*, with subsequent supralinear insertion of the dropt *VI*.

362.

sed ego, sumne ille infelix, qui non curro curriculo domum?

I here follow the MSS, scanning *ille infelix*. If I am right in



doing so, this verse, perhaps, forms the second test case<sup>1</sup> necessary to prove the older view that *ille ipse*, etc., are sometimes genuine pyrrhics, and neither owe their pyrrhic value to the iambic law (quid illic), etc., nor are to be read *ill'*, *ips'*, etc., with Skutsch. The grounds for skepticism in respect to Skutsch's theory cannot be better stated than has been done already by Seyffert (Bursian's *Jahresber.*, vol. 80, p. 256). I agree with Seyffert and Niemeyer that *illum* in Miles 1231 has a naturally short initial syllable. I believe that *ille* and *iste* are as truly compounds as *ipse*: accident has left us no \**eumle*, \**eum* <*p*> *te* (cf. *tu-te*, *eop-te*) to match off against *eumpse*, that is all. If this is the case, *ille* and *iste*, as compounds, are entitled to such variations of quantity in Plautine metre as *ecquis*, and *ecquis* admits the iambic shortening in its final when long by position (e. g. in *Persa* 225, as pointed out by Seyffert, l. c.). The theory of composition with an enclitic also accounts for *nēmpē*, and the fact that *nēmpē* never fills a complete foot in Plautus is a phenomenon of musical phrasing (proclisis), and does not prove it a monosyllable.

A list of sentences, believed to be exhaustive, comparable in type with the line before us is herewith presented:

Men. 852. *sumne ego mulier misera, qui illaec audio?*

Merc. 588. *sumne ego homo miser, qui nusquam queo bene quiescere.*

*Persa* 75. *sed sumne ego stultus qui rem curo publicam.*

Cf. Men. 904. *sed ego stultus sum qui illius esse dico quae meast.*

Rud. 1184. *sumne ego scelestus ('accurst'), qui illunc hodie excepi uidulum.*

Bacch. 91. *sumne autem nili, qui nequeam ingenio moderari meo.*

Pseud. 908. *sumne ego homo insipiens, qui haec mecum egomet.*

Cf. Bacch. 623. *sumne ego homo miser? perdidit me, etc.*

Cas. 303. *sumne ego homo miser? satin omnes res sunt aduersae mihi?*

Miles 1345. . . . *sumne ego apud me?*

In these sentences the *qui*-clauses (and the coordinate clauses) furnish genuine motives for conviction of sorrow, folly, ill luck on the part of the questioner; while in our sentence, Tranio's not trotting along home is hardly a natural ground to allege for his personal conviction of ill luck. But the presence of *ille* in our sentence differentiates it from all the rest. I have cited in my note on this passage Plautine and other instances of *ille* in the sense of 'the typical, the proverbial, the notorious'; here I will cite but one fresh instance (Horace, *Epist.* 1. 20. 14): *ridebit monitor non exauditus, ut ille | qui male parentem in rupes pro-*

<sup>1</sup> I say 'perhaps' because *sumne* seems to me a possible scansion, and if so *sumne ill(e)* might fall under the iambic law.

trusit asellum | *iratus* (cf. Cist. 15). Does Plautus here use *ille infelix* of a typical man in a difficulty, as Horace uses *ille iratus* of a typical man in a passion? If so, not proceeding home is cited as a sign of being in a difficulty. A proverb to this effect is found in Greek: οἴκοι γενοίμην: ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκφυγεῖν τὰ δεινὰ εὐχομένων; cf. also the proverbs οἶκος φίλος, οἶκος ἄριστος and οἴκοι μένειν δεῖ τὸν καλῶς εὐδαίμονα (see Leutsch l. c., I, pp. 439, 262; cf. also his notes). A possible echo of these proverbs in Horace, Epist. i. 17. 37,

sedit qui timuit ne non succederet.

From what fable shall we suppose this proverb to have come? Inasmuch as grounds have already been given for identifying Tranio with the jackdaw (κολοιδες), Phaedrus' fable of the jackdaw may be brought to our notice here:

. . . (Graculus) deinde *contemnens suos*,  
se immiscuit pavonum formoso gregi.  
illi impudenti pennas eripiunt avi  
fugantque rostris. *male mulcatus* graculus  
*redire maerens* coepit ad proprium genus, etc.

Or perhaps allusion is made again to the dallying κόραξ (see f. n. on p. 253).

375.

. . . disperii :: bis peristi, . . .

I have interpreted *bis* as perhaps an etymological quip with *dis*, rather than a drunken stumble such as *totus . . . :: potus* (Stich. 771). Words like *des* for *bes* (Varro) and the glosses *dimus* for *bimus*, *difariam*, *difrax*, to say nothing of the form *dicolor*, a bad spelling (?) for *bicolor* (cf. Goetz, l. c. s. vv.), show a variation of *d*- and *b*- in the adverbs for 'twice'; cf. also in Cas. 974 *dis-marite*, with Leo's note.

1166.

dispuDET. <Tr.> istam ueniam: quid me fiet nunciam.

I have corrected i. u. to <bis> isti ueniast, assuming a repetition here of the etymological play noted at 375. On the correction of *ueniam* to *ueniast* see below on 926.

377.

<i,> iube abire rursum: quid illi reditio | etiam huc fuit.

So the editio minor. The offending hiatus, which I put in my text after *etiam*, might be removed by reading illi | <málum> red | itio eti | am, etc. The result is a good Plautine sentence (cf. vss. 6, 34): but how account for the falling out of *malum*?

382. See above, p. 262.

407-408.

407 Pluma haud interest, patronus an cliens probrior siet.

408 Homini, quoi nulla in pectorest audacia,

410 [Nam quoiuis homini, uel optumo uel pessumo]

411 Quamuis desubito facilest facere nequiter.

So the editio minor. My text transposes the space of one line before 407, inserting therein the (late) scene heading of D<sup>b</sup>, and reads,

TRANIO *Seruos*

SPHAERIO *Puer.*

pluma haud interest patronus ac cliens: probe cor ciet

hominem quoi nulla in pectorest audacia.

Nam quoiuis homini, etc.

The metrical change from trochaic septenarii to senarii is not unlike the modulation in 745-747 from iambic octonarius through an iambic Septenarius to Senarii. At Amph. 973 Jupiter speaks a trochaic septenarius in dialogue, and then goes on with senarii in soliloquy. In the present passage, according to my reading, Tranio, after a long dialogue in septenarii makes use of one septenarius more to pass into his soliloquy in senarii: cf. also Capt. 360-361.

In reading *ac* I but follow B. B's probrior (propior, CD) I change to probe cor, and my reading of ciet is founded on the *sciet* of BCD, which was changed in B to *siet*. The miswriting of ciet as sciet is on a par with consciuit for concuiuit (Persa 784) and, conversely, citus for scitus, i. e. scitius, Pseud. 748.

For the sense, cor means 'conscience', and ciet 'accusat', as in Bacch. 415 (cf. Ussing's note): the sense is 'conscience makes a brave attack upon the coward'. Perhaps we should read, not probe cor, but *probri* <c> or, 'conscience impeaches the coward only of ill-doing' (*probri*). In anapaestic verse, at least, probri is susceptible to the iambic shortening (Bacch. 1167): the iambic shortening through mute and liquid in iambic and trochaic measures is rare, but fabris in vs. 131 of our play is a probable instance, and patrēm s- in Bacch. 404 is not to be called in question.

469.

. . . obsecro hercle, quin eloquere <rem>?

I have supplied rem 'it, the truth, the matter'; cf. 198-9, si dictis nequis perduci ut uera haec credas | mea dicta, ex factis nosce rem.

506 sq.

I have given the words *st st* to the insiders, interpreting them as a cautious attempt to open communications with Tranio, and have followed the MSS in leaving to Tranio *hicine percussit* (508); in 512 I again follow the MSS, leaving *abscede ab ianua*: *fuge obsecro hercle* to the frightened master, now trying in his turn to get Tranio away from the door. This involves changing the nota TH. in 513 to TR. This readjustment of the parts renders it possible to interpret *percussisses* in 521, as it stands, without changing to *percussissem*. For the interpretation of all this difficult ghost scene I refer to my text and notes.

545.

sicut me habet < miserum >. uerum, etc.

I have inserted *miserum*: it were better placed perhaps after *me*. The possibility of confusion by homoioteleuton with *uerum* is of course reckoned with, and *miserum* makes an excellent repetition of *miserius* in the previous verse. For the thought of (*consci*us animus) *me miserum habet* cf. Cist. 672, *itaque petulantia mea me animi miseram habet*. Other cases of the idiom *miserum habere* are Asin. 869, Casina 116, Epid. 667, Trin. 268.

552.

dixtin <ei> quaeso? :: dixi inquam\*ordine omnia.

I have supplied *ei*.

559.

tam facile uinces, quam pirum uolpes comest.

My notes defend this passage, but the following emendation for *pirum* seems worth suggesting, viz., *pinam* 'mussel'. This suggestion is based on the Greek proverb (cf. Leutsch., l. c. II, 268), 'Ἀλώπηξ οὐ δωροδοκεῖται: ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥαδίως δώροις πειθομένων, which Apostolius (II, 17) goes on to illustrate with three fox stories; first, how the fox catches hedgehogs (*χερσαίους ἐχίνο*ς), which, having split open, *ἐσθίει ῥαδίως*; a second story tells how the fox hunts *ἰχθύδια*, viz., by letting down his tail into the water, which, when the fishes tangle themselves therein, he draws out, *καὶ ἐκεῖναι δειπνον ἀβρότατον ἔχουσι*. The situation here is that Tranio has just wished for a judge who will believe him, "then", says he to his master, "you will win your case as easily as a fox eats a mussel".

I do not define *ἰχθύδια*, as shell-fish, crustaceans, but I think *ἰχθύδια* has taken the place in the story of some word for shell-

fish, crustaceans, perhaps of *ἐχίνοὺς πελαγίους*: nowadays the fox does secure shell-fish and crustaceans upon the seashore.

569.

. . . qui de argētos (B<sup>1</sup>-teos)? . . .

So the MSS, with a correction in B<sup>2</sup> to quid de argēto est, which the editors follow. My text reads qui de argento es? 'how are you off for money?' comparing Truc. 741, de eo (sc. argento) nunc bene sunt.

580.

See above, p. 262.

663.

nisi ut in uicinum hunc proximum d<olum ēx>ercitem.

This reading accounts for all of the reasonably certain letters of A. P's line end, *mendacium*, can clearly not be brought into conformity with A's reading, and seems to have been caught up from the next line but one. The frequentative verb *ex(s)ercitare* may be derived either from *exercēre* 'to practice', or from *exercire* [ptc. *exserc(i)tus*] 'to cobble up, patch up': for the sense, the latter is the more probable derivation, cf. Amph. 367, compositis mendaciis aduenisti . . . *consultis dolis*. This passage makes us wonder if *mendacium* in the Palatini was not perhaps a gloss on *dolum*?

725.

< tuo animo > morem geras.

The Palatini indicate a gap before morem, and we cannot judge how much to supply by the spacing of the gaps in these MSS. Of course tuo animo is a mere *ad sensum* supplement, but Casina 784 facite uostro animo uolup, in conjunction with Amph. 131 pater nunc intus suo animo morem gerit,—cf. also Bacch. 416: est lubido homini suo animo obsequi; | iam aderit tempus, cum sese etiam ipse oderit: morem geras—, sufficiently vindicate the phraseology for Plautus.

727.

. . . quid <est>? Ehem.

I have supplied est (following Z), and have transposed ehem from the beginning of 728 to the end of 727. Notice that B reads the *hic*, final in 723 (A), as the initial word of 724.

757.

quid <rei> consomniavit? Tr. etc.

The loss of *rei* (? *rē*, gen.) may perhaps be connected with the misunderstanding of the word as the nota, Tr. (see on vs. 5). For quid rei? cf. Rud. 487 si . . . quid rei, etc.



802-803.

Misericordia s<e abstinere> hominem oportet  
 :: morare hercle <uerba ut> facis, etc.

My text adopts these insertions from other sources. For 802 we get as good sense and metre by reading misericordia<m> s<ibi adhibere> etc., 'charity ought to begin at home' and this makes 802 parallel with 801:

lucri quicquid est, id domum trahere oportet.

A general approach to the sentiment is found in Men. 982, ego ita ero ut me esse oportet: | metum [id] mihi adhibeam, etc. For 803 we might supply *me et male*, comparing Poen. 359 morare et male facis, but we should have to define male facis by something like 'you're boring', or 'you're making a fool of yourself'.

870.

. . . probe textum habebo

So I read for tectum h., treating *textum* as a verb of effecting with an *ut* and a *ne* dependence. This is forcing textit 'contrives', beyond the warrant of the examples known to me. Perhaps rather we should correct to *effectum*. This is palaeographically easy (see on 890) and the context might have prompted a copyist to the misreading.

890.

ferocem facis quia effertus fumat:: uah.

I read effe(a)rtus for te eratus of the MSS (see my 1st paper p. 184),—cf. Men. 91 where A reads effugiet and P te fugiet—; and for amat,<f>umat. For the interpretation of these words I refer to my notes. Metrically, fumāt vāh as a 4th Bacchius in the tetrameter is a rare type. It were easy to infer from the statement of the metrical hand books that — : — (the colon here symbolizes a word end) *does* not occur in the the 2d and 4th Bacchius, that it *cannot* occur (but cf. Most. 101, where (ex-)templo sunt is a 2d foot; and Cas. 23, where inter se is a 4th — though inter se might be regarded as — — — rather than — : —); but such an inference will not hold. In the 378 (=370) bacchii listed by Goetz and Schoell only 40 + instances of a 4th foot containing 6 morae occur [— — — (24); — : — — (10); — ∪ ∪ — (2); — : ∪ ∪ — (3); ∪ ∪ : — — (? Men. 759); — — : — (Cas. 23)]. In the remaining 330 instances of 5-moric 4th feet, the type ∪ — : — occurs 25 times (1: 13), not counting among the monosyllabic endings cases where there are two monosyllables, nor

cases where the final monosyllable is merged with the preceding word by elision. There are not enough cases for a certain induction, but if in 330 cases of  $\cup - -$  only 1 in 13 are of the type  $\cup - : -$ , the utmost expectancy of the type  $- - : -$ , in 40 + cases of  $- - -$ , would be 3.<sup>1</sup>

Possibly, however, we should read 890 as follows: *ferocem facis quia effertūs amat :: uah*, interpreting "you're showing off your wit (or temper) because a full man loves <to do so>", defending the quantification of *effertūs* by *Casina* 650,

*malūm pessumūmque hic modo intūs apūd nos*

904.

*quid tibi uisumst mercimoni? Th. <totus> totus gaudeo.*

So my text, following Gruter. It now occurs to me that the word that has fallen out may have been *emtum* (*emptum*), written *ētū*; cf. *Merc.* 500, *hoc emi* ('I've taken') *mercimonium*.

926.

. . . *tam deis gratia*, etc.

This reading, advanced in my first paper (p. 184) for B's *Eam dehis gratiam*, may be further defended by *Pseud.* 713, *tam gratiam* (B) *tamgratia* (A), but *tam gratiast* (the editors); here also we might read *gratiast*. In *Aul.* 758 *eam* has been corrected to *iam*.

967.

. . . *amplius quam cui* . . .

Thus I have combined A's *amplius quam* and B's *melius cuiquam*.

984.

*Tranio: is uel Herculi conterere quaes<i>tum potest.*

In this verse I restore the metre by recognizing a doublet *quaesitus/quaestus*; cf. *Casina.* 530, in *quaesitione*, against

<sup>1</sup> May I ask users of my book to correct the table at the top of p. xxv, under 4th foot to  $\cup - \simeq 36$ , and insert below it  $- - - 2$ ? I have neglected also to call the students' attention in § 24.1 and § 30 to the common occurrence of a caesura in bacchiac tetrameters in the second or third feet as a substitute for the diaeresis between said feet: however, if it be observed that the diaeresis can come between the parts of a compound word, the diaeresis rather than the caesura must be regarded as the normal pause. We should do well, in my opinion, to scan 785, e. g., as follows:

*eró seruós múltī—modīs suó fidus :: unde is.*

If we had the musical score, we might discover that in the musical phrasing diaeresis was in general made good at the expense of dividing words by a musical pause between syllables.

some half-dozen cases of in quaestione (Capt. 253; Cist. 541, 593; Persa, 51; Pseud. 663; cf. Trin. 1012).

A surprising number of verses occur with defective metre containing the word quaestus: it is more surprising how many of them are mended in their metre by reading quaesitus, e. g.

Most. 1107. quidum? :: quia nil quaes<i>ti sit: ita mali hercle ambo sumus.

Capt. 98. nunc hīc occipit quaes<i>tum hunc fili gratia.

Persa 61. unde ēgo hūnc quaes<i>tum optineo et maiorum locum.

Rud. 291. praesertim quibus nec quaes<i>tus est nec didicere artem nullam.

Rud. 1345. si fraudassis dic ut te in quaes<i>tu tuo.

Truc. 416. ad suom quemque aequomst quaes<i>tum esse callidum.

Truc. 932. omnes homines ad suom quaes<i>tum calēnt et fastidiunt.

990.

puere atque puero quaeritemus :: sequere hac me <modo>

:: puere, etc.

This is A's reading; the editors correct puero to porro. For reasons of interpretation (explained in my notes) I have transposed the first puere to a position before sequere, inserting before it the nota Th. Leo drops puere altogether, inserting *illos* after quaeritemus.

1012.

Quid, a Tranione seruo? :: multo id minus.

So B. A preserves, of the whole line, only multo minus, with space for more words than the Palatini. My text reads, mending the metre, id <nimis> multo minus. In behalf of this emendation I note F's misreading of *minus* by *nimis*, a common manuscript fault; and Bacch. 672, where the editio minor corrects nimio minus multo to nimis multo minus.

1038-9.

. . . Th. seruorumque operam et lora mihi cedo.

<Si> sume <ea>. <Th> eademque opera haec tibi narrauero.

So the editio minor, plus <ea>, which is my insertion.

1091.

See above, p. 262.

1107.

See on 984 above.

1134.

age mitte ista: cito ad me ad cenam.

I read *cito* for *acto* of the MSS, supposing it to stand for *καλῶ* in the original, with the sense of *voco*, *inuito*, playing on the legal

sense 'I summon(s).' Callidamates has been appointed *orator* for the errant son, and his use of legal language is not unnatural. Perhaps, however, Plautus wrote καλῶ (transcribed *cato*, then *acto*), for the sake of a quip on the name of Callidamates.

1166.

See after 375.

1172.

Ca. Mitte quaes<o>, istum <mihi> <Th.> Em uiden? Ut resistat furcifer.

This reading is new only so far as concerns the insertion of *mihi*; *em* and *resistat* for *e* and *restat* of the MSS were suggested in my first paper (l. c., p. 188).

1178.

hanc modo unam noxiam unam quaeso fac causa mea.

My notes defend the second *unam* as predicate after *fac*, not a skipping dittography: 'make (treat) one fault (as) one'; *unam domum* (*familiam*) *facere* occurs in Terence, *Adelph.* 909, 926.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS,  
AUSTIN, TEXAS.

EDWIN W. FAY.

## II.—THE MODES OF CONDITIONAL THOUGHT.

### III.

#### I.

Having considered the question of the order of the two concept-groups most intimately concerned in a conditional thought-period, it now remains to examine somewhat closely into the nature of the act of intellection that binds the two together; the precise nature of this act of intellection determines the mode of the conditional thought.

It should perhaps be made clear at the very outset that the act of intellection that binds together the groups of a conditional thought-period is in no way peculiar—it is identical in kind with that which binds together the groups of other periods. To illustrate, suppose a general has left an officer in command of a town with directions to keep a certain signal flying at the cost of his life, if need be. As he returns to relieve this officer a messenger comes in with the news that the flag is down. The general's thought will instantly leap to the inference to be drawn from this state of affairs reported, namely, that the officer is dead. If for any reason he is not assured of the reliability of the news, his course of thought would naturally be indicated by the words,

“ If that is so (i. e., if the flag is down), my officer is dead ”.

The act of intellection that binds together the thought of the flag's being down and the thought of the officer's being dead is obviously a simple act of inference—the speaker judges that the first presupposes the second. Such an act of inference is not in any way peculiar to conditional thinking, but is common in all kinds of thought. What is true of the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in this case is true in all other conditional periods. The reader will have an opportunity to test the truth of this statement for himself later when the different modes of conditional thought are taken up; meantime this one case will serve as an illustration of the general principle.



The real peculiarity of the conditional thought-period which distinguishes it from other thought-periods is the quality of its concept-groups; in other respects (the subject-matter of the groups and the act of intellection that unites them) the conditional thought-period is identical with thought-periods of other kinds. For suppose that the general above referred to marches to the relief of his officer without meeting any messenger by the way; instead a sudden turn in the road brings him in sight of the town, and his first observation is that the signal is not flying. He will instantly draw the same inference as before,—the death of his officer. He would not be apt to express himself so formally, but the course of his thought, exactly stated, would be

"The flag is down; therefore my officer is dead".<sup>1</sup>

The difference between this and the course of thought which underlies the sentence

"If that is so (i. e., if the flag is down), my officer is dead"

lies simply in the quality of the concept-groups; in the first case the speaker feels that he is dealing with facts—he sees that the flag is down, and is convinced that his officer is dead; while in the conditional period his groups are strongly colored by the lack of assurance that they correspond to actual fact—he does not know that the flag is down, and is therefore not assured of the death of his officer. But except for that peculiarity in the quality of the groups of the conditional thought-period the two courses of thought are identical; for the concept-groups in each case deal with the same subject-matter (the flag's being down and the officer's being dead), and in both cases the speaker passes from one group to the other by an identical act of inference—he judges that the flag's being down presupposes the death of his officer. To avoid any possible ambiguity, it should perhaps be definitely stated that the *certainty* with which the inference is drawn is exactly the same in both the cases just described—in the conditional period the general's lack of assurance

<sup>1</sup> A natural form of verbal expression would be an exclamation, "My officer is dead". This form gives full expression only to the second group—the inference. In speaking to someone who did not understand the situation he would be apt to add a statement of the ground of the inference (contained in his first group); "My officer is dead; for the flag is down".



the concept-groups themselves, i. e., that they have the coloring of lack of assurance characteristic of the conditional thought-period. The force of the word is expended in this way, for there are several modes of conditional thought, and it has to be left to the hearer to guess that the act of intellection that binds together the groups in this particular case is the apprehension of a cause and effect relation. Since then it is not the function of "If" to give expression to the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups of a conditional thought-period, obviously no inference can be drawn as to the nature of that act of intellection from the fact that this word is the subordinating conjunction of the conditional sentence. The failure to grasp the real function of the conditional particle, probably in large measure accounts for the scanty attention given to the act of intellection that binds together the groups of the conditional thought-period, and for the lack of a clear description of its varieties, i. e., of the modes of conditional thought.<sup>1</sup>

From what has been already said, it is very easy to understand the often noted interchange in speech of conditional and other subordinating particles. For it has been shown that two courses of thought may be identical except that in one case the concept-groups exhibit the quality characteristic of the conditional thought-period. Two such courses of thought would find natural expression in the following pair of sentences:

"Since he has done his best, no more will be required".

"If he has done his best, no more will be required".

Assuming that the speaker is giving ingenuous expression to his thought, he will use one form or the other according as he is sure or lacks assurance that the person in question has done his best, and consequently that nothing more will be required of

<sup>1</sup> To indicate these in speech it would be necessary to have a sort of compound conjunction, one part (like "If") unchanging, to denote the peculiar quality of the groups of the conditional thought-period, the other varying according to the nature of the act of intellection joining the groups. The varying second part of the compound would correspond in function to "Since", "When", "Because", etc.; for these latter are left free to indicate the nature of the act of intellection which binds together the groups in the thought-period in whose verbal expression they appear by the fact that they all take for granted that there is nothing peculiar in the nature of the concept-groups themselves, i. e., their use presupposes that the speaker is dealing with what he knows or believes to be facts.

him. This distinction appears so clear-cut at first sight that there might seem to be no excuse for inconsistency in the use of two words like "Since" and "If", provided that the speaker were to give exact expression to his thought. But it must be remembered that the line between human certainty and uncertainty is not fixed and unvarying; with the same subject-matter and exactly the same evidence before him, the optimist might feel certain, and thus justified in saying "Since", while the lack of assurance of the pessimist left nothing open to him but "If". A similar observation might be made with reference to a single individual if he were taken at times of widely varying moods. However, any inconsistency in the use of conditional and other subordinating particles arising from this source is only a reflex of inconsistency in thought, and probably exerts little influence in producing the real confusion that does exist in the use of these words. A much more potent factor is the attempt of the speaker to hide his real thought, either by choosing the form of speech that implies lack of assurance when he is sure, or the formula of certainty when he really lacks assurance. As an example of the latter we may take the case of a man of broken fortune who has little hope of making good his losses; despite his lack of assurance that amounts almost to despair, he may yet say to his family "*When* I regain my fortune, we will do thus and so". This form of speech he assumes to encourage them; his own thought really justifies nothing stronger than "If". The converse process—the use of the formula that implies lack of assurance when one is sure—is very common. The reason is, I suppose, that the speaker in this way secures a modest form of expression. Such a use appears when, in asking a favor, the speaker wishes to support his claim by a reference to past services rendered by himself to the hearer; the use of the conditional particle gives the impression of virtuous self-depreciation. Thus in Homer (Il. i. 39 ff.) the priest Chryses prays to Apollo, "*If* I have ever roofed over a temple pleasing to thee, or *if* ever for thee I have burned the fat thigh-pieces of bulls and goats". A similar form of modesty is found in the expression "If this is so"; these words are often used when the speaker is sure of his premise, but by expressing himself in this way he seems to lead the hearer to a conclusion, whereas "Since this is so" would seem to force him to it, and thus might rouse his antagonism. As

soon as uses like these become conventional something like a real interchange of subordinating particles has taken place; e. g., the phrase just quoted ("If this is so") becomes a mere commonplace in formal argument—it is often used when the speaker has no feeling that he is understating his certainty, and the audience is not misled on that point by the use of the formula he employs; he means, and they gather from his words, just what would be conveyed by "Since this is so". From such uses it is but a short step to passages in which there is found a conditional particle used side by side with a subordinating conjunction of another sort as an exact synonym of the latter; the following seems to be a case in point:

Hor. Ep. II. 2. 175 ff.:

Sic, *quia* perpetuus nulli datur usus, et heres  
 Heredem alterius velut unda supervenit undam  
 Quid vici prosunt aut horrea? Quidve Calabris  
 Saltibus adiecti Lucani, *si* metit Orcus  
 Grandia cum parvis, non exorabilis auro?

In this passage we should not far miss the sense if both *quia* and *si* were rendered by "in view of the fact that"; for Horace himself can hardly be less sure that death reaps great and small than he is that a perpetual lease is given to none—these are merely two aspects of the same thought, and, on the other hand, *si* can hardly be chosen to secure a modest form of expression, for the formula of assurance above (the *quia*-clause) refers to practically the same subject-matter. Finally the metre does not force the writer to the use of *si*, for though *quia* could not stand in the line as arranged, *cum* (*metat*) might have been used at that point. The reason, therefore, for the choice of *si* is not obvious, unless it be the avoidance of *cum . . . cum* (*parvis*), or that Horace, as he impresses his lesson by asking substantially the same question twice, carries out the variety of verbal expression even to the detail of the subordinating conjunction, finding in *si* a more striking variant on *quia* than *cum* would have been.

In describing the modes of conditional thought the examples supposed are Consequence rather than Proviso Periods; for the latter order of conditional thought is but a subsidiary development of the former, as I have tried to show in a preceding paper, and further, its groups are not closely contiguous as in the case of the Consequence Period. A discussion of the effects



of the Proviso order on the modes of conditional thought would be interesting from the point of view of psychology, but it seems to offer little for the purposes of syntax, and is not attempted here. In terms of the Consequence Period the problem is, What relations may a person apprehend between two possibilities such that he feels that the realization in fact of one of them entails the realization in fact of the other? At least three such relations are to be distinguished; (1) a cause and effect relation, (2) a relation of ground and inference, and (3) a relation of equivalence. The subsequent discussion follows this order.

## 2.

## THE CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATION.

Conditional periods whose groups are bound together by the apprehension of a cause and effect relation may be defined as judgments that the coming to pass of one event is (will be, etc.) followed by the coming to pass of another. All such judgments are applications to a particular case of generalizations based, for the most part, on our preceding experience. Thus we are not slow to learn that the hand thrust into the fire is burned. This generalization puts us in a position to forecast the outcome when we see a child apparently planning to touch the fire, and our thought finds expression in such sentences as

"If you do that, you will be burned".

The conditional periods which fall within the first class may be subdivided into two groups; for the phrase "cause and effect relation" has a broad meaning, being sometimes used of real cause and effect, sometimes of immediate cause and effect (an immediate cause being one that merely precipitates the effect of the real cause). According as it is a real or immediate cause that is apprehended in the act of intellection that binds together the groups of a conditional thought-period, the period may be styled Conditional-Causal or Conditional-Circumstantial respectively.

## (a). Conditional-Causal Periods.

Suppose that a child is tempted to do wrong; he judges on the basis of his past experience that the commission of the proposed

act will be followed by punishment—a clear case of real cause and effect. His thought might be thus expressed :

“ If I do this, I shall be punished ”.

The same mode of conditional thought underlies the following sentence

“ If he has done his best, no more will be required ”.

Whenever there is any doubt about the mode of conditional thought underlying a given sentence, a practical test may be applied by asking ourselves how the speaker would have expressed himself if his concept-groups had not been colored by the lack of assurance about realization in fact characteristic of the conditional thought-period. By discarding this element that alters the quality of the concept-groups we do not at all affect the act of intellection which links the groups together (see section 1), but we thus find ourselves forced to a form of verbal expression in which we must take ground as to the nature of that act of intellection. Thus in the first case above, suppose the child determined to commit the act. When it occurs to him that the commission of the deed entails punishment, his course of thought would be expressed by

“ I shall be punished *for doing this* ”.

So, in the other case, the removal of the lack of assurance that colors the concept-groups produces

“ Since he has done his best, no more will be required ”.

These forms of verbal expression indicate clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups of the corresponding conditional periods.<sup>1</sup>

#### (b). Conditional-Circumstantial Periods.

Suppose that a child has already done something wrong and

<sup>1</sup> Instead of “ I shall be punished for doing this ”, we might conceivably say “ Since I shall do this, I shall be punished ”, but one doubts whether that is good English; for “ Since ” seems not much used referring to the realm of the future. Quite often, as in the other example, the assumption of realization in fact for the subject-matter of the concept-groups calls for verbal expression in a hypotactic period, and when this is the case, the door is open (as noted in section 1) for an interchange in the use of the conditional and other subordinating particles.

proposes to confess it at once. A companion sees that punishment will follow such a course, and might say

"If you tell, you will be punished".

Here the cause is only immediate—the child will not be punished for telling, but his confession will precipitate the result of the real cause (the commission of the wrong). We may apply here the test above suggested for bringing out more clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds the groups together. Assuming the second child has no doubt that the first will carry out his design of confessing what he has done, his thought may find expression in

"When you tell, you will be punished".

Under this head of cause and effect relation fall all the periods that have an element of will or wish in the conditioned group. This element most often produces conditional sentences whose apodoses are expressions of determination with regard to the speaker's own action, or commands and exhortations addressed to others. When the conditioned group is thus modified, the act of intellection that joins the groups is less distinctly a judgment—the speaker no longer judges that the coming to pass of one event is (will be, etc.) followed by the coming to pass of another, but rather he wills or wishes such a sequence. Here too are found the Conditional-Causal and Conditional-Circumstantial types.

(a). Conditional-Causal Periods.

Suppose that the parent of the child above referred to is informed from a not very reliable source that the boy has done the wrong in question; he may however determine on a course of action, and his thought find expression in

"If he has done that, I will punish him".

Remove the uncertainty about the truth of the message, and the verbal form becomes

"I will punish him for this".

This form of speech again shows clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups in both cases. To illustrate again, suppose that both parents hear the doubtful

report, and that it suggests to one a certain course of action; to delegate this to the other the verbal form might be

"If he has done that, punish him".<sup>1</sup>

(b). Conditional-Circumstantial Periods.

Suppose that A says to B, "C may pass by here this morning"; this reminds B that he wishes to interview C, and he may say

"If he does, I will stop him".

On the other hand, if A states without reservation that C will pass and B believes it, his verbal expression will be

"I will stop him as (when) he passes.

The real reason for stopping C is that B wishes to interview him—not the mere fact of his passing by that way; the latter is but the immediate cause—it gives the real cause a chance to produce its effect. An example with an imperative apodosis appears if we suppose that when A says "C may pass here this morning", B delegates his interest to A with the words

"If he does, stop him".<sup>2</sup>

It may be said in general of the conditional periods that show

<sup>1</sup> In the use of the first person of the verb the speaker may express will directly, or he may simply predict his own action as he might that of another person. In trying to arrive at the thought underlying conditional sentences it is sometimes difficult to tell which of these meanings is to be attached to the first person of the verb. The matter is still further complicated because it is quite possible that the two things—direct expression of will and statement of fact—are united in many cases. Genuine imperative expressions (as in the last example above) are not, and cannot be, statements of fact or belief; hence when they appear in apodosis they provide better and clearer illustrations for the conditional thought-period with an element of will in the conditioned group.

<sup>2</sup> It may be of interest to note in passing that an element of will in the conditioned group does not always result in a verbal form that we count a direct expression of will; for the group may be further colored by a feeling of modesty, politeness or the like. The speaker then will say e.g., "when he passes, I *wish* you would stop him." So also a speaker whose feelings urge him to exhort may content himself with a formula of advice, as a matter of diplomacy or for other reasons: "If that is so, you had best proceed as follows." An element of will does not always figure in the thought that underlies such a sentence as this last; for a statement of propriety or duty may be the outcome of the most dispassionate and disinterested judgment on the part of the speaker.

the cause and effect relation that they belong mostly to the realm of the present and the future; this is particularly true of those which have an element of will or the like in the conditioned group, for man cannot well will the past to be different than it is. Even in the case of those periods whose conditioned group contains no such element, examples are rare in which both concept-groups deal with the past; e. g.,

"If he did that, he has been punished".

It may be noted also that this first mode of conditional thought described accounts for the great majority of conditional sentences.

### 3.

#### THE GROUND AND INFERENCE RELATION.

Conditional thought-periods whose groups are bound together by the apprehension of a ground and inference relation may be defined as judgments that the coming to pass of one event *presupposes* an antecedent state of affairs; in such a case we reason backward from effect to cause, and our judgment here again is, for the most part, an application to a specific case of a generalization based on past experience. To this type of conditional thought-period is given the name

#### Conditional-Inferential.

To illustrate, suppose that a person who has arrived at the generalization that after a night rain the flowers are fresh, is told on any particular morning that the flowers outside seem fresh; if he does not trust the powers of observation of the informant he might say

"If the flowers are fresh, it rained last night".

On the other hand he might himself glance out of the window and note the condition of the flowers; he would draw the same inference as before, and free from the lack of assurance that characterized his concept-groups in the former course of thought, he might say

"It rained last night; for the flowers are fresh".

The latter form of verbal expression indicates very clearly the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups



in each of the thought-periods—it is an act of inference, a judgment that one state of affairs presupposes another.

The same generalization, if the train of thought starts from the other end, will furnish the basis for a Conditional-Causal Period. Thus suppose that the person above referred to hears that it probably rained in the night; he will apprehend the result entailed, and his thought may be thus expressed

“If it rained last night, the flowers are fresh”.

The difference in the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in this conditional thought-period and that which unites the groups in the thought underlying

“If the flowers are fresh, it rained last night”.

may be further accentuated by contrasting the thought of the following sentences which shows a like difference:

“The grass is green *because* the sun shines here”.

“The sun shines here, *since* the grass is green”.

The difference may be again illustrated by comparing the two following conditional sentences, the first of which is the expression of a Conditional-Causal Period, and the second of a Conditional-Inferential:

“If there is water in that valley, there is also vegetation”.

“If there is vegetation in that valley, there is also water”.

The distinction between real and immediate cause in this mode of conditional thought is not important enough to call for separate names for the thought-periods according as it is one or the other that is involved in them. Further, there cannot well be an element of will or the like in the conditioned group, for it is a matter of hard and cold reasoning—the speaker simply judges that one event presupposes another. In Plautus there is but scanty evidence of this mode of conditional thought; it is common enough in an age of more formal thinking.

#### 4.

#### THE RELATION OF EQUIVALENCE.

If we should seek a set formula to express the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups in the two modes of con-

ditional thought thus far described, for the Conditional-Causal Periods it would be "*A is followed by B*", and for the Conditional-Inferential "*A presupposes B*". In this third mode of conditional thought the judgment is of the form "*A is B*", i. e., the subject-matter of the conditioning group is defined or characterized by the subject-matter of the conditioned group. Accordingly I suggest for the conditional periods that fall under this heading the name

#### Conditional-Defining Periods.

Suppose that A reports to B that C proposes to commit some act of cruelty. B passes judgment on the act, and the course of his thought might find expression in

"If he does that, it will be a shame".

Similar intellection underlies the following sentence

"If you are obedient to your father, you are doing the right thing".

Taking away the lack of assurance that colors the concept-groups in this case, the verbal expression becomes a hypotactic period whose introductory word indicates the nature of the act of intellection that binds together the groups

"In that you are obedient to your father, you are doing the right thing".

Evidence of this mode of conditional thought is abundant in Plautus. The conditioned group cannot of course contain an element of will or the like; it is another case of judgment pure and simple.

The name "Conditional-Defining" as a description of the conditional thought-periods that fall under this heading calls perhaps for a word of explanation. In naming the periods that exhibit the other modes of conditional thought it was possible to accept the terms that formal grammar would naturally choose as designations for the conditional sentences through which these modes of conditional thought are suggested to the hearer. But the term that would naturally be applied in grammar to the sentences by which a Conditional-Defining thought-period is suggested to the hearer could hardly fail to produce confusion if applied to the thought-period. Take, for example, some conditional sentences from Plautus which convey this mode of conditional thought:

Bacch. 1165:

si amant, sapienter faciunt.

Curc. 144 :

magnum inceptas, si id expectas quod nusquamst.

Men. 126 :

si foris cenat, profecto me, haud uxorem, ulciscitur.

Men. 805 :

male facit, si istuc facit.

Tri. 279 ff. :

feceris par tuis ceteris factis,  
patrem tuum si percoles per pietatem.<sup>1</sup>

The *si*-clauses in these sentences will at once appeal to the student of Latin as parallel to *quod*- and *cum*-clauses that grammar has named "explanatory" or "explicative", and it would seem natural to apply these adjectives also to them. But such a designation would not answer for the conditional sentences that show the mode of conditional thought under discussion; for it would seem to imply that the conditioning group in the underlying thought explained or amplified the conditioned group. Almost the reverse is true—it is the conditioned group that characterizes or defines the conditioning group; or, to put it in another way, it is the subject-matter of the conditioning group on which judgment is passed; e. g., (as above)

"If he does that, it will be a shame".

<sup>1</sup> Other illustrations may be found in Plautus, Amph. 198, 675, Cas. 997, Men. 760, Merc. 874, Mil. 694, Tri. 1173; Cic. ad Fam. III. 3. 2, III. 6. 6, III. 7. 5, XIII. 23. 2, p. Clu. 50, 139, in Cat. I. 11. 28, II. 3. 6, p. Mur. 3. 5, 30. 62, p. Sulla 3. 8, p. Arch. 10. 23; Livy, XXI. 11. 2; Pliny, Ep. VII. 33, 3; Hor. Ep. II. 1. 3 ff., II. 1. 64 ff. cf. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 549 ff.:

εἰ τοι νομίζεις κτῆμα τὴν αἰθαδίαν  
εἶναι τι τοῦ νοῦ χωρίς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς φρονεῖς.

The conditioning group may find expression in an infinitive; e. g.,

Cic. ad Att. VIII. 3. 7;

non puto etiam hoc Gnaeum nostrum commissurum, ut Domitium relinquat;  
etsi . . . ; sed turpe Domitium *deserere* erit implorantem eius auxilium.

That "to desert him will be base" is equal to "If he deserts him, it will be base" is shown by what precedes—Cicero is not assured that Pompey will desert Domitius, in fact he says he thinks he will not. Cf. Plautus, Cist. 42, Tri. 119; Pliny, Ep. IV. 13. 4; Cic. Lael. 11. 39.

To avoid any confusion that might thus arise, the name Conditional-Defining has been given to the thought-period.<sup>1</sup>

In attacking a pile of conditional sentences it will be found much easier to pass judgment on the mode of the speaker's conditional thought than it was to determine the order of that thought; for the test is much more tangible in this case, and

<sup>1</sup> As for the conditional *sentence* through which this mode of conditional thought is suggested to the hearer, it is perhaps not worth while to introduce further inconsistency into the nomenclature of formal grammar by insisting that the *si*-clause be not called "explanatory" or "explicative", though there is no other warrant for the use of these terms than the unfortunate application of the same to analogous *quod*- and *cum*-clauses which they fit as little as they do the *si*-clauses under discussion; take for instance:

Cic. in Verr. II. 2. 6. 16:

Videor mihi gratum fecisse Siculis, quod eorum iniurias . . . sum persecutus. In this sentence clearly it is the subject-matter of the *quod*-clause on which judgment is passed; the thought order must be "My prosecution of their wrongs is, I think, pleasing to the Sicilians". Sentences in which are found such *si*-, *quod*- and *cum*-clauses deserve, in grammar, a distinctive name descriptive of the nature of the underlying thought.

On the other hand grammar may be said to be justified in applying, in a rather mechanical way, the terms "explanatory" and "explicative" to any *si*-clause (whatever the mode of conditional thought) that is anticipated by some particular word or words in a preceding apodosis; e. g.:

Livy XXI. 17. 6:

Cum his . . . copiis Ti. Sempronius missus in Siciliam, *ita* in Africam transmissurus, si ad arcendum Italia Poenum consul alter satis esset.

The only example at hand where there is such anticipation of the conditioning clause when the underlying thought is a Conditional-Defining Period chances to be one in which the conditioning concept-group finds expression in the infinitive:

Plaut. Bacch. 97 ff.:

ego opsonabo; nam *id* flagitium meum sit, mea te gratia et operam dare mi et ad eam operam facere sumptum de tuo.

I have said just above that it is in a rather mechanical way that grammar may apply the names "explanatory" and "explicative" to *si*-clauses that are anticipated in apodosis in this way. For such an arrangement of the sentence does not by any means signify that the *si*-clauses expresses a concept-group that occurs to the mind after the thought of the apodosis is worked out; when the thought-period is of the Conditional-Defining variety this would hardly ever be the case, and in other thought-periods (cf. the passage just quoted from Livy) the fact that in speech the condition is anticipated shows that the conditioning concept-group is already present in the mind; in the thought-period it may have either preceded or followed. The range of words

the fact that the sentences are written, not spoken, is much less of a disadvantage. There are of course complicated cases, but often it is simply a question of noting the subject-matter of protasis and apodosis and the relation that these two subject-matters would naturally sustain to one another. Here again all conditional sentences that are not really the expression of conditional thought must be thrown out; most of the others classify readily according to the mode of the underlying thought. The relation between the subject-matter of the protasis and that of the apodosis is sometimes so obvious that it is surprising that the matter has not attracted more attention; there are, however, sporadic references that show that it has not escaped notice altogether. E. g., Lindskog<sup>1</sup> heads one of his sections as follows, "*Vis causalis sententiae condicionali subest*", quoting such examples as

Plaut. Amph. 857:

Abin hinc a me, dignus domino servos?—Abeo, si iubes.

Plaut. Asin. 460:

Non magni pendo; ne duit, si non volt.

In terms of the present paper, the thought suggested by such sentences as these is Conditional-Causal.<sup>2</sup>

---

and phrases that may anticipate a following conditional clause is somewhat wider than seems generally noted; e. g.:

Cic. ad Att. II. 22. 5:

sed totum est in eo, si antequam ille ineat magistratum (sc. te videro.)

Cic. p. Sest. 10. 24;

Foedus fecerunt cum tribuno pl. palam, ut ab eo provincias acciperent, quos ipsi vellent . . . *ea lege*, si ipsi prius tribuno pl. adflictam . . . rem publicam tradidissent.

Pliny Ep. IV. 13. 7:

Huic vitio occurri *uno remedio* potest, si parentibus solis ius conducendi relinquatur.

Cf. Cic. Lael. 17. 64, Caes. B. G. III. 5, Livy XXI. 10. 4.

<sup>1</sup> De enuntiatis apud Plautum et Terentium condicionalibus, Lundae, 1895, p. 83 ff. Cf. Rothheimer, De enuntiatis condicionalibus Plautinis, Göttingen, 1876, Chap. I (and his reference to Holtze), Reisig, Vorlesungen über lateinische Sprachwissenschaft, Berlin, 1888, § 264 ff., and Lane, Lat. Gram. 2065.

<sup>2</sup> In the first of these cases the question might be raised whether the thought to be conveyed is not a causal period rather than a conditional, and I see no objection to such an interpretation, though Lindskog seems to fear it.



In applying the test suggested it will be found that, in dealing with negative expressions, the term "cause" has a somewhat different meaning than in other kinds of sentences, but this adjustment will be readily made. More likely to confuse is the common substitution in language generally of expressions of ability, readiness and the like for e. g., a promise. Such substitutions are not peculiar to the conditional sentence; thus, when we wish to change a piece of money, we commonly say "*Can you change this?*" and the reply "Yes" or "I can" is as commonly taken as an expression of willingness to do so. The writer once witnessed a case of this sort when the first speaker, at the words "I can", confidently held out his money, only to be met with the unexpected addition "but I do not know that I care to part with the change", much to the amusement of the spectators. Examples of this tendency to substitution may be seen in the following conditional sentences:

"I can attend to this for you, if you will wait a moment".  
 "If you want anything, I am ready" or "at your service".

cp. the following cases taken from Plautus:

Curc. 328:

PH. Perdidisti me. CV. Invenire *possum*, si mi operam datis.

Ep. 448 ff.:

sed istum quem quaeris Periphanem† Platenium  
*ego sum*, siquid vis.

Merc. 287 ff.:

Quamquam negotiumst, siquid veis, Demipho,  
*non sum occupatus* umquam amico operam dare.

Mil. 972:

*cupio* hercle quidem, si illa volt.

In cases like this the speaker says less than he means and less than the hearer understands him to mean; in seeking to determine the mode of conditional thought that is suggested to the hearer we must of course deal with the real meaning of the apodosis. In the same way must be treated sentences like the following:

"If you want me, I shall be at the bank".

Here again the speaker means more than he says; the hearer

gathers from the scant verbal expression what he would gather from

"If you want me, come to the bank; I shall be there."<sup>1</sup>

We must treat the sentence in this way, for in the original form the two parts are not protasis and apodosis. One other source of confusion that crops out insidiously is the fact that many *si*-clauses are concessive rather than purely conditional in function; when this is true, there is an adversative relation between the subject-matter of protasis and apodosis not treated in this paper.

These remarks on the difficulties met in trying to determine the mode of conditional thought underlying given conditional sentences are merely general suggestions; further particulars would naturally be added in a detailed discussion of concrete sentences. Calling for special treatment are idioms like *miror si* and sentences that contain *si* in the sense of "on the chance that".

## 6

### UNREAL CONDITIONAL PERIODS.

Any conditional thought-period referring to the time realms of the existent or the past differs from an unreal conditional thought-period only in this that its concept-groups are colored by a lack of assurance about realization in fact, while those of the corresponding unreal period are permeated by the assurance of *non*-realization in fact. Consequently the variety seen in the act of intellection that binds together the concept-groups of conditional thought-periods generally may be observed also in periods of this class. The following sentences would be natural expressions for unreal thought-periods exhibiting the different modes of conditional thought;

#### (a). Conditional-Causal.

"If he had done wrong, he would be punished".

#### (b). Conditional-Circumstantial.

"If he had come home, he would be punished".

<sup>1</sup>This fuller form is rarer than the other; there is a very good case in Plantus, Mil. 480.

## (c). Conditional-Inferential.

"If the flowers were fresh, it would follow that it rained last night".<sup>1</sup>

## (d). Conditional-Defining.

"If he were doing that, it would be a shame".

Taking up a mass of syntax material, some unreal conditional sentences like these will be found—sentences designed to convey to the hearer the bare information that something would follow from circumstances that do or did not exist. But a very large number are not (at least primarily) the expression of conditional thought at all. This has come about very naturally from the fact that when the speaker utters the clauses of an unreal conditional sentence, the hearer cannot well help thinking of the corresponding realities; e. g., when I say "If I had been present", the hearer invariably infers that I was not there. A speaker often takes advantage of this state of affairs, and makes use of an unreal conditional sentence as a mere roundabout way of suggesting to the hearer (a) the cause of an existing or past state of affairs or (b) the ground from which an existing or past state of affairs may be assumed.

## (a). Suggests a Cause.

Suppose A says to B "You ought to have invited C". This suggests to B's mind the reason why C has not been invited, and he might thus express his thought;

"I have not invited him, because he offended me".

Yet, with precisely the same thought to convey, he would be quite as apt to say

"I should have invited him, if he had not offended me".

This form of expression is available for the conveyance of his thought because the hearer will instantly extract from "if he had not offended me" the information "he offended me", and the general circumstances under which the words are spoken, along with the speaker's tone and manner, show clearly that this is the

<sup>1</sup> The English idiom demands the periphrasis in the unreal conditional sentence; elsewhere it is optional. Thus we may say either "If the flowers are fresh, it rained last night" or "If the flowers are fresh, it follows that it rained last night".

reason that C has not been invited—this last being a fact already known to A, but also in addition implied by "I should have invited him". Such a conditional sentence is not really the expression of conditional thought at all; its function is to tell A why C has not been invited. To take another illustration, suppose that A says to B "These goods are inferior"; B replies

"If you had provided skilled workmen, they would have been satisfactory".

Here again the unreal conditional sentence is but a tool to suggest to the hearer the reason for the state of affairs to which he has called attention—he is told that it was his own lack of interest in providing proper workmen that accounts for the unsatisfactory grade of the goods in question.

(b). Suggests the Ground of an Inference.

Suppose again that a general advancing to the relief of an officer whom he has left with directions to keep a certain signal flying, at the cost of his life, if need be, catches sight of the town and notes that the flag is not flying; he at once infers from this the death of his officer. Someone who does not know about the order for the display of the signal might call for an expression of this intellection by asking whether he (the general) thought his officer safe. The latter could express his thought directly by saying

"No; (for) the flag is down".

Or, more fully,

"No, he is dead; (for) the flag is down".

To convey the same thought he would however be quite as apt to say

"No; (for) if he were safe, the flag would be up".

This last form of speech is a clear expression for the thought because the words "the flag would be up" instantly calls the hearer's attention to the real state of affairs—that the flag is down; the circumstances under which the words are spoken show that this is the ground from which the speaker infers the death of his officer, which inference (already known to the hearer) is implied in "if he were safe".

Other examples of the same use of the unreal conditional sentence are; "Did it rain last night?"

"No; for the ground would be wet, if it had rained last night".

Again, "Is he within?"

"No; for we should hear talking, if he were within".

The fact that sentences such as these are being used as a round-about form of expression for thought that is not really conditional sometimes produces curious and (possibly) hybrid forms of speech; e. g., the thought of the last example might produce

"No, he is not within; for we should hear talking".<sup>1</sup>

This form of verbal expression states the inference in so many words, and implies the ground of the inference. It is possible that such a sentence should be treated as a sort of compromise between two regular ways of expressing the same thought, namely

"No, he is not within; for we do not hear talking".

"No; for if he were within, we should hear talking".

These two special uses of the unreal conditional sentence are easily distinguished from the use of the same verbal form to express real conditional thought, for in the latter case the speaker's point of view is what would be if things were not (or had not been) as they are (or were), e. g., he forecasts the outcome of circumstances that do or did not exist. This is obviously not the case with such a sentence as e. g.,

"I should have invited him, if he had not offended me".

Even without making any formal analysis whatever the reader feels instinctively, from the circumstances under which the words are spoken, that the speaker is explaining or defending his course of action, and that this explanation is the real information conveyed to the hearer. It is noteworthy that these two rhetorical uses of the unreal conditional sentence are well established as early as Plautus.<sup>2</sup> The second (suggesting the ground of an inference) is a striking feature of the diction of the first book of Lucretius; e. g.,

I. 159 ff.:

Nam si de nilo fierent, ex omnibu' rebus  
Omne genus nasci posset, nil semine egeret.

cf. 180, 213, 217, 239, 335, 342, 356, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plautus, Cas. 910.

<sup>2</sup> The facts of Plautus' usage are recorded in the American Journal of Philology, Vol. XXII. p. 310 ff. It is there shown how our instinctive feeling for these rhetorical uses lies at the basis of our judgment that many conditional sentences that use the present subjunctive deserve the name "unreal".



Elsewhere<sup>1</sup> I have noted the interesting fact that, in Cicero's Orations, nearly all of the unreal conditional sentences with the imperfect subjunctive in the protasis and the pluperfect in the apodosis (a hard combination) may be explained by observing that the imperfect subjunctive in the unreal condition may refer to a time realm as wide as does a general truth, e. g., "If black were white" (such a phrase being so to speak, both present and past unreal all at once), while the pluperfect of the apodosis may refer to the same time realm as the perfect definite of the indicative mood, e. g., "I should have known (and should now know)", thus being a sort of combination past and present unreal; and further, that the remaining cases are conditional sentences used in the second of these two special ways (suggesting the ground of an inference); the passages are in Verr. II. 3. 39, 89, II. 3. 58. 134, II. 5. 51. 133, p. Mur. 14. 32, p. Arch. 7. 16, p. Cael. 6. 14, p. Planc. 22. 53, p. Mil. 17. 45. Other examples may be found in Cicero outside of the Orations; e. g.,

Lael. 4. 13:

... qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere *arbitrarentur*.

It certainly seems that this peculiar use of the imperfect subjunctive—referring flatly, as it does, to the past—must find its explanation in the special rôle which the unreal conditional sentence is playing as the expression of a quite different class of thought; that the two things go hand in hand so often must be something more than a coincidence. Beyond this I make no special claim, though (l. c.) I have suggested one way in which the nature of the thought to be conveyed might have affected the choice of tense. The current explanation of the use of the imperfect subjunctive in the protasis of conditional sentences of this type, namely that the reality to which the clause is opposed is a continuous state, sounds like an echo of Greek grammar, and needs at least to be very carefully stated if it is to cover such cases as

p. Mil. 17, 45:

quem diem ille, quam contionem, quos clamores, nisi ad cogitatum facinus *adproperaret*, numquam reliquisset.

Here (as the context shows) the reference is to a single act on a

<sup>1</sup> Amer. Jour. Phil. XXI. p. 264 ff.

definite day in the life of Clodius, who is now dead. A case like this should perhaps predispose us to seek some explanation that is based on the function of the sentence as a whole—some such explanation as that offered in the article in the American Journal of Philology above referred to; additional support for that explanation is afforded by

Sallust, Cat. LII. 19:

Nolite existumare maiores nostros armis rem publicam ex parva magnam fecisse. Si ita res esset, multo pulcherrumam eam nos haberemus.

7.

THE GENERAL "CONDITION".

The heading of this section reads general "condition" because the point of view is the speaker's intellection. Some would write it "general" condition, and there is some justification for that phrasing from the point of view of the hearer; for he at times cannot read the idea of repeated action into the protasis until he reaches the verbal indication of the same in the apodosis. When I say general "condition" I mean to raise the question whether the thought which underlies a protasis that refers to a repeated action is really a conditioning concept-group. For the characteristic thing about a conditioning concept-group is its lack of assurance concerning realization in fact—the speaker is not sure that the thing in question will happen (has happened, etc.) but in a course of thought that we would be apt to express by

"If he saw a soldier fighting bravely, he always rewarded him"

the speaker knows that the action referred to in the protasis did happen, at least occasionally, a fact which receives due recognition in another form we sometimes use under the same circumstances;

"When(ever) he saw a soldier fighting bravely, he always rewarded him".

Looking at the question from the point of view of psychology it would certainly seem that the second of these forms is the wholly unexceptional expression for the speaker's intellection, and that the use of a conditional particle in such a case calls for explanation. Unfortunately for Latin syntax, the literature of that language begins too late to show whether the Roman mind

originally experienced a jar when the conditional particle was so used; in Plautus the problem of verbal expression is already worked out almost (if not quite) as completely as at a later period, the *si*-clause being perhaps the prevailing form, though such relative words as *qui* and *ubi* appear not infrequently. But Greek literature began early enough to show clearly that the Greek mind attacked the problem along exactly the lines we should expect from the psychological considerations above noted; for the normal early form of verbal expression is a clause introduced by a relative word like *ὅτε*, whereas the wide use of *εἰ* (and *ἐάν*) in the classical period is a distinct intrusion on the part of those particles. This is manifest from the statement of Goodwin (*Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 462 ff.), who says that in Homer the subjunctive of the present general condition (his term is "supposition") is introduced by a conditional particle but nineteen times, and the optative of the past but once—this too in spite of the fact that Homer has very frequent occasion to express the type of thought under discussion (cf. l. c. § 538). But these figures given by Goodwin may be further cut down in dealing with the problem in hand, for of the nineteen cases of the present subjunctive quoted by him, at least fourteen are *concessions*, differing not at all from ordinary concessions except for the fact that they refer to a repeated act. The introductory word in these cases is not *εἰ*, strictly speaking; it is *εἰ περ* (Od. i. 166 ff., Il. i. 81 ff., iii. 25 ff., iv. 261 ff., x. 225 ff., xi. 116 ff., xii. 302 ff., xvi. 263 ff., xxi. 576 ff., xxii. 191 ff.), *καὶ εἰ . . . περ* (Il. xi. 391 ff.), *εἰ . . . καὶ* (Od. vii. 204 ff.), and *καὶ εἰ* (Od. xvi. 97 ff. = 115 ff.); in four of these passages the concessive force is still further accentuated by the presence of *ἀλλά* in the apodosis (Il. i. 81 ff., x. 225 ff., xxi. 576 ff., xxii. 191 ff.). It might be added that the single case of *εἰ* and the optative cited as a past general condition also has *ἀλλά* in its apodosis. Concessive clauses should not be counted in the present discussion, for a concessive clause in Greek (as in Latin and English) refers indifferently to something of whose realization in fact the speaker is not assured or to something of which he is sure; an instance of the latter is

Soph. Oed. Tyr. 302 ff.:

πόλιν μὲν, εἰ καὶ μὴ βλέπεις, φρονεῖς δ' ὅμως  
οἶα νόσφ' σύνεστιν.

When the speaker here says "though you cannot see" in addressing the blind and aged seer, he refers to a patent and obvious fact. There is therefore nothing noteworthy in the fact that the concessive *εἰ* *περ*, *καὶ* *εἰ*, etc., of the Homeric examples above quoted introduce clauses that refer to an action that the speaker is assured does happen at least occasionally. But from the Greek point of view manifestly *conditional* *εἰ* had to swerve from its proper function to be used under like circumstances; that it did so swerve is abundantly attested by the language of the classical period; e.g.,

Eur. Alc. 671:

*\*Ὦν ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θυήσκειν.*

The problem in hand is to determine whether, in Homer, conditional *εἰ* had begun to overstep its bounds, threatening the hitherto undisputed reign of *ὅτε* and other relative words in sentences of the type just quoted (Eur. Alc. 671). Throwing out, then, the fourteen or fifteen<sup>1</sup> concessive sentences above referred to, there remain but five or six passages in which to find examples of conditional *εἰ* overstepping its proper bounds. These latter figures give a truer impression of the disparity between the use of Homer and that of the classical period than does the original statement quoted from Goodwin.

It may be even questioned whether putting the figure at five or six is not making it too large. Ameis rejects Od. xi. 158 ff. as spurious (not, however, with reference to the use with which we are dealing), and Il. xii. 238 ff. is certainly peculiar:

*Τῶν οὐ τι μετατρέπομ' οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω,  
εἰ τ' ἐπὶ δεξι' ἴωσι πρὸς ἧῶ τ' ἡελιόν τε  
εἰ τ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοί γε ποτὶ ζόφον ἡρβέντα.*

The meaning of *εἰ* in this passage hardly looks toward "when" or "whenever"; rather it verges toward the indirect question; for "I care not for them, whether they go to the right or the left" is but a step removed from "I care not whether they go

<sup>1</sup> It should perhaps not be insisted that Il. xxiv. 768 ff. is concessive, though the *ἀλλά* in the apodosis looks in that direction; the sentence however is involved, and there may have been a shift of the point of view by the time the apodosis was reached.

to the right or the left". The three remaining cases not yet cited are Od. xii. 95 ff., xiv. 372 ff., Il. i. 166 ff.; it is noteworthy that the conditional word in each of these passages is accompanied by an indefinite (*εἴ ποθι, εἰ μὴ πού, ἦν ποτε*). Showing thus as it does the very beginnings of the process, Greek literature affords a very interesting field for the study of the causes that led to the intrusion of the conditional particle into the realm of various relative words of that language.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

H. C. NUTTING.



### III.—THE EDITIO PRINCEPS OF THE GREEK ÆSOP.

So many uncertainties surround the first edition of Æsop's Fables in a Greek form that although bibliographers have been discussing the subject for several centuries there still remains much to be done in order to clear away the difficulties which surround this knotty problem. In the present article an investigation of certain phases of the question will be attempted, and it is hoped that the result will be readily recognized as a distinct advance in one or more directions in the way of attaining to greater definiteness in our information concerning the copies of this edition which have hitherto escaped the ravages of time.

The first point to engage our attention will naturally be to determine, as well as may be, how many copies of the Editio Princeps are still in existence, and where they are preserved. By means of personal research, correspondence with librarians, and in various other ways it has been possible to construct the following list of libraries and shelf-numbers :

#### LIST OF EXTANT COPIES.

1. Firenze, R. Bibl. Mediceo-Laurenziana, K. 3. 401.
2. London, British Museum, C. 1. a. 1.
3. London, British Museum, C. 19. c.
4. London, British Museum, G. 7726.
5. Manchester, John Rylands Library, 3474.
6. München, K. B. Hof- u. Staatsbibliothek, Inc. s. a. 56. 4°.
7. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct. K. 4. 9.
8. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Douce A. 541.
9. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Rés. Yb. 478 (Exposition VII, 125).
10. Washington, Library of Congress, Chap. 35 (Exhibition).

An endeavor to ascertain the contents of these ten copies immediately reveals the rather disconcerting fact that they vary widely in this respect, and yet this is only one of the many interesting problems which thrust themselves upon our notice in a study of this edition. Short descriptions of the extant copies will, therefore, throw important light on this question.

## DESCRIPTIONS OF EXTANT COPIES.

1. *The Firenze Copy.*

No description of this copy is at hand, unfortunately, and we must for the present be content with the bare mention of its existence as kindly reported by Dr. Murray P. Brush, of the Johns Hopkins University, in a letter to the author of the present article written in Italy in the summer of 1897.

2-4. *The London Copies.*

The printed catalogue of the British Museum<sup>1</sup> gives the following collective description of these copies, only the most pertinent portions being here cited:

"*Begin.* [pt. 1 fol. 2 *recto*, after a Latin letter by the editor Bonus Accursius on fol. 1:] Αἰσώπων βίος του μυθοποιου Μαξιμου τω Πλανουδη συγγραφεως. [Fol. 33 *recto*:] Αἰσώπων μυθοι. [147 fables, including three in iambic verse by Ignatius Archbishop of Nicæa. Pt. 2 fol. a 1 *recto*:] Vita Æsopi fabulatoris clarissimi e græco latina p Rynuciu facta, etc. [Fol. e 1 *recto*:] Argumentum fabulae Æsopi e græco i latinu. [Fol. h 3 *recto*:] Totius operis anacephaleosis. hAbes uitam pariter & fabulas [100] æsopi . . . per me nup uerbis latinis intusiatis. non tamen oēs sed quotquot ad manus meas usque peruenerunt, etc. [ib. *verso*:] Finis . . . Ego Bonus accursius Pisanus: eadem in ea omnia correxi: & emendauui. 4°. C. 1. a. 1. (1.).

129 leaves, without titlepages or pagination; 25 lines to the full page. Pt. 1 has 70 leaves without signatures. Pt. 2 has 59 leaves with sig. a - h 3 in eights.

[Another copy.]

C. 19. c. (1.)

[Another copy.]

G. 7726. (2.)

*Begin.* [sig. a 2 *recto*, preceded by the preface of Bonus Accursius on fol. a 1 *verso*:] Μυθοι Αἰσώπων. Fabulae Æsopi. [A selection of 61 fables, edited in Greek with a literal Latin translation.] Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit: 4°. C. 1. a. 1. (2.)

38 leaves, without titlepage or pagination; 25 lines to the full page; register, sigs. a, b, C, D, E 6 in eights. Fol. a 2 is mutilated.

[Another copy.]

C. 19. c. (2.)

[Another copy.]

G. 7726. (1.)"

<sup>1</sup> British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books: Æsop. London: printed by William Clowes and Sons, Limited, Stamford Street and Charing Cross, 1883. Folio, 34 cols. See cols. 4-5.

5. *The Manchester Copy.*

A letter from Librarian H. Guppy, dated January 28, 1902, kindly informs me that this is the copy described by Dibdin.<sup>1</sup> We may therefore cite the following extracts from his description:

"On the recto of the first leaf is the following address:

Bonus Accursius Pisanus doctissimo ac sapientissimo ducali quæstori Iohanni Francisco turriano salutem plurimam dicit. . . .

On the recto of the following leaf ΑΙΣΩΠΟΥ ΒΙΟC. The Greek life terminates on the reverse of fol. 31, from its commencement. On the recto of the ensuing leaf begin the Fables . . . The fables extend to 36 leaves. On the recto of the ensuing leaf begins a Latin version by Rinutius of the life of Æsop. This continues from sign. a i. to d viiij, in eights: on the reverse of d viiij, are 14 lines, ending with FINIS. On the recto of the following leaf, sign. e, begins the Latin prose translation of the Fables; which ends on the reverse of what should be h iii. in eights, thus:

Finis.

Vita Aesopi per Rynucium thettalum traducta.

Verum quoniam ab eo nonnulla fuerūt præter

missa: fortassis q̄a græcus eius codex esset minus

emendatus: Ego Bonus accursius Pisanus: eadem

in ea omnia correxi: & emendaui.

On the reverse of the ensuing leaf (sign. a i.) is an address, in 17 lines, of Bonus Accursius Pisanus to John Franciscus Turrianus, in which mention is made of the foregoing impression. For the sake of the children of Turrianus, and that they may the more readily understand both languages, Pisanus subjoins some SELECT FABLES from Æsop—'hoc enim pacto uerbum quasi uerbo respondebit sine longa inquisitione'. [After this come the fables in parallel columns.] The signatures (a b C D) run in eights, as far as E; which latter has only six leaves: on the recto of the 6th of which, is the following colophon:

ΤΕΛΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΥ

ΑΙΣΩΠΟΥ ΜΥΘΩΝ

FINIS AESOPI FA

BVLARVM.

<sup>1</sup> Bibliotheca Spenceriana, or a Descriptive Catalogue of the Books Printed in the Fifteenth Century, and of Many Valuable First Editions, in the Library of George John Earl Spencer, K. G., &c., &c., by the Reverend Thomas Frognall Dibdin. Vol. I. London: printed for the author, by W. Bulmer & Co. (Shakespeare Press), 1814. 8vo, VIII, XII, LII and 383 pp. See pp. 221-226.

Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit: qui non do-  
ctorum hominum sed rudium ac puerorum gratia  
hunc laborem suscepit."

6. *The München Copy.*

A courteous letter from Geheimrat Dr. v. Laubmann, Direktor der K. Staatsbibliothek, under date of Feb. 17, 1902, contains the following statements concerning this copy:

"Unsere Bibliothek besitzt von dem griechischen Aesop, gedruckt von Bonus Accursius, nur eine unvollständige Ausgabe, welche Ludw. Hain, Repertorium bibliographicum, unter Nr. \*265 ausführlich beschrieben hat. Wir besitzen also nur Teil 1: Bonus Accursius Pisanus. cum animaduertentem bis τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων und Teil 3: Bonus Accursius . . . in superiore codice, ut nosti, imprimi curauimus uitam et Aesopi fabulas . . . bis zur Unterschrift . . . laborem suscepit. Der 2<sup>te</sup> Teil, die lat. Übersetzung des Rynucius Thettalus, fehlt also in unserem Exemplar."

As Hain's description<sup>1</sup> is well known and corresponds rather closely to that cited above from Dibdin, though much briefer, no specific citations from it will here be necessary.

7-8. *The Oxford Copies.*

Under date of Dec. 20, 1901, Mr. F. Madan, the Acting Librarian of the Bodleian Library, kindly writes enclosing the following descriptions from the pen of the Senior Assistant, Mr. Parker.

"Part 1.

Douce A. 541. Æsop's Life by Max. Planudes, in Greek, A 1 - D 8, showing most of the *signatures* at foot of page; they begin 2¼ in. below the text. a 1. (beg.) Bonus Accursius Pisanus . . . Johanni Francisco turriano salutem . . . Cum animaduertentem . . . a 2. (beg.) Αἰσώπου Βίος. D 8, verso. (end) γεγόνασιν.

Auct. K. 4. 9<sup>o</sup>. Another copy; the signatures cut off.

Part 2.

Auct. K. 4. 9<sup>o</sup>. The Fables, in Greek only. 38 leaves, without signatures, unless they are cut off. (beg.) Αἰσώπου Μῦθοι . . . (end), τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων.

<sup>1</sup> Repertorium Bibliographicum, in quo libri omnes ab arte typographica inventa usque ad annum MD. typis expressi ordine alphabetico vel simpliciter enumerantur vel adcuratius recensentur. Opera Ludovici Hain. Voluminis I. Pars I. Stuttgartiae et Tubingae. Sumtibus J. G. Cottae. MDCCCXXVI. 8vo, 596 pp. See p. 31, col. 2, No. \*265.

## Part 3.

Auct. K. 4. 9<sup>b</sup>. The Latin version of Remicius. a i - [h] iii. a i. (beg.) Vita Aesopi . . . e græco latina per Rynucium facta; d. 8, v<sup>o</sup>, Finis; e i. Argumentum fabularum . . . [h] iii, v<sup>o</sup> (end) Ego Bonus accursius Pisanus . . . correxi: & emendaui.

## Part 4.

Auct. K. 4. 9<sup>a</sup>. The Fables in Greek and Latin, on same pages, a i (eights) - E 6 (Sign. a, b, C, D, E). a i, r<sup>o</sup> is blank; a i, verso, 'Bonus Accursius Pisanus . . . Iohanni francisco Turriano salutem . . . iN superiore codice . . . Vale.' a ii. Μῦθοι Αἰσώπου, Fabulae Aesopi: (end) E 6 r<sup>o</sup>, τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων . . . Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit . . .

Douce A. 541. Another copy, wanting leaves D 8, E 1-6.

The length and breadth of the text in each part is the same, viz. nearly  $5\frac{7}{8} \times 3\frac{3}{8}$ ."

9. *The Paris Copy.*

This copy forms part of the permanent exhibition (VII. 125) in the Galerie Mazarine of the Bibliothèque Nationale, and on July 24, 1897, through the kindness of the officials I was permitted to examine it. Upon this occasion I was able to take the following meagre note concerning its contents. The volume is bound plainly in red leather with full gilt edges, etc. On the back of the binding there have been stamped the words ÆSOPI || FABULÆ || MEDIOLAN || CIRCA || 1480 || TOM || I. On a fly-leaf at the beginning of the volume are the notes: 579 Y, Rés. Yb. 478, Hain 265.

Fo 1 ro begins: Bonus Accursius Pisanus doctissimo ac sapientissimo || mo ducali quaestori Iohanni Francisco turriano || salutem plurimam dicit. The Greek text begins on fo 2 ro, comprising 31 folios; the fables themselves begin on fo 32 ro and continue to fo 69 ro, the verso being blank. The entire volume thus comprises 69 folios.

The book has been officially stamped as follows: Bibliothèque Royale. I. on fos 1 ro and 69 ro; Bibliothèque Impériale. Impr. on fos 2 ro and 32 ro; R. F. Bibliothèque Nationale. Impr. on fo 48 ro.

10. *The Washington Copy.*

Of the two copies which I have been able to personally inspect, the Washington copy alone has been carefully examined. Having



first been made aware of its existence on Mar. 24, 1896, by coming across the following entry in the printed catalogue<sup>1</sup>:

"*Æsopus*. Αἰσωπου Βίος του μυθοποιου. Μαξιμω τω Πλανουδη συγγραφεύς, [and] Αἰσωπου μυθοι. fol. 1-70 unnumb. sm. 4°. [*Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit, Mediolani?* 1480?]"

I was led at the time of publishing the first fascicule of my manual to insert the following statement in a footnote<sup>2</sup>:

"On April 7, 1896, an unsuccessful attempt was made by me to verify this entry; the most that I was able to do was to make a copy of the corresponding entry in their card catalogue, where the book is described as an imperfect copy, etc., etc., preserved in the Librarian's private office. This gentleman, Mr. A. R. Spofford, kindly made a personal search for me, but was obliged to report it as 'unfindable.' The copy in question was acquired by the *Library of Congress* in 1875."

Several subsequent visits to the library while it was still in its old and cramped quarters in the Capitol failed to discover the book's whereabouts, but on my first visit to it after its installation in the then recently completed new library building I discovered on Oct. 8, 1898, the volume which had so long eluded me in a glass case on the second floor in quite an extensive exhibit of incunabula.

Upon this occasion I was enabled to make a careful examination of this copy, and subsequently on Feb. 8, 1902, I again made a study of its many interesting features. The points especially noted by me are the following:

The volume is handsomely bound in full black morocco and full gilt, with both blind and gilt tooling including a sparing use of an ivy-leaf ornament. The tooling consists of a framework design with the ivy-leaf stamped twice at each corner, gold exteriorly, blind interiorly, and is exactly the same on both covers. On the back these words have been stamped: ÆSOPI|FABULÆ|GR.|ED. PRINC.|CIRCA.|1480. The fly-leaves are merely plain white paper more modern in appearance than that used in the body of the text, and the whole aspect of the

<sup>1</sup>Alphabetical Catalogue of the Library of Congress. Vol. I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878. 4to, II and 912 pp. See p. 85, col. 1.

<sup>2</sup>A Manual of Æsopic Fable Literature, a First Book of Reference for the Period Ending A. D. 1500, by George C. Keidel. First Fascicule. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Company, 1896. 8vo, XXIV and 76 pp. (Romance and Other Studies II.) See p. 36, note 1.

binding would seem to indicate that it was executed about the middle of the last century.

The following measurements in millimetres were taken

Binding over all 165 by 225;

Size of leaves 157 by 217;

Size of Roman matrix 98 by 149;

Size of Greek matrix 98 by 148.

Although the Roman matrix of the dedicatory letter to be mentioned presently is apparently one millimetre longer than the Greek matrix, this difference is no doubt due merely to the larger size of type used for it, and the same matrix was probably used for printing the whole of the text as found in this copy.

On the inside of the front cover a label has been pasted which contains the legend: *Library of Congress.* | *Chap. 35* | *Shelf* | *Office.* | *United States of America.* On the recto of the first fly-leaf at the top is the number 531, while the verso of the second fly-leaf contains the following annotations:

Æsopus. | Editio Princeps, 1480 | This is the largest & finest copy known of | the Greek text. 5<sup>a</sup> x 6<sup>a</sup> | *Wants:* 2d pt. 59 folios containing | *Vita A. & fabulæ e graeco latina facta* | also 3d. pt. 35 folios containing | *Fabulae selectae gr. & lat., 2 columns to the page, one greek & the other latin.* 35. Office. No water-marks are discernible on the fly-leaves, on which however the fine parallel lines run horizontally while in the body of the work they are vertical.

Combining the fact already mentioned that this copy was acquired by the Library of Congress in 1875 with the evidence furnished by the notes on the fly-leaves, we may reasonably conjecture that this copy was No. 531 of an auction sale probably held in London, and for which the notes were made by a careless dealer who has allowed himself to make a slip in his English.

The first fly-leaf at the end of the volume has on its recto the note:

Bonus Accursius pisanus impressit. | Mediolani? | 1480?

The second fly-leaf at the end is entirely blank.

Approaching now the body of the book as it left the printer's hands we find that the whole text is intact, and apparently only a small portion of the margin has been removed by the binder's knife. The whole volume is, in fact, in a perfect state of preservation, with the unimportant exception of the first leaf at the beginning and the last two at the end, which have a few spots on

them due to dampness and evidently acquired before the book received its present binding. The recto of the first leaf is also somewhat soiled and the blank verso of the last leaf is very much so, blemishes which must have been caused by much handling previous to binding.

The entire text of this copy consists of three distinct portions, which will here be considered separately. First there comes a short dedicatory epistle in Latin, then a long biography of Æsop in Greek, and then a collection of Fables also in Greek.

The Latin text occupies the whole of the recto of the first leaf, and half of its verso, the remainder of the page being blank. It reads as follows:

*Fo 1 ro:*

Bonus Accursius Pisanus doctissimo ac sapientissimo ducali quæstori Iohanni Francisco turriano salutem plurimam dicit.

Cum animaduertērem quanto ī pretio et apud platonem et apud uniuersam uetustatem Aesopus habitus fuerit: existimaui me facturum rem non in dignam: si græcas eius fabellas & uitam una cū latina interpretatione imprimi curarē: quo diuulgarentur inter omnes: & eas ad te omnium primū qui grauissimus & doctissimus sis: dono mitterē. res enim graues ac seueræ redduntur ueluti mitiores: si suis salibus condiantur. hoc autem fecisse Aesopum ex hoc ad te uolumine cum p otium lectitaueris: non difficulter intelliges. nam huiusmodi fabellæ īter maximas tuas occupationes afferēt tibi: ut existimo: non parum uoluptatis: & ex ea& lectione consules liberis tuis: quo tibi sint ut cæteris in rebus tum in doctrina eloquentia que simillimi. Non enim me latet non licere tibi per occupationes tuas harum rerum lectioni operam dare: at ne indiges quidem: qui & scribendo & loquendo ornatissimus sis & eruditissimus. Verum liberi tui si huic rei studuerint: reddentur propediem & docti & disertī in primis: quos

*Fo 1 vo:*

tu plurimum cupis esse exulta quadam ac perpoluta litteratura. quā itelligis nemini posse e nostris

hominibus absolute contingere : ubi græca& litte  
ra& omnino sint rudes. Cæterum ut ad Aesopum  
redeam : ex eius uita quæ est ueluti totius operis ca  
put : qualis uir fuerit : dilucide cognosces. Est enī  
ut uidebis : & lauta & facetia& plena : quæ dum le  
gitur uel e mortuis risum excuteret. id autem ita  
esse res ipsa idicabit. Nolim enī prolyxiore uti ora  
tione : ne pro uoluptate tædium tibi afferam. Vale  
uir doctissime ac sapientissime : & me uti soles  
ama.

As this epistle affords us evidence of the utmost importance concerning many obscure points connected with the Editio Princeps of the Greek *Æsop*, it will be worth while to scrutinize its various features more closely.

This text has here been reproduced with the utmost care, being given line for line, with every abbreviation, every dot over an *i*, and every punctuation mark carefully noted. It is printed in a large-sized Roman type, and the following peculiarities should be especially noted :

All the single *t*'s are short, being the same height as the vowels, for instance. *ft* and *ct* in every instance form ligatures.

Initial and medial *f* is always long, final *s* always short, except in the words *omnes* and *eas* in the ninth line of the recto page. Double long *f* always forms a ligature, but double *f* does not in *afferit*, although it does in *difficulter* and *afferam*.

Small *æ* is always printed as a diphthong, but capital *Æ* is not.

There are no *v*'s or *j*'s used, except capital *V*'s in *Verum* and *Vale*. A capital *U* does not occur.

The syllable *-rum* is four times abbreviated *R*. An *n* is indicated frequently either by a short line over the preceding vowel, or by a long one. The *p* sign is used only once. The & appears to be overgrown in comparison with the remaining letters.

The punctuation used differs from our modern system in some respects. The periods are triangular in shape, the colons square. A peculiar sign is a "slant colon", either right or left, composed of two triangular dots. The single instance of the left slant colon occurs after the word *redeam* on the verso page.

A full page of the Roman type would have contained twenty-

five lines, but neither of the pages found is complete in this respect.

Passing on to the Greek text, we note that it begins on the recto of the second folio as follows:

*Fo 2 ro:*

ΑΙΣΩΠΟΥ ΒΙΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΥΘΟΠΟΙΟΥ . ΜΑ  
ΞΙΜΩ ΤΩ ΠΛΑΝΟΥΔΗ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΣ.

*π ραγμάτων φύσιν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡκρί*

The whole of the Life of Æsop has been printed as a single huge paragraph extending to fo 32 vo, on which there are only seventeen lines, the last one being:

*τῷ Αἰσώπου θανάτῳ γεγόνασιν.*

At the beginning of the body of this text the printer has left a blank measuring 18 by 28 mm., and extending over five lines. This space was intended to be filled by an ornamental initial, but the rubricator has not done his part, although in the middle of the first line the printer has put a small letter for his guidance.

On fo 33 ro the fables begin with the following heading:

ΑΙΣΩΠΟΥ ΜΥΘΟΙ  
ΑΕΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΛΩΠΗΞ

As a specimen fable the following may serve:

*Fo 40 ro, line 6:*

*Γυνή καὶ ὄρνις*

Γ  
υνὴ χήρα τις ὄρνιν εἶχεν καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν  
ὥδιν αὐτῇ τίκτουσαν. νομίσασα δὲ ὡς εἰ  
πλείους τῇ ὄρνιθι κριθᾶς παραβάλλοι,  
δὶς τέξεται τῆς ἡμέρας, τοῦτο πεποίηκεν. ἡ δ'  
ὄρνις πιμελὴς γενομένη οὐδ' ἀπαξ τῆς ἡμέρας τε-  
κεῖν ἠδύνατο. Ἐπιμύθιον.  
'Ο μῦθος δηλοῖ, ὅτι οἱ διὰ πλεονεξίαν τῶν πλειό-  
νων ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀποβάλλου-  
σι.

These fables continue until fo 70 ro, where at the bottom of the page the last line is as follows:

*ριτας. τέλος τῶν τοῦ Αἰσώπου Μύθων.*

The verso of this last folio is entirely blank.



The fables number one hundred and forty-seven, and are in accordance with Greek usage arranged in alphabetical order except towards the end where disorder prevails.

The spaces regularly left for the rubricator to insert an ornamental initial to each fable give rise to some interesting observations. In the case of the first fable, as we have already seen, this space is five lines high. For the remaining fables it is only three lines high, except in a few instances where the bottom of a page intervening it has been reduced to two lines, once even to a single line. In one instance without apparent reason this space has been reduced to two lines in the middle of a page.

The guiding letter for the rubricator is in every case placed in the upper left-hand corner of the blank space, not in the middle of the first line as was done in the *Life of Æsop*. A full page of the Greek text contains twenty-five lines, but as the leaves have been very irregularly folded the various margins are oftentimes extremely unequal in width. As a specimen page with margins of average proportions *fo 2 ro* was taken, and here it was found that the upper and interior margins were about equal in width, while they were less than half that at the bottom and a trifle more than half the exterior one. As margins depend primarily on the printer, and next on the binder, these proportions would probably vary considerably in other copies of the *Editio Princeps*.

The leaves are numbered in lead pencil (twice) by modern hands on the rectos at the lower left-hand corner of the text. But there are also traces of a much older system of foliation at the lower right-hand corner of the rectos placed quite an appreciable distance from the printed text. These letters and numerals were apparently stamped on the leaves after the printer had completed the body of the text, and probably originally extended throughout the entire volume. Most of them were no doubt later trimmed off by the binder's knife when this copy received its present covering, as only nine leaves now show any remains of what must have been the original marking. The letters used seem to have been Roman capitals interspersed perhaps with a few lower case forms, while the numerals are in every instance Arabic. The type (or stamps) used is much ruder in appearance than that in the Latin text.

The following traces were noticed :


*fo 33 ro* : upper portion of a capital E or F;

*fo 36 ro* : a stamp similar to the preceding;

# ΑΙΣΩΠΟΥ ΒΙΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΥΘΟΠΟΙΟΥ · ΜΑ ΖΙΜΩ ΤΩ ΠΛΑΝΟΥΔΗ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΣ ·

τ ραίματων φύσιν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡκρί  
 βωσαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐ-  
 τὸν παρέδωκαν φέροντες · αἰσωπος  
 δὲ δοκᾷ μὴ πόρρω θειότερας ἐπιτηροί-  
 ασ τῆς ἠθικῆς διδασκαλίας ἀφάμε-  
 ρος, πολλῶ τῷ μέτρῳ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῶν παρε-  
 λάσαι · καὶ γὰρ οὐτ' ἀποφαιρόμενος οὔτε συλλογί-  
 ζόμενος, οὔτε μὴν ἐξ ἱστορίας, ἐν ᾧ πρὸ τῆς κατ'  
 αὐτὸν ἡλικίας ἤνεγκε χρόνος, τῶν μυθεσίαν διὰ  
 τίθεμενος, ἀλλὰ μύθοις τὰ πάντα παιδοτρῖβων,  
 οὔτω τὰς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ἀγράφει τύχας, ὥς αἰ-  
 σχώεσθαι τοὺς λογικοὺς ποιῆν ἢ φρονεῖν, ἢ μήτ'  
 ὀργῖθαι μήτ' αλώπεκες · καὶ αὖ πάλιν μὲν προσέ-  
 χειν ἐκείνοις, οἷς πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἐν καιρῷ μου  
 μεχῶς προσεσχικότα μυθᾶσθαι · ἐξ ὧν, ἃ μὲν κιν  
 δάμους ἐπιτημένους αὐτοῖς διείδρα ἃ δὲ μεγίστης  
 ἐν τοῖς καιρίοις τῆς ὠφελείας ἔτυχεν · οὗτος  
 τοίγῃς ὅτ' οὐ κατ' αὐτὸν βίον φιλοσόφου πολιτί-  
 ας ἔκοντα προθέμενος, καὶ ἔργοις μᾶλλον ἢ λό-  
 γοις φιλοσοφῆσαι, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ ἀμορίου τῆς  
 φρυγίας κατήγε τῆς μεγάλης ἐπὶ κλησὶν · τῶν δὲ  
 τύχην γέγονε δούλος · ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ σφόδρα μοι δοκᾷ

The Greek text wherever cited in this description has been printed in  
 ordinary Greek type. For its appearance in the original, the accom-  
 panying facsimile of the first page of the Greek text (fo 2 ro) may  
 serve as an illustration.



- fo 42 ro: upper portion of a rounded letter ;
- fo 43 ro: a stamp similar to the preceding ;
- fo 44 ro: plainly F 4 ;
- fo 57 ro: apparently part of a letter, thus h ;
- fo 58 ro: H 2 ;
- fo 59 ro: H, ;
- fo 60 ro: plainly H 4.

A trial of the usual system of foliation by quaternions of eight leaves will be found to fit in with these slight fragments. It thus becomes apparent that fo 33 ro originally had an E stamped upon it, probably without a following Arabic numeral as is commonly the case for the first leaf of a quaternion (cf. fo 57 ro where no numeral, or fragment of a numeral, is visible). The numeral 4 has probably been trimmed off of fo 36 ro, as the numerals where preserved are a trifle lower than the letters of the stamp. The curves found on fo 42 ro and 43 ro must be portions of F's probably somewhat blurred. The letter on fo 57 ro must be an H of peculiar shape, as also the letters on fo 58 ro, 59 ro and 60 ro. The small mark after the letter on fo 59 ro must be the upper portion of the figure 3. As the whole volume contains just seventy leaves, the last quaternion must be two leaves short of the usual number.

The ink used in this edition is an intense black, although some pages are noticeably fainter than others, especially fo 54 ro. The signatures are much more blurred, and somewhat fainter than the text.

It is hoped that the above description, besides presenting many features intrinsically interesting in themselves, will also afford a norm with which other copies of the *Editio Princeps* may be compared, as well as other incunabula coming from the same press.

#### DESCRIPTIONS OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHERS.

The evidence afforded by the statements to be found in the various standard bibliographies for incunabula and rare books is rather special in its nature. While on the one hand these descriptions are more widely known among scholars and book-lovers than any of the others which may be found, their value is greatly lessened through the almost unintermitted presence in them of the bibliographer's pet sin of taking his information at second-hand, instead of deriving it from the sources themselves. As the

bibliographers seldom state how much they know themselves, and how much they see through some one else's spectacles, their so well-known descriptions are in reality shrouded in a great deal of mystery when, as in the present instance, we find them varying widely—*omnes inter se differunt*.

The professional bibliographer of this sort is concerned mainly with the description of an edition as an edition, and only rarely does he think it worth his while to refer to the particular copy which he himself may have examined. As I have been unable with the means at my disposal to either harmonize the discrepancies found in these descriptions or decide between the contradictory statements made in them, I will content myself with subjoining a list of the bibliographical descriptions consulted by me.

a. Maittaire, *Annales Typographici*, Hagæ-Comitum, 1719, p. 262.<sup>1</sup>

b. Maittaire, *Annales Typographici*, Editio Nova, Amstelodami, 1733, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 764-765.<sup>2</sup>

c. Panzer, *Annales Typographici*, Norimbergæ, 1794, Vol. II, p. 96, No. 592.

d. La Serna Santander, *Éditions du Quinzième Siècle*, Bruxelles, 1806, Part II, pp. 20-21, No. 27.

e. Hain, *Repertorium Bibliographicum*, Stuttgartiæ et Tubingæ, 1826, Vol. I, Part I, p. 31, col. 2, No. \*265.

f. Grässe, *Trésor de Livres Rares*, Dresde, 1859, Vol. I, p. 31.<sup>3</sup>

g. Brunet, *Manuel du Libraire*, Cinquième Édition, Paris, 1860, Vol. I, Part I, cols. 83-84.

In conclusion I will merely refer to the recent article of Aug.

<sup>1</sup> *Annales Typographici ab Artis Inventæ Origine ad Annum MD. Operâ Mich. Maittaire A. M. Hagæ-Comitum, apud Isaacum Vaillant. M.DCC.XIX. 4to, XIV and 388 pp. (Boston Public Library, \*2200. 17. v. 1.)*

<sup>2</sup> *Annales Typographici ab Artis Inventæ Origine ad Annum M.DCLXIV., operâ Mich. Maittaire A. M. Editio nova auctior & emendatior, Tomi Primi Pars Prior. Amstelodami, apud Petrum Humbert, M.DCC.XXXIII. 4to, VI, XVI and 791 pp. (Washington, Library of Congress, Chap. Z 240, No. M 23 A.)*

<sup>3</sup> *Trésor de Livres Rares et Précieux, ou Nouveau Dictionnaire Bibliographique, par Jean George Théodore Graesse. Tome Premier: A-B. Dresde: Rudolf Kuntze, libraire-éditeur, 1859. 4to, IV and 588 pp.*



Hausrath<sup>1</sup> and the short statements concerning the Editio Princeps to be found in the literatures of Krumbacher<sup>2</sup> and Christ.<sup>3</sup>

GEORGE C. KEIDEL.

<sup>1</sup> *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, herausgegeben von Karl Krumbacher. Zehnter Band. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1901. See pp. 91-105: Aug. Hausrath, *Die Äsopstudien des Maximus Planudes*.

*Geschichte der Byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Oströmischen Reiches (527-1453)*, von Karl Krumbacher. Zweite Auflage, bearbeitet unter Mitwirkung von A. Ehrhard, H. Gelzer. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oskar Beck), 1897. 8vo, XX and 1193 pp. See pp. 543-546 and 897-898. (*Handbuch der Klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, herausgegeben von Dr. Iwan von Müller. Neunter Band, 1. Abteilung.)

<sup>3</sup> *Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur bis auf die Zeit Justinians*, von Wilhelm Christ. Dritte vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Oskar Beck), 1898. 8vo, XIV and 946 pp. See p. 140. (*Handbuch der Klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, herausgegeben von Dr. Iwan von Müller. Siebenter Band).

#### IV.—ON THE NON-EXISTENCE OF *yemi* (*yēimi*), *yēhi* (*yēihi*), *yēiti*, ETC.

The first law in the decipherments and restorations of Zend Philology is to bring the Avesta language, so far as may be possible, into line with the Indian Vedic. As is known, the present writer so long ago as '87 in SBE XXXI<sup>1</sup> advanced the opinion that among the signs of the Avesta Alphabet more than one retained the polyphonic force of its original Pahlavi.

Up to that date, it should be stated for the benefit of those who do not study the Avesta, the Avesta alphabet was supposed to be wholly free from ambiguities.

Conspicuous among the opinions held in view was this, that the Avesta-Pahlavi character, generally reproduced as *ē*, or when lengthened, as *ē̄*, was in some of its more important uses actually the Avesta-pahlavi characters generally reproduced as *y + ā* (or *y + a*).

The clear and irrefutable case where the equivalent of this form is '*yā*' (or '*ya*') in the gen. sg. masc. neut. of nouns in the '*a*' declension was brought forward illustrating the total error of rendering the sign as *ē* in such supposed forms as the *-ahē* reported for the gen. singular masc. neut. of the '*a*' declension,<sup>2</sup> and this was shown to possess convincing force as to other similar falsely reported usages.

Among the various items which I have proposed from time to time were the very prominent verbal forms which I have placed in the heading.

What I first presented was followed by Darmesteter and others; and if these opinions be correct, then we must conclude

<sup>1</sup> See also Zeitschrift D. M. G. '95, III Heft, '98, III, 1901, II.

<sup>2</sup> *-ahē* was strikingly irrational as a gen. sg. masc. neut. of the '*a*' declension, as much so as if we were obliged to account for an Indian *-ase*, in the place of *-asya*, in the most familiar of all terminations; see also the Gāthic *-ahyā* and the old Persian *-ahyā*; there was never such a sound as *-ahē* in such a place as a gen. sing. masc. neut., and leading colleagues have assented to the remark.

that much light must be thrown by them upon still other forms of Avesta Grammar.

As to the unsightly forms above mentioned with their irrational *ē* in *-yēmi* (*yēimi*), *yēhi* (*yēihi*), etc., I should say that I once indeed surmised that the presence of these supposed *ē* sounds in the terminations cited looked backwards towards the original Indogermanic '*e*' which has thrust the Indian '*ā*' and '*a*' for the moment aside from our consideration in our search for the original vowel sounds of the verbal terminations. But after we have seen that the once reported *ē* sounds in the very familiar and important terminations of the gen. s. masc. and neut. have no existence whatsoever, and that they never had any place among real linguistic features in use by persons speaking their vernacular, we look for another explanation of the phenomena in the verbal terminations. And we soon see that the explanation of the origin of our forms there is similar to that pursued before.

The character present in each of these cases of verbal termination, as in many others (see below) positively arose from the misapprehension of a Pahlavi sign which indeed, as I hold (see below), may have expressed *a + i* which are the elements of an *ē*, but which also still more prominently expressed and expresses *y + ā* in the original Pahlavi forms out of which our remarkable Avesta Alphabet was developed. So that the terminations which we have universally read as *-yēmi* (*-yēimi*), *-yēhi* (*-yēihi*), *-yēiti*, etc., etc. (much to the bewilderment of all who have given the matter interior attention) are the result of a complete mistake; and of one quite as irrational as our supposed *-ahē* for a gen. sg. m. n. of the '*a*' declension, and perhaps even more offensive to the philological instinct, though this last might be saying too much. And this explanation is fully corroborated by the occasional usages of *our Avesta text itself*, which sometimes leaves us no loophole to escape into our blunder; for the *Avesta itself* at times actually reads the normal forms *-yāmi*, *-yahi*, etc. fully in accordance with the Indian, see below on page 322. The sign which we have supposed to be *ē*! in the *yēimi* (!) of the *-ya* verbs is simply *-yā*, a survival of the original familiar Pahlavi form without which *-yā* at one time could hardly have been written, and without which it could never have been naturally written.

I do not produce the original characters here, as this might cause inconvenience or expense, but the reader will find them

used in the *Zeitschrift* of the German Oriental Society as cited in the note above.<sup>1</sup>

The first item which an objector should notice is that I am obliged to render our compositum as *-yā* for the first personals and as *-ya* for the 2d and 3d. To this we must say at once that uniformity in equivalence is precisely what we must not look for in the developments of these transitional forms, and above all not just here and in reference to this *ā* and *a*, for the Avesta scholars of the early centuries were in fact just *beginning to use* the Pahlavi form which stands for long *ā* as the Avesta form now used for the *shortened a*, as the equivalent of which it now stands, for they were just inventing all the now prevalent regular signs for the shortened vowels, they (the short vowels) having never before been expressed in writing, so far as we are now aware. All the short vowels (and not merely the short 'a', as in Indian) have been always inherent in the consonants of the Pahlavi Alphabet, save the 'a' privative which has no consonant before it. The usage, therefore fluctuated, as a matter of course, at the formative, or reformative, period of reconstruction, when the Avesta Alphabet was just emerging from the Pahlavi. And the Avesta Alphabet partook and still partakes to some degree of the notorious characteristic of its parent, the Pahlavi Alphabet, which was polyphonic in the extreme. That the Avesta Alphabet partook only to a slight degree of this characteristic of its mother was all the more natural because it (the Avesta Alphabet) was especially invented for the purpose of removing the original and long prevalent ambiguities, though it could not be expected to have retained no lingering trace of the agitation.

Another objection should be at once pointed out, which is that by this rectification we are left with a redundant 'y'. We have already here in our erroneous forms, *-yēimi*, etc. before us the fully written Avesta 'y' of the *-ya* verb; when therefore we decipher our character (until lately mistaken for an *ē*) as being simply in fact our needed *y + ā*, an expected relic of Pahlavi usage, we have on our hands an additional unnecessary and redundant 'y'; for beside the fully written Avesta 'y' we have our ancient compositum with the same 'y' in its meaning, which meaning is *y + ā* (or 'y + a').

To this the answer is that here we have an instance of a

<sup>1</sup> As well as in my *Gāthas*, Vol. II, and IIIa; see also at many places in the Latin notes to the texts in Vol. I.

redundancy not nearly so irrational as some others which appear in the still halting Zend alphabetical forms, with our still more imperfect transcriptions of them.

For our lingering and redundant 'y' was originally by no means so useless as one might at the first glance suppose. It was obviously left in its place in the endeavor to save us from the very error into which we have fallen. The intention to abandon the use of our compositum for  $y + \bar{a}$  (or ' $y + a$ ') was beginning to be formed within the scattered schools of Avesta Philology, and an Avesta  $y + a$  was purposely inserted before our character here to guide the readers against the coming use of this sign for  $\epsilon$ , which use was not applicable here in the first, second, and third personals of the *-ya* verbs, and therefore not to be written with that slight prolongation of one extremity which alone distinguishes the form at present known as ' $\epsilon$ ' from its fellow character of the same shape; that is to say, from the actual Pahlavi original of our  $y + \bar{a}$  (or  $y + a$ ) and from the same form when standing for 'š', sh.

The fully expressed Avesta and later characters for  $y + \bar{a}$  were inserted to save us from writing ' $y\epsilon$ ', just as the otherwise so irrational 'a' was left before ' $\epsilon$ ' in *Daēva*, etc. (as to which see *Gāthas* Vol. IIIa, p. xv). This correctly written Avesta 'y' is a portion of that once wisely inserted ' $y\bar{a}$ ', and it has been left in the word like other fragments as débris, and just as also a now useless and extinct 'a' has been left clinging to our sign for  $\bar{n}$ , which originally represented an 'an'; see also the unnecessary nasalism long  $\bar{a}$  before *m* in  $y\bar{a}m = y\bar{a}m$ , etc. This last is especially useful as an illustration; for the redundant nasalisation once pointed to the now so well expressed nasal 'm'. The  $\bar{a}$  which originally stood after our redundant 'y' disappeared in consequence of its having been already and originally expressed in the sign which we have mistaken for an  $\epsilon$  (in the falsely deciphered *yēimi*).

Or, *vice versa*, we might say (on the other hand) that the redundancy consists in the presence of the first half of this our sign till lately mistaken for ' $\epsilon$ ', but which cannot possibly mean anything but  $y + \bar{a}$  here; so that we have in fact in either case a doubled 'y' upon our hands as in *yyāmi*, *yyahi*, etc., just as we have a superfluous 'a' in our sign for ' $\bar{n}$ ' which was originally 'an', a superfluous anticipation of the nasalisation in our 'a' for *a* before 'm' in  $y\bar{a}m$ , and in our 'a' before ' $\epsilon$ ' in *d(a)ēva*, etc.

My answer is that we should simply do as our predecessors did with the superfluous *a* in our present sign for ' $\bar{n}$ ' which was 'an';



we should in our transcriptions ignore and *omit* our first superfluous sign for 'y', or we should bracket it, as our form is *-yāmi*. There is most certainly no *-yeimi* (nor *-yemi*) whatsoever, nor ever were there such forms, nor is there any *-yēhi* (*-yēhi*), nor any *-yeiti*, nor *-yeñti* in any *-ya* verbs in the Avesta language. The words end in *-y(y)āmi*, *-y(y)ahi*, *-y(y)ati*, *-y(y)anti*; see Indian *-yāmi*, *-yasi*, *-yati*, *-yanti*; and also the actual Avesta forms quite rationally written as *-yāmi*, *-yahi*, *-yati*, *-yañti*; and all the forms should be so transcribed, if transcribed at all.

Although wishing to avoid statistics here, I cannot refrain from citing Avesta

<i>jaiðyāmi</i>	<i>zayayāmi</i>	<i>zayayāhi</i>
<i>frāvayāmi</i>	<i>saočayāhi</i>	<i>paiðyāñti</i>
<i>verezyāmi</i>	<i>frāvayāhi</i>	<i>išudyāmahi</i>

and the other nine (odd) forms of the first person pl.; so of the conjunctive e. g. *taurvayāma*, etc. all read *-yā* in the *-ya* verbs.

<i>jaiðyañti</i>	<i>yañti</i>	<i>šyañti</i>
<i>davayañti</i>	<i>rāzayañti</i>	<i>šyañti</i>
<i>yañti</i>		

So of the third pl. med. all (?) the *-ya* verbs have *-yañta*, each form being perfectly rational. How could an ancient Iranian have said *-yāmi* at one moment like his Indian kinsman, and then this *-yeimi* at the next at the next (no dialectical influence being here present in any shape).

P. S.—Objectors should not ask for instances of absolutely pure Pahlavi of an unequivocal character in the Avesta Alphabet; yet we have these in the otherwise exclusively Pahlavi characters, in the compositum for *h* (or 'hw', which in no sense requires the elevation of the *v* (or *w*)). Both the signs are absolutely pure Pahlavi, and both are otherwise totally excluded from the Avesta Alphabet, which has but one and a different sign for 'h' (though at times abbreviated) and but one and a different sign for this particular interior *v* (or 'w') in other occurrences.

## V.—VICA POTA.

In the *Ludus de morte Caesaris*, that scurrilous but amusing diatribe against the deceased Claudius, Seneca briefly mentions Vica Pota, one of the obscurest of the many obscure Roman deities. The passage in question occurs in 9, 4 and reads as follows: "Proximus interrogatur sententiam Diespiter Vicae Potae filius, et ipse designatus consul, nummulariolus: hoc quaestu se sustinebat, vendere civitatulas solebat."

The earliest reference to the goddess is found in Cicero, *De Leg.* II, 11, 28, "Virtutes enim, non vitia consecrare decet. araque vetusta in Palatio Febris et altera Esquilis Malae Fortunae detestanda, atque omnia eius modi repudianda sunt. quod si fingenda nomina, Vicae Potae potius vincendi atque potiundi, Statae standi cognominaque Statoris et Invicti Iovis, rerum expetundarum nomina, Salutis, Honoris, Opis, Victoriae." Such at least is the reading of the codices, but the majority of editors would bracket as glosses the gerunds *vincendi*, *potiundi* and *standi*. Whether we grant or deny that Cicero derived the name Vica Pota from *vinco* and *potior* has little bearing on the aim of this investigation, for we have certain proof that in the early Empire the goddess Vica Pota was completely identified with Victoria. The evidence may be seen in the passages next cited. Livy II, 7, 12, after telling how, in the first year of the Republic, P. Valerius aroused suspicion by beginning to erect a house on the summit of the Velia, and how, in indignation at the fickleness of the people, he decided to build at the foot of the hill, says: "Delata confestim materia omnis infra Veliam, et, ubi nunc Vicae Potae est, domus in infimo clivo aedificata." Plutarch, *Poplicola* 10, gives the same tradition (ὅπου νῦν ἱερόν ἐστὶν Οὐίκας Πότας); and Asconius, in his commentary on Cicero's oration *In Pisonem* 52, shows the popular identification of Vica Pota and Victoria by his statement: "Iulius Hyginus dicit . . . P. Valerio Volesi filio Publicolae aedium publice locum sub Veliis, ubi nunc aedis Victoriae est, populum in lege quam ipse tulerat concessisse."

Without exception, every scholar who has treated the subject identifies Vica Pota with Victoria and follows the lead of Cicero,

or the interpolator of Cicero, in deriving the name itself from  $\sqrt{\text{vik}}$ , seen in *vinco*, *victor*, etc., and  $\sqrt{\text{po-t}}$ , seen in the Sanskrit *patis*, Greek *πάσις*, Latin *potis*, *posse*, *potior*. That is to say, Vica Pota is the victorious possessor, or the goddess powerful in victory.

But how explain "Diespiter Vicae Potae filius"? So far as I know, there is no myth which names Victory as the mother of Jupiter (or rather Diespiter, for Seneca distinguishes the one from the other). It might be possible to identify Vica Pota with Victoria, and at the same time explain "Diespiter Vicae Potae filius", by recalling the Greek myth according to which Zeus supplanted his father, Kronos, and in so far might be called the son of Victory. Yet if Seneca had a Greek myth in mind, why did he give the two deities distinctively Latin names?

Buecheler, in his annotated edition of the Apocolocyntosis, says that the point of the jest seems to lie in the double reference to victory in war and victory in private gain. Diespiter is not only victorious in war, he is also a kind of money-broker, who gets rich by selling the rights of citizenship. In a word, he is one of the Emperor's freedmen, who employed their great influence to acquire wealth. Buecheler also thinks that the god is called Diespiter because under that name he was worshipped by the Fetiales, whose ritual Claudius restored (cf. Suetonius, Claud. 25), and that his relation to war is manifested by the genealogizing addition, "Vicae Potae filius." Preller, Röm. Myth. II, 245, follows the usual tradition in identifying Vica Pota with Victoria, but admits that in the Seneca passage she seems to be a goddess of gain. His theory that Vica Pota may possibly be identical with the Etruscan Lasa Vecu has little probability and no helpfulness. Ball,<sup>1</sup> following Schenkl, points out the fact that Cicero apparently identifies Dispiter and Pluto with Plutus, and that Phaedrus calls Plutus the son of Fortuna. He further suggests that "Seneca . . . may have held a reminiscence of some of these associations in view of Diespiter's financial dealings."

The comments of Buecheler and Ball, however plausible they may be, certainly fail to give a satisfactory explanation of the jest in its entirety. I wish to offer an interpretation, radically

<sup>1</sup> The Satire of Seneca on the Apotheosis of Claudius, p. 201. He cites Cicero, De Nat. Deorum II, 26, 66, "Terrena autem vis omnis atque natura Diti patri dedicata est, qui Dives, ut apud Graecos Πλούτων, quia et recidunt omnia in terras et oriuntur a terris"; Lactantius, Inst. Div. I, 14; Phaedrus IV, 12, 5; and others.

different in its nature from those already mentioned, and based primarily on the etymology of Vica Pota.<sup>1</sup> According to my view, Vica Pota is derived from  $\sqrt{\text{vik}}$  and  $\sqrt{\text{po-t}}$ , the former not the root meaning "to conquer", but that meaning "to enter", as seen in Skr. *viç* = settlement, community, people, and *veça* = village; Gk. *oikos*; Lat. *vīcus*. Vica Pota, then, is the same as Skr. *viçpati* (Epic *viçām pati*) = lord of the people (epithet of Agni), and fem. *viçpatnī* (Vedic, as applied to the fire of attrition); Zend *viçpaiti* = master of the people; Lith. *vėszpatis* = lord (only of god and the king); Old Pruss. *Waispattin* (fem. acc.) = *matrem familias*.

In seeking to trace the history of the word down to its transformation into the classical Latin form, several possibilities present themselves. From the pro-ethnic nature of the word we might have expected it to come down as *vicpotis*; but it would have been difficult for such a form to survive unchanged, as the combination *cp* was apparently unknown to the Latin language<sup>2</sup> and, therefore, must have sounded harsh to the Roman ear. Again, we have seen that in Sanskrit there was a form with the first member inflected, *viçām pati*, as well as the compounded *viçpati*. So we might postulate a Latin form *vicōm potis*, weakened to *vicōm potis*. Finally, the word may have been, according to the regular laws of composition in Latin, *vicopotis*, weakened to *vicupotis* or *vicipotis*. Whether it was *vicom potis* or *vicupotis*, we must suppose that it was corrupted to Vica Pota partly through the popular derivation from *vinco* and *potior*, partly from the analogy of such forms as *Anna Perenna*, *Dea Dia*, *Fauna Fatua*, *Aius Locutius*, etc.

If this etymology is correct, then Vica Pota means not "she who conquers and possesses", or "the victorious possessor", but "the mistress of the people", or "the mistress of cities".<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In his *Religion u. Kultus d. Römer*, Müller's Handbuch V, 4, 196, Wissowa seems to me to be far astray when he says that some of the ancient grammarians derived Vica Pota from *vinco* and *potior*, others from *victus* and *potus*, and that Seneca probably had the latter derivation in mind. On the contrary, the "*Victua et Potua*" of Arnobius (III, 25) have nothing to do with Vica Pota, but are analogous in formation and meaning to those other deified abstractions, *Educa*, *Cuba*, *Statina*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> I have been unable to discover any native Latin word with the combination *cp*.

<sup>3</sup> Following the proposed etymology, it is probable that the *i* is long—Vica Pota. Cf. *oikos*, *vīcus*.

It is quite possible that the Romans of Cicero's time and later were mistaken in identifying Vica Pota with Victoria. Now to what goddess above all others should the epithet "Mistress of Cities" be applied? And what goddess was the mother of Jupiter (or Diespiter)? The evident reply is Cybele, the Great Mother, of whom Lucretius II, 606-7, says,

Muralique caput summum cinxere corona  
Eximiis munita locis quia sustinet urbes.

We have already seen that Claudius restored the ritual of the *Fetiales*, whose patron god was Diespiter (cf. Buecheler, l. c.); and it is also known that he interested himself in the worship of Cybele.<sup>1</sup> With his scholarly and antiquarian leanings, so undeservedly ridiculed by ancient and modern writers, it is well within the bounds of probability that he may have identified Vica Pota with Cybele, and thus afforded Seneca an opportunity for his jest, "Diespiter Vicae Potae filius".<sup>2</sup> In "Diespiter . . . et ipse designatus consul, nummulariolus", we see a probable reference to one of the Emperor's rich freedmen, who used his high position for financial gain (cf. Buecheler, l. c.). The additional explanation is then volunteered that he made his living by selling the rights of citizenship, than which nothing would more naturally be at the disposal of the son of Vica Pota, the Mistress of Cities.<sup>3</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER.

CHARLES HOEING.

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Showerman, *Trans. A. P. A.* 31, 58, and *The Great Mother of the Gods*, Bull. No. 43 of University of Wisconsin, p. 270.

<sup>2</sup>From the first introduction of the rites of Cybele into Rome, she seems to have been connected with Victoria. When the sacred image was brought from Pessinus in 204 B. C., it was deposited in the temple of Victoria on the Palatine, and remained there until 291, the date of the dedication of the temple newly erected for Cybele. Was this merely a prophecy of victory over the Carthaginians? Probably, though it has occurred to me that in the minds of the people Vica Pota may have been the connecting link between the two goddesses.

To identify the temple of Vica Pota "infra Veliam" with the shrine of Cybele shown in the relief on the tomb of the Gens Hateria (cf. Showerman, *The Great Mother*, p. 313) would be a conjecture altogether too rash.

<sup>3</sup>It is hardly necessary to remark that the identification of Vica Pota with Cybele may be rejected without affecting the acceptance of the proposed etymology.




## VI.—A MEDICAL PAPYRUS FRAGMENT.

Among the writer's Greek papyri there is one, unfortunately mutilated, which, while not precisely literary in character, presents some points of more than ordinary interest. Like the Oxyrhynchus papyrus CCXXXIV, it contains a series of medical prescriptions. Where alternative remedies for the same ailment are given, they are introduced by *ἄλλη*, much as in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus, which employs *ἄλλο*. Parts of three remedies are preserved in the fragment. It is not clear for what the first was designed, but alum (*στυπτηρία*) and a sort of wax ointment scented with rose (*κηρωτὴ ροδίνη*) were among the drugs recommended. The previous wiping (*προαποσμήχειν*) of the part affected or of some instrument or utensil used, is also enjoined. The second disorder prescribed for seems to have been leprosy; no other way of completing *λεπρ*[ seems more probable. It is doubly annoying here that the lines should be fragmentary, in view of the interest attaching to this disease and to ancient methods of dealing with it. Two treatments are prescribed. Of the second of these practically nothing remains. The first seems to have consisted in part at least of external applications, perhaps of some ointment in which dry pitch and possibly the blossom of some plant were ingredients. It is possible, however, that the word partly lost before *τοῦ ἄνθους* was *χαλκοῦ* and that the reference is to that *ἄνθος χαλκοῦ*, as the ancients called the scaly 'efflorescence' formed on the cooling surface of the heated metal; cf. the scholium on Nicander, Th. 257. As in the first prescription, the instructions include a wiping (*περιμάσσειν*), here probably of the part affected, perhaps to remove any excess of the substance applied that might remain. Or as the noun lost before *ψυχρῷ* seems to have modified *περίμασσε*, the wiping may have been intended to cool and soothe the diseased parts. Galen's expression, *περίματτε σπόγγῳ θερμῷ* (14, 424, 3) suggests *σπόγγῳ ψυχρῷ περίμασσε* here; but the last trace before *ψυχρῷ* cannot belong to *ω*. It might be *ι* of *σπογγῶι*, but adscript *ι* does not appear elsewhere in the papyrus.

As in the case of the Oxyrhynchus prescriptions, these are written on the *verso* of a papyrus the *recto* of which had previously been used for some document, probably an account, as several amounts in artabae of grain are clearly legible on the *recto*. While the *recto* preserves no date, the hand is of a sort common in the second century A. D., and the later use of the papyrus for the medical prescriptions probably fell in the second or third. It thus belongs in time as well as in subject matter, with the Oxyrhynchus medical papyrus already mentioned. The papyrus came from Kôm Ushîm in the Fayûm. It measures cm. 6 by 16. The hand is a well-formed and fairly regular semi-uncial, not of the best literary type, but very far removed from the ordinary cursive hand of Roman documents. The spaces, such as are sometimes called "half-paragraphs", in ll. 6 and 13, seem further to favor the view that the manuscript was not a mere private copy, made for the writer's own use, as many literary works written on the *verso* of old documents doubtless were, but a more careful and formal writing, perhaps designed for sale. The only punctuation is a high point in l. 6, at the end of the first prescription. A blank space of cm. 2 is left after it before the beginning of the second prescription, and a similar space seems to have been left (l. 13) before the third. The lines are from the upper part of the column, and cm. 1. 7 of the upper margin are preserved. Little if anything is lost from the right-hand margin of the column; at the left something is lost, but how much cannot be certainly determined; hardly less than four or five letters, however, for the lost beginning of l. 8 pretty certainly contained the concluding letters of ξη[ρᾱς and the opening letter, or letters, of ?χ]αλκοῦ, and probably some intervening word or words, besides.

		] δις μινος στυπτηρ
ιας?		]ε κεκαυμενης δι
		]η κηρωτη ροδινη[
		]μα προαποσμηξ[
5. as		]θει την επειφανεια[ν?
		]επει δει· λεπρ[
		] . . υρου λ [ πισης ξη[
ρας	? χ]	αλκου του ανθους
		]κοψας εμβαλε εις κ[





10.           ]λκου πυρος χρωτι[  
               ]ξη ενχριε εις δερ  
               ]ι ψυχρω περιμασσε[  
               ] αλλη πυ[ . ]ιτυ . εν  
                   ]αιου παλαι  
 15.           ].(    ) . . . ομθιν (    ) π[  
                           ]ν λι  
                           ]υρι  
                           ]αν[

Here the papyrus breaks off.

5 *l. ἐπιφάνειαν*

7 *l. πίσσης*

Many forms and sorts of *στυπτηρία* (alum) were known to Greek writers on medicine; *σχιστή*, *στρογγύλη*, *ἀστραγαλωτή*, *χαλκίτις*, *τριχίτις*, *πλινθίτις*, *πλακίτις*, *ύγρά*, *Αἰγυπτίη*, *Μηλίη*, are some of the names applied to them. The first letter of l. 2 might belong to *στυπτηρ[ια]ς*, were it not that ll. 7 and 8 lead us to expect a greater lacuna at the beginning of lines. Even as it is, *κεκαυμένης* probably limits *στυπτηρ[ιας]*. *Κηρωτή ροδίνη* (l. 3), the *ceratum rosaceum* of Appuleius, seems to have been a recognized preparation of the ancient pharmacopoeia. *Προαποσμήχειν* too (l. 4) is met with in Dioscorides (1, 144) Oribasius (2, 417, 9) and Galen (13, 374 C). *Ἐπιφάνεια* (l. 5), while not primarily a medical term, is used by medical writers in describing symptoms. Paul of Aegina, for example, says that leprosy manifests itself in *τραχυσμὸς ἐπιφανείας*. The restoration *πίσσα ύγρά* is suggested by Dioscorides (1, 95), who speaks of *πίσσα ύγρά* and *πίσσα ξηρά*: *ἡ δὲ ξηρὰ πίσσα ἐψομένης τῆς ύγρᾶς γίνεται· καλεῖται δὲ αὐτὴ ὑπ' ἐνίων παλίμπισσα*. That Theophrastus too recognized the same distinction, though under a different terminology, is implied in his *πίττα ὠμή*; and the corresponding *πίσσα ἐφθή* occurs in Hippocrates. The imperatives *ἐμβαλε* and *ἐνχριε*, ll. 9 and 11, recall some of the directions of Galen and of the Oxyrhynchus prescriptions, where imperatives singular and aorist participles largely constitute the verbal mechanisms.

A third medical fragment, of a more formal character than the two mentioned, is preserved in the Cairo Museum (No. 10160) and will be found in the University of Chicago Decennial Publications, Vol. V, pp. 5, 6.



## REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

CARLO PASCAL, Prof. nella R. Università di Catania: *Studii Critici sul Poema di Lucrezio*: Roma-Milano, Società Editrice Dante Alighieri di Albrighi, Segati & C., 1903. Pp. viii + 218.

The study of Lucretius is still in its infancy. Excesses which would not be condoned in treating of other authors are applauded in an editor of the Roman philosophical poet. One who can stand aloof and consider dispassionately the almost countless modifications introduced into the text of Lucretius by Brieger and Giussani, cannot well help being perplexed. Taken singly, most of the changes seem plausible; viewing them in the mass, reason revolts. The first duty of the scholar is to understand and interpret the text as it stands. This is, to be sure, no easy task in the case of Lucretius; for he is not one of those writers who are their own best interpreters. The subject-matter is often obscure, and the allusions must necessarily be lost to one who has not an intimate knowledge of the common stock of philosophical ideas current in the schools of the first century B. C. That fund of ideas was derived from the entire course of Greek thought from Thales onward; chiefly, indeed, from the pre-Socratics, but also from Plato, Aristotle, and their successors.

There remains much to be done in the way of interpreting the traditional text of Lucretius, even after the successful labors of Munro, Brieger and Giussani, not to mention lesser names. Pascal, as we shall presently see, has shed light on some dark places where others had despaired. But what shall be done when one meets insuperable difficulties? The answer of our generation has been that the text must then be reconstructed, chiefly by means of transpositions. If a reasonable number of such changes satisfied the critical judgment, we should welcome the expedient; but the transpositions are so many and the plausible reconstructions are so conflicting that they must give us pause.

Nevertheless we are not to conclude that the criticism to which the *De Rerum Natura* has been subjected has proved to be futile. It has changed the aspect of the work, even if not one of the proposed alterations should be adopted. This new Ptolemaic system of cycles and epicycles has naturally produced a reaction, and many sober-minded scholars now either abandon or at least reduce to a minimum the resort to the makeshifts of the interference of a putative editor, of the confusion created by copyists, and of detached paragraphs written by the poet and wrongly placed when entered into the text.

What we most need at present is clearly a more fully defined conception of the method followed by the poet in the composition of his treatise. The story that he wrote parts in lucid intervals is a theory in regard to the composition of his work. Further suggestions were made by Lachmann and Munro, but their views were not worked out sufficiently in detail to account for all of the difficulties encountered. More recently the direction of the inquiry has changed; but we need now to return to the old question, deriving suggestions for its solution from the rich store of observations collected in the newer literature.

The last decade has been productive of much good work in elucidation of Lucretius and of the Epicurean philosophy of which he is an exponent. Italy is conspicuous for the honorable part she has borne in these contributions: not to speak of matters of less importance, the elaborate edition of Lucretius by the lamented Giussani, and these critical studies by Pascal deserve to be counted with the best work done in this field.

Indeed, comparison of these two scholars is inevitable and I am tempted to characterize them, but refrain. Suffice it to say, that, though Pascal has not touched upon so many points in controversy, his work, possessing as it does the distinction of sound learning and sober judgment, is quite as valuable as that of his countryman. This mental balance is perhaps best seen when Pascal is engaged in defending the text. Editors are agreed in indicating a lacuna after I. 43. Brieger and Giussani regard vv. 50-61 as part of an older recension of the poem. Brieger is unable to find a place for them; Giussani assigns them a position after v. 145. Pascal (p. 1 ff.) shows how within the space of the six verses crowded out by the intrusion of II. 646-51 the gap *may* be bridged and the thought satisfied. It is not necessary to maintain that the connection was really such as Pascal assumes; but it is enough to have shown that, admitting a lacuna, the text may stand without further change.

Another illustration will serve to show the intimate knowledge Pascal has of the earlier systems. In I. 784 f. the MSS show:

hinc ignem gigni, terramque creari  
ex igni, retroque in terram cuncta reverti . . .

Here all recent editors substitute *imbrem* and *imbri* for *ignem* and *igni* and *a terra* for *in terram*. Pascal adopts the last-mentioned change as unquestionably necessary, but defends the rest of the text by citing Heraclitus, fr. 76 (Diels) apud Max. Tyr. XII. 4, p. 489:  $\xi\eta$   $\pi\upsilon\rho$   $\tau\acute{o}\nu$   $\gamma\eta\varsigma$   $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$   $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$   $\xi\eta$   $\tau\acute{o}\nu$   $\pi\upsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$   $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ ,  $\upsilon\delta\omega\rho$   $\xi\eta$   $\tau\acute{o}\nu$   $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$   $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ ,  $\gamma\eta$   $\tau\acute{o}\nu$   $\upsilon\delta\alpha\rho\omicron\varsigma$ . Diels has interchanged  $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\gamma\eta\varsigma$ , and it may be that in so doing he correctly reproduces the thought of Heraclitus; he may be right also in assuming that the addition of  $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$  was due to the Stoics; but these considerations cannot affect the text of Lucretius. It is clear that the MSS correctly report what the poet wrote. Whether

Maximus Tyrius and Lucretius are authentic witnesses to the doctrine of Heraclitus is another question.

This leads me, however, to speak of a point at which Pascal seems to me sometimes to be wanting in caution. When he has shown in regard, say, to Heraclitus or Empedocles, that the account of Lucretius tallies with the report of the doxographers, he at once concludes that the doctrine is authentic, because, as he asserts, our poet had first-hand knowledge of their writings. But some of the statements in question are clearly not direct reports but interpretations of what was actually said. Hence, when in such cases Lucretius agrees with the doxographic accounts it is hardly to be assumed that he is speaking on his own authority. However familiar Lucretius may have been with the primary sources of early Greek thought, he must have had also some secondary sources for his knowledge of it. These secondary sources were doubtless the writings of Epicurus and the doxographic tradition. Hence, instead of asserting categorically that a given tenet was a part of the philosophy of Heraclitus and not an accretion of the Stoics, on the ground that Lucretius so stated it, it would be wiser to claim only that such was his opinion: the possibility of error must be conceded to be quite as great on his part as on the part of the doxographers.

But there are matters of greater moment to which we must now proceed. Pascal believes that the teachings of Aristotle exerted not a little influence in shaping the doctrines of Epicurus. In this he is clearly right. However we may discount the learning of Epicurus, it is self-evident that one who attempted to reassert the atomic philosophy would be confronted by the strictures which Aristotle had so lavished upon it. Indeed, numerous instances could be adduced of the revision of the doctrines of the Atomists by Epicurus in consequence of Aristotelian criticisms. One such has been clearly pointed out by Pascal (p. 49 ff.). It relates to the difficult chapter of the *partes minimae*, Lucr. I. 599-634. Pascal accounts for this curious innovation by referring to the reiterated declaration of Aristotle (*de anima* 409<sup>a</sup> 13 ff., *de gen. et corr.* 326<sup>b</sup> 1 ff., *phys.* 240<sup>b</sup> 8 ff.) that the ἀμερές—that which has no parts—cannot have motion, or if it have, only κατὰ συμβεβηκός. But motion is of course an indispensable property of the atoms; hence, if one allows the force of Aristotle's arguments, the atoms must have parts. Yet, to remain atoms, they cannot have separable parts: hence the singular doctrine contrived by Epicurus. This view I now accept as correct, although I had myself looked to other criticisms of Aristotle for an explanation of the point.

The influence of Aristotle made itself felt also in other ways. The *coniuncta* and *eventa* are a case in point. Pascal (p. 16 ff.) has vindicated the assertion of Munro (note on I. 449) that in Epicurus συμβεβηκός and σύμπτωμα are synonyms, and that 'coniuncta and eventa appear to have been devised by Lucretius

himself to distinguish the two kinds of συμβεβηκότα or *accidentia*, the καθ' αὐτά or *per se*, and those not so.' The distinction thus practically coincides with the Aristotelian, which divides qualities into essential (permanent) and non-essential (transient). In the Atomists the difference between qualities primary and secondary nearly, but not quite, coincided with the difference between essential and non-essential qualities resulting from the Platonic-Aristotelian logic. The intention was the same; the points of view differed. The Atomists took for their point of departure the conception of physics which recognizes the validity of no qualities but the universal properties of mass; the Socratic ethics, from which conceptual logic sprung,—in this agreeing with the science of chemistry,—accorded permanent value to properties distinctive of a class of beings not absolutely all-inclusive. It was not unnatural that, in an age when all schools acknowledged the primacy of ethics, the Epicureans should have adopted the view of the Aristotelian logic.

It is an opinion stoutly maintained by many scholars that the doctrines of the Epicureans made no progress during the continuance of the school, the system remaining precisely as it sprang from the head of the founder. Pascal pronounces the view sheer nonsense (*una fola*, p. v.), and finds evidence to disprove the notion in the notorious doctrine of the declination of atoms (Lucr. II. 217-293). He holds (p. 131 ff.) that the conception of the declination set forth by Lucretius and Cicero is a later development, due in part to error and in part to the criticisms and suggestions of the Stoics. He discovers a reference to the original form of the doctrine, as propounded by Epicurus, in Laert. Diog. X. 61: οὐθ' ἡ ἄνω οὐθ' ἡ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων φορά, οὐθ' ἡ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν. ἐφ' ὅποσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχη ἐκάτερον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φοράν σχήσει, ἕως < ἂν τι > ἀντικόψη, ἡ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν. According to Pascal the declination was merely the curve resulting, by the composition of forces, from the action of gravity upon a body moved laterally by the impact of another. The swerve would be the infinitesimal deviation from a right line of the body so moving and approximating a path straight downward.

The theory is cleverly conceived, but rests upon too slight a foundation, especially in view of the entirely different conception presented by Lucretius and Cicero. As I read the argument presented by Pascal, I wondered whether he had carefully considered Lucr. II. 288 f.

pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant  
externa quasi ui.

The passage, taken in connection with the context, would seem to offer a slight support even in Lucretius for the view extracted from the letter of Epicurus. Yet, even so, the theory appears too hazardous. Epicurus has been so much abused for his supposed



origination of the doctrine of the declination of atoms, that more arguments are hardly needed to prove it illogical and inconsistent with the remainder of the system. Against all this we can only refer to the well-known fact that Epicurus was extremely concerned to assure man of freedom of action, and to the equally notorious fact that philosophers, ancient and modern, especially such as accepted the fundamental conceptions of materialism, have, in their efforts to escape fatalism, resorted to many a *salto mortale*. Hence this would seem to be a clear case for the exercise of the sceptic's *ἐποχή*.

However that may be, Pascal is clearly right in insisting, with Giussani, that the last phrase in the passage just quoted—*πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν*—should not be set aside as a scholion, as Usener proposed. He accepts (p. 213) the reading *αὐτοῖς γνωστὰ* in Laert. Diog. X. 68, proposed by me (A. J. P. XXIII, p. 193). In the difficult passage X. 43, discussed by me, *ibid.* p. 189, he thinks (p. 113 f.) to maintain the MSS reading, only supposing a lacuna after *εἰ μέλλει τις μή*. His interpretation, however, is not satisfactory. I may be permitted here to state that Professor Diels assures me that Bruns' report of the MSS reading in X. 43 (Lucrez-Studien, p. 32, n. 1), as *εἴτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις*, is incorrect (see A. J. P. XXIII, p. 185); but Professor Diels accepts the correction *κατὰ πάντα*, which I there proposed.

It is hardly fair, with Pascal (p. 27), to interpret Laert. Diog. X. 69 οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερ' ἅττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα by saying 'cioè espressamente è affermato che quegli *αἰδία* sono nell' intima struttura del corpo.' Epicurus merely desires to affirm that qualities are not *additions* to a body, acquired, as e. g. in Plato, by *μίθεξις* with an incorporeal idea; but are of the essence of the body, depending upon its atomic composition. He also misinterprets the words of Zeno, Laert. Diog. VII. 140 ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωματικῶν οὐ κατεχόμενον, when he says (p. 33) 'definiva il vuoto come l'incorporeo che può essere occupato dai corpi, ma che non è *dentro* i corpi.' The whole point lies in the opposition of οὐ κατεχόμενον τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι.

On p. 54, n. 2, Pascal makes Democritus, according to Laert. Diog. VII. 35, charge Anaxagoras with plagiarizing from him the doctrine of the *Νοῦς* as the fashioner of the universe. It is of course only an amusing slip due to hasty reading. In VII. 34 Democritus is reported to have said that the notions of Anaxagoras touching the sun and moon were old and had only been appropriated by him; in 35 it is stated that he scoffed at the opinions of Anaxagoras regarding his *διακόσμησις* and the *Νοῦς*. On p. 124 Pascal misapplies the Stoic term *φύσις* in Laert. Diog. VII. 156. The word has there its widest signification, applied to the universe as matter possessed of the potency of development. There are also many minor errors of the compositor, as when we read *porta* for *poeta* Agrigentino (p. 89), *posse* for *porro* in Lucr. I. 587 (p. 105), Hirschel for Hirzel (p. 115).



I cannot take leave of the book, which I have endeavored to represent fairly, without expressing my opinion that it is one of the best dedicated in recent years to the study of Lucretius, and also my hope that its author will continue the work he has so well begun.

IOWA COLLEGE, GRINNELL,  
July 9, 1903.

W. A. HEIDEL.

Aeli Donati quod fertur Commentum Terenti. accedunt Euphrasi commentum et Scholia Bembina. recensuit PAULUS WESSNER. Vol. I. Leipzig, Teubner, 1902, pp. L. 542.

The world has waited long for a critical edition of Donatus' commentary. Schopen, who as early as 1821 published his dissertation, 'De Terentio et Donato eius interprete', began to accumulate the materials for such an edition. Reifferscheid and Wissowa continued the work and their collations have been generously placed at the disposition of Wessner, a pupil of Goetz, whose competency for the present undertaking had been shown by his articles, "Die Ueberlieferung von Aeli Donati Commentum Terenti", Rhein. Mus. LII (1897) pp. 69-98 and "Untersuchungen zur Lateinischen Scholienlitteratur", Bremerhaven, 1899. Noteworthy investigations and contributions to the text have been made by Dziatzko, Sabbadini, Rabbow and other scholars to whom Wessner makes due acknowledgment. In the preface 36 MSS are enumerated, some of which have been used for the first time by Wessner. The text is based in the main on the seven superior MSS which are free from the interpolations and corrections of the Itali. The oldest of these is A, the codex Parisinus 7920 of the eleventh century, the next oldest B, the codex Vaticanus Regin. 1595 of the thirteenth century, both unfortunately incomplete; the rest being of the fifteenth century, as are all of the inferior MSS.

Having made, myself, many years since a collation of A, I can attest the extreme accuracy of Wessner's report of its readings (in Euanthius II 2, p. 16 he does not note that A has *quinq; ptito* for *quinquepartito*). The relation of the MSS to each other is fully discussed in the preface and a rather intricate stemma is given on p. xxxiii. The earlier editions of Donatus are passed in review, and the various bodies of Scholia examined in their bearing on Donatus. Perhaps not sufficient attention is paid to the Scholia Parisina of codex Parisinus 7899, which have never been published *in extenso*. Wessner admits that they were derived from a more ancient MS than A, but he rarely cites them. In many cases however they contain readings which are elsewhere found only in A, and so help to establish the authority of that MS. A conspectus of the variants of these scholia would, it seems to me, have added to the value of the edition. I give here a few readings from my own collation, citing page and line of

Wessner's edition. 37, 18 *temptat* omitted by A, *teneat* TC, *tentat* V. 19, *periculumque* with A. 38, 10 *orbem* with A. 40, 1 *actu* with A, perhaps to be accepted as a dative. Wessner prints *actui* as he does *adventui* 323, 16 where B has *adventu* elsewhere found as a dative. 40, 10 *Chremen* with A. 44, 1 *nunc animum advertite non nunc vitio dent.* 44, 11 *de eo* with A. 50, 9 *adulatrix* with A, 52, 9 *moderata aequalitas* with ATCV which makes against Wessner's emendation *aequa levis*. In the appendix he accepts Rabbow's emendation to *aequa talis*. 54, 11 *mandamus* with A, 15 *adverbialiter* with A, 56, 14 *quo* with A, 60, 5 *extra natum* with A 69. 19 *collisus* with A, 75. 9 *stringitur* with A, 80, 2 *ex coniectura* with A, 84, 17 and 19 *confidit* with A, 96, 15 *fas nefas velis nolis* with A, 99, 9 *sumite* 102, 8 *nam nec sic consentiret ad nuptias* 10, *dolet autem se non habuisse spacium consilio*, 103, 1 *pro axioma* more suo.

The present volume contains only the commentary on the *Andria* and *Eunuchus*. For convenience of reference the editor has put on the margin the number of the line of the play. In an appendix of over forty pages he refers more fully to the discussions and views of other scholars, showing that little has escaped him, which bears directly or indirectly upon Donatus. We note that two American scholars, Hendrickson and Kirby Smith, "Archaisms of Terence" are referred to, while Dr. Hoeing is thanked for putting his collation of T (codex Vaticanus 2905) at the service of the editor. The great improvement made in the text can best be judged by comparing it page by page with that of Klotz. While on the whole very conservative, Wessner has admitted many conjectures of other scholars, and not a few corrections of his own, but his judgment is uniformly good. Many asterisks remain however in passages, where all attempts to restore the original text seem to Wessner unconvincing. E. g. *Eun.* 689, *at ego \*edessionum sequor*, where various scholars have suggested *Helenium*, *Acronem*, *Aelium Stilonem*, *Suetonium*, *Isidorum*, the asterisk stands to tempt still further inquiry. Schoell's proposal to read *Αἰδέσιον* (*aedession<sup>um</sup>*) is noted with apparent approval in the appendix. *And.* 54, we find '*metus magister*' *\*is quoque\**. Cannot *is quoque* perhaps be a corruption for *isagogus* which has intruded itself into the text as a gloss on *magister*? cf. Corp. Gloss. IV. 102. 2. *Isagogus instructor litterarum*. *Eun.* 939, we find in the text *cui contrarium Sallustius \*fuit de deliciis militum loquens*. Comparing Donatus on *Andria* 36, *cui contrarium Vergilius ait, fuit* would seem to be a corruption of *ait*. Cf. also the commentary on *Ad.* 1. 1. 47, 4. 5. 8; *Hec.* 5. 2. 3; *Phorm.* 1. 1. 11; in all of which *ait* is used with *contra*. Porphyrio however, *Horace* C. 1. 20. 10, has *Huic contrarium Plautus in Trinummo fecit* so that *fuit* may be a corruption of *fecit* as it evidently is in *Lucan* in the subscriptio to the scholia of *Liber I. SIDONIVS SUBDIAČ FVIT*. In *And.* 337. Wessner following *Stephanus* reads *FUGIN HINC comminantis est et abigentis a se*;

*argueatis* is the reading of A. *arguentis* BTCV. Perhaps Donatus wrote *arcentis*, as *arceo* and *arguo* are often confused in MSS. Eun. 315. Wessner reads *quam accuraverit fames*. Some may prefer the emendation of Goetz, *macerauerit*, or Sabbadini's *attenuaverit*, but as Terence in the next line uses *curatura*, I think Wessner is justified in keeping *accuraverit*.

On p. 14 the emendation *appotis* credited to Leo, belongs also to Bentley. Andria 473 we find a note not given by Klotz IVNO LUCINA *Iunonis filia*. *Graece ΕΙΔΕΙΘΥΙΑ*. *Latini Nixos dicunt*. This must be added to the few references given by the Dictionaries for *Nixi*. Cf. Festus pp. 174 and 177 and Roscher's Dictionary. The new edition also furnishes some new words And. 788, *subpalpatio*, Eun. 236, *morologia*, Eun. 240, *obiurganter*, Eun. 537 *amusus*. We have also a new instance of *oricula* = *auricula* in Eun. 539. Whether *intersumptam* is to be accepted, And. 286, on the evidence of TC. may be doubted, for A has *interfunctam* (= *interpunctam*?) V, *interruptam* which through the vulgar form *interrumptam* may have given rise to *intersumptam*.

The quotations from other authors embedded in Donatus especially from Sallust and Lucilius are often improved in form, and in the case of passages still doubtful, we have at any rate now a reliable apparatus from which to proceed to further conjectures. All in all we congratulate Wessner on the way in which he has accomplished his difficult task, and we await with impatience the concluding volume which will contain not only the commentary of Donatus and the other plays, but also the commentary of Eugraphius and the Scholia Bembina.

MINTON WARREN.

Sénèque le Rhéteur Controverses et Suasoirs, Traduction Nouvelle, Texte Revu par H. BORNECQUE, 2 tomes, Garnier Frères, Paris.

The assiduous labors of Leonard Spengel in the field of Greek Rhetoric, begun just seventy-five years ago, promised to give a lasting impulse to this long neglected branch of philological research, but his influence practically died with him, and the great bulk of his own work now possesses little more than a historical interest and value. This apathetic attitude of classical scholars was doubtless the direct outcome of that indifference to beauty of form and stylistic elaboration for its own sake which generally distinguishes the latter half of the last century. Rhetoric was all but synonymous with bombast and affectation, and it cannot be denied that something of this connotation in *malam partem* still clings to the term, but the last two decades have witnessed a remarkable revival of rhetorical studies in all directions, and the movement thus inaugurated bids fair to continue unabated.

While the despotic sway which Rhetoric exercised over literary expression in antiquity was too conspicuous to be lost sight of,

its profound influence was perhaps more felt than demonstrated. The area, so to speak, in which it moved, the stylistic manifestations which it produced, the means, as it were, which it employed to realize its objects and the effect which it had upon the development and character of literature in general, all these problems had not been exhaustively studied or methodically analyzed. This is happily true no longer and, in consequence, we to-day possess a far deeper insight into the forces and elements which to so large an extent made classic literature what it is. With many of the secrets of its irresistible fascination already disclosed, a juster and fuller appreciation and a more unclouded, critical perspective than had hitherto been possible has been acquired.

This great advance was brought about in the first place by the appearance of scientific and up-to-date editions of works like Cicero's *Orator* and *de Oratore*, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian and the *Dialogus* of Tacitus, of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Dionysius *περὶ ὑψους* and the *de elocutione*. Minute investigations into the nature and scope of prose rhythm and the utilization of its laws for textual criticism, no less than the attention bestowed upon rhetorical features in the exegesis of classical authors generally, also reveal the progress and intensity of modern rhetorical research. On the other hand the comprehensive and exhaustive works of Volckmann, Gerber, Blass, Peter, Norden, to mention only these, give a vivid idea of the manner in which our horizon has been extended within less than a generation.

Among the works rescued from the disastrous tidal wave that has swept away so many of the masterpieces on Ancient Rhetoric, the *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae* of the elder Seneca have always occupied a unique position as a priceless source of information for the history, development and influence of Roman Rhetoric, and yet no commentary has appeared for more than two centuries, although readable texts have repeatedly been published.

It was, therefore, natural to look forward with a keen expectancy to the work under notice, written, as it was, by a scholar favorably known by his accurate and acute researches into the *numerus* in Cicero, Pliny and Tacitus, and the fact that this new edition of Seneca Rhetor had been crowned by the French Academy augured well for the book.

A careful examination of its contents has, however, rudely shattered these expectations. A satisfactory exegetical edition of Seneca Rhetor still remains as great a desideratum as ever.

While this criticism is made deliberately, it may yet involve an injustice, in that M. Bornecque may possibly maintain that it was not his intention to supply an exhaustive commentary. In his preface, at least, he disclaims originality for his notes and no reference to them is made in the title page. Moreover, the collection of French translations of Latin classics to which this work belongs doubtless precluded a scientific and elaborate treat-



ment of the subject. But even on this plea, it were difficult to say, what class of readers the editor can have had in mind. It may fairly be questioned that there exist, even in France, many men of general culture who, though incapable of reading the Latin original, will be fired with an irresistible desire to peruse a work like that of Seneca Rhetor. But even if such there be, the Latin text printed below the translation, in so small a type as almost to preclude its perusal, seems a gratuitous addition, and yet it alone has chapter and paragraph numerals and all the lemmata of the notes refer to it.

The introduction is doubtless designed solely for this hypothetical lay reader, for it is elementary, superficial and commonplace, with the possible exception of a long passage virtually paraphrased from the *Dialogus* of Tacitus, although all reference to this fact is wanting, while a citation from G. Boissier to whom the book is dedicated, is duly credited.

The translation itself, though somewhat free, is, if a foreigner can presume upon an opinion, an admirable piece of work. The text upon which it is based, deviates from that of Müller in some 600 places<sup>1</sup> and, so far as I have compared the variant readings, Bornecque has shown a sound critical method and good judgment.

It is in the very brief commentary that M. Bornecque seems to have been quite unmindful of the question, '*Quis leget haec?*' His notes can be of no possible use to the reader for whom the Introduction and Translation are evidently designed, for there are pages filled with citations which will presumably be unintelligible to one in need of the translation, not to mention a great number of bald references to authors not readily accessible, even supposing that they were known to him. If, on the other hand, these notes are intended only for scholars, as, indeed, stray citations from a German dissertation, an allusion to Otto, *Sprichwörter*, to an article by Morawski, to the Roman *Prosopographia*, to Mommsen's *Strafrecht* and others seem to suggest, they are wholly inadequate. Thus not the slightest attempt is made to analyze the style of Seneca with a view to determining whether the diction as revealed in the prefaces is any way differentiated from the language which the rhetoricians are made to use, for only in this way can we discover to what extent the author's marvellous memory has succeeded in reproducing the original discussions. There is scarcely a trace touching upon the problems connected with the sources of the rhetorical themes themselves, and this is the more inexcusable, as Bornecque might have found considerable material on the subject in Simonds' *The Treatment of the Themes in Seneca Rhetor*.<sup>2</sup> The commentary,

<sup>1</sup> B. has given a list of these deviations and, in several instances, a special justification of his readings in the *Rev. de philol.* XXVI, pp. 360-378; XXVII, pp. 53-63.

<sup>2</sup> It is possible that the editor touched upon these matters, in his '*Les declamateurs et les declamations après Sénèque le père*', a book not accessible to me.



in fact, virtually consists of a mass of more or less relevant parallelisms in thought, culled chiefly from Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Seneca, and Quintilian. The entire collection is useful in that these passages are now made easily available, there being also not a few which we owe, so far as I can see, to the editor's own reading.

In matters of detail, Bornecque's comment is often open to criticism. Thus 'Sénèque le poète' and 'Sénèque le philosophe' are constantly distinguished from 'Sénèque le rhéteur'<sup>1</sup> and he shrewdly suggests that these cognomina were devised to differentiate the *three* authors. That is, of course, true, only these epithets were given in *modern* times! Ancient authors<sup>2</sup> and our MSS know of no such distinction between the poet and philosopher, nor am I aware that any scholar of repute now denies their identity. In contrast with this unwarranted scepticism Bornecque still ascribes to Quintilian the *Declamationes* which have indeed passed under his name, but his authorship is now well recognized as an impossibility.

Quite a startling discovery is revealed by the citation, (e. g. Vol. I, p. 298) *l'auteur des Gesta Romanorum* and *l'auteur du Violier des Histoires Romaines* (e. g. Vol. I, p. 303), but their names are unfortunately still withheld.

Lucretia and Virginia, we are told, are often quoted by the rhetoricians as stock examples of virtue, the former is, however, mentioned more frequently as being of an earlier date!

In Contr. II 1, 26 the phrase '*amorem describere volo*' occurs, on which the editor remarks (p. 317), that it is probably an imitation of Anacreon's, θέλω, θέλω μανῆναι—θέλω, θέλω φιλῆσαι—θέλω λέγειν Ἀρπείδας, but these Anacreontics were not composed till centuries after Seneca's time!

But there is no use in multiplying illustrations of this exegetical nature, and I conclude by repeating that an adequate edition of Seneca is still to be written. In this work only the translation and the care bestowed upon the text can be conscientiously praised.

I believe Bornecque to be capable of better things, and it is devoutly to be wished that he will yet utilize his wide knowledge of Seneca Rhetor by giving us an exhaustive edition of the author that will satisfy modern scientific demands. It is not a Herculean task and, in any case, one that is "des Schweisses der Edlen werth."

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, N. Y.

A. GUDEMAN.

<sup>1</sup> Bornecque prefers 'le père' on the ground that Seneca never taught rhetoric!

<sup>2</sup> With the one exception of Sidonius Apollinaris who is notoriously untrustworthy in such matters.

## REPORTS.

REVUE DE PHILOGIE, Vol. XXVI.

No. 3.

1. Pp. 257-62. *Κόρου Πεδίον*. Acute and interesting discussion, by Bruno Keil, of the position of this place, mentioned in two inscriptions on the monument of a Bythinian named Μηνᾶς, who was killed in the battle between Lysimachus and Seleucus. The gaps in the inscriptions are convincingly filled.

2. Pp. 263-71. H. de la Ville de Mirmont publishes an article, to be continued, on the Nenia. See below, No. 4, pp. 335 ff.

3. Pp. 272-8. Isidore Lévy discusses the significance of the term *πατρόβουλος*, reaching the conclusion that it does not mean "patronus" (see above, pp. 224 ff.), but designates the son of a *βουλευτής*.

4. Pp. 278 f. F. Hiller de Gaertringen publishes for the first time an inscription in which *πατρόβουλοι* are mentioned in connection with *βουλευταί*. (See pp. 224 ff., pp. 272 ff.)

5. P. 279. C. E. Ruelle cites a hitherto unpublished example of the word *ἀπότολμος*, in which it means "audax" (not "in-audax").

6. Pp. 280 f. Franz Cumont adds a note to his article (pp. 5-11), incidentally explaining the expression "ubi ferrum nascitur", which appears in Greek as *ἐνθα ὁ σίδηρος τίκτεται*, as referring to a belief (cf. Strabo v. 2, 6, p. 224 c) that as iron was removed from the earth in certain localities, fresh iron grew in its place.

7. Pp. 282-90. The conjunction "cum", by F. Gaffiot. An animated reply to the article of Lebreton (pp. 192 ff.). These articles throw no light upon Latin syntax, and a *précis* of them may well be omitted.

8. Pp. 291-300. A new document relating to the confederation of the Cyclades, by J. Delamarre. The document is an inscription found on the island Heraclea in 1860, but now on Amorgos. The date is probably in the second half of the third century B. C. The author gives a fac-simile, the text in ordinary Greek, and a translation, and then draws several interesting conclusions from it as to the confederation.

9. Pp. 301-325. The Macedonian influence in the Cyclades in the third century B. C., by J. Delamarre. An elaborate investigation based on eight inscriptions, six of which are reproduced.

10. Pp. 325 f. Book Notices. 1. Academicorum philosophorum Index edidit Segofredus Mekler. Berlin, 1902. Favorably noticed, and analyzed, by Pierre Bovet.

No. 4.

1. Pp. 327-34. Critical notes on the letters of Alciphron, by Mondry Beaudouin, apropos of an edition as a doctor-dissertation by M. A. Schepers.

2. Pp. 335-48. H. de la Ville de Mirmont concludes his discussion of the *Nenia* begun pp. 263 ff. In these articles the author, starting out with the fact that the Senate at Rome rejected the proposition of certain senators that the *nenia* should be sung at the funeral of Augustus (Suetonius, Octavius Augustus C), gives an elaborate and instructive account of the origin and history of the word and of the things that it denoted.

3. Pp. 349-53. L. Parmentier discusses Soph. Oed. Tyr. 10 f. Though he reads v. 2 *τάσδε μοι*, he says the stress is to be placed on *μοι*. Others, reading *τάσδ' ἐμοί*, have correctly taken the same view. What seems to be new in this discussion is that in v. 11 *δείσαντες, ἢ στέργαντες* (without *οὐ*) present the alternatives contained in *τίνι τρόπῳ* in v. 10, and that *ὡς θέλοντος ἂν κτέ.* is to be construed with *στέργαντες* = "par amour (ou, pour rendre plus spécialement le sens de *στέργαντες*, par affection filiale) dans la pensée que je suis disposé à vous prêter toute assistance".

4. Pp. 354-9. The adjective *ἐξάντης* (Plat. Phaedr. 244 E), by L. Parmentier. An examination of all the known examples of this adjective (which, as is well known, is employed chiefly as a medical term to denote recovery from disease) leading to the conclusion that probably it was first employed in mystic, religious phraseology.

5. Pp. 360-77. The text of Seneca the Elder, by Henri Bornecque. An enumeration of the six hundred departures of the author's text from that of H. J. Müller, with some explanations of the reasons for the readings adopted.

6. Pp. 378-91. The Parisian MSS of Gregory of Nazianzus further discussed (see pp. 44 ff.) by A. Misier.

7. Pp. 392-9. Critical discussion of five passages of Tibullus, by A. Cartault.

8. Pp. 400-403. Latin studies, by F. Gaffiot. The author remarks that sometimes the words that form set phrases (*locutions fixes*) may happen to be grouped as in those phrases, while each word really has its ordinary separate signification. He thus explains the exceptional constructions of "quid est quod", "ut qui", and "praesertim cum". [The Hellenist will recall *δεινὰ ποιεῖν, μὲν οὖν*, etc.]

9. Pp. 404-18. Book Notices. 1. Robert Brown, *Researches into the origin of the primitive constellations of the Greeks, Phoenicians and Babylonians*. Vol. II, London, 1900. Reviewed by Paul Tannery, who finds this volume characterized by the same qualities and faults as the first volume. He points out several special errors and regrets that the author fails to distinguish between hypothesis and established fact. 2. Euripidis *Fabulae ediderunt R. Prinz et N. Wecklein*. Vol. I, pars III. *Hecuba*. Editio altera quam curavit N. W. Leipzig, 1901. Quite favorably mentioned by E. Chambry, who finds a few things in which he does not agree with the author. 3. Euripidis *Fabulae ediderunt R. Prinz et N. Wecklein*, vol. III, pars V, *Troades*. Leipzig, 1901. Brief criticism by E. C. similar to the preceding. 4. Euripide *Alceste con introduzione e note di V. Brugnola*. Torino, 1901. Briefly, but favorably, mentioned by E. Chambry, as a work exhibiting thorough acquaintance with modern scholarship without pretension to originality. 5. *Lysiae orationes*. Recensuit Theod. Thalheim. Leipzig, 1901. Both editions ("maior" and "minor") reviewed very favorably by Albert Martin. 6. *Syntaxe latine d'après les principes de la grammaire historique par O. Riemann*; 4<sup>e</sup> éd. revue par Paul Lejay. Paris, 1900. Highly commended in a few words by L. D. 7. *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, by Otto Richter. 2 edition. München, 1901. Brief and commendatory account of the work by Ch.-Ant. Dubois. 8. *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, by G. Wissowa. This work, forming part of the great manual of I. von Müller, is analyzed and highly praised by J. Zeiller. 9. *Caesar's conquest of Gaul*, by T. Rice Holmes. London, 1899. L. Laurand finds this work exceedingly valuable, and advises all students of Caesar to read it. 10. Paul Monceaux: *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à l'invasion arabe*. I. Tertullien et les origines. II. Saint Cyprien et son temps. Paris, 1901-2. J. Lebreton reviews this work at some length. He commends the author for not following the German method of placing philological above literary matters, and yet complains that he has not given more complete philological information, especially in regard to the Latin Bible of Africa, which the author has shown to be of African origin and not an importation from Italy. The reviewer regrets also that the author seems not to be versed in other departments of Christian literature, but recognizes his admirable knowledge of that literature in Africa. 11. Joseph Fabre. *La pensée antique de Moïse à Marc-Aurèle*. Paris, 1902. Reviewed by J. Lebreton. The work is the first volume of a series that is to bring the history of human thought from Moses to Tolstoi; and it is what one would naturally expect it to be. The reviewer cites some painfully amusing examples of the sad results of so ambitious an undertaking. 12. *Incerti scriptoris Byzantini Saeculi X Liber de Re militari*.—Recensuit R. Vari, Budensis. Leipzig, 1901. Favorably mentioned by



Paul Tannery, who makes some comments on the MSS of the work.

The *Revue des Revues*, begun in No. 1, is completed in this number.

MILTON W. HUMPHREYS.

HERMES XXXVII 1, 2 (1902).

First Fascicle.

Die Familie des Alcibiades (W. Dittenberger).

Alcibiades the colleague of Cleisthenes 510 B. C. cannot have been the grandfather of Alcibiades the famous son of Cleinias. Isocrates is right in stating, XVI 26, that he was the greatgrandfather, and we must recognize an intermediate generation: Cleinias I, trierarch 480 B. C. and Alcibiades II, father of Axiochus and Cleinias II. The *latter* was father of the famous Alcibiades III. The identification of Cleinias II with Cleinias I by Plutarch (Alcib. I) is certainly an error. Alcibiades II is referred to in Plat. Euthyd. 275 A. the epithet *ὁ παλαιός* notwithstanding; also in Thuc. V 43, 2 and elsewhere.

Vergil und die Ciris (Friedrich Leo).

Franz Skutsch in 'Aus Vergils Frühzeit' (Leipzig, 1901) has undertaken to prove that the Ciris is a work of Gallus, and that the verses and passages common to it and Vergil's poems were borrowed by the latter. The Gallus-hypothesis is not new, but Skutsch's presentation has revived interest in it, and so Leo tries to show that the incongruities S. finds in Eclogue X do not exist. Gallus the warrior, placed in bucolic surroundings, is the key to the understanding of the poem, and the verses, which according to Servius (v. 46) were taken from Gallus, could just as well be Vergil's. Likewise, Eclogue VI is not a 'catalogue' poem and admits of a perfectly satisfactory interpretation. Gallus' poem on the Grynian grove is indeed cited (v. 72); but there is no proof that the other myths enumerated represent so many *epyllia* of Gallus. The number alone makes this wholly incredible. The crowning argument of S. is that Eclogue VI 74 ff., refers to the Ciris; but Vergil cites the form of the Scylla myth, which the Ciris rejects. A detailed comparison proves the priority of Vergil's works. The Ciris then must be placed shortly after 19 B. C. It is an excellent example of a belated Neoteric. The style of Catullus and Lucretius is plainly imitated, at the same time the author shows the influence of Vergil's genius.

Demokrits angebliche Leugnung der Sinneswahrheit (Adolf Brieger). To show in how far we may trust our senses Democritus wrote his *κρᾶννῆρια*. Nevertheless, that he distrusted the evidence of the senses was believed from the time of Sextus



Empiricus until Hirzel in 'Untersuchungen über Ciceros philosophische Schriften I' (1877) showed that there was an essential agreement between Epicurus and Democritus in this matter. P. Natorp's 'Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Alterthum' (1884) revived the old charge. Against him Brieger contends that D. placed a rational trust in the senses. The difficulty lies less in the conflicting and largely *ex parte* testimony than in D.'s psychology. For his doctrine that thought is produced by the direct influx of images independent of ordinary sense perception, coupled with his distinction of *γνώμη γνησίη* and *σκοτιή* apparently supports the view that he rejected the evidence of the latter. Hasty generalization led D. to believe that we think in pictures; but, unaware of the difficulty of the problem, he did not attempt to show how. Epicurus failed in this very attempt, and too much stress must not be laid on the picture-thoughts. Sextus and Natorp err in calling them the *γνώμη γνησίη* or *λόγος*, which they say was the *κριτήριον* of D. instead of the *αἴσθησις*. For D. recognized τὰ φαινόμενα as *κριτήρια* (cf. Sext. VII, 140). By *γνώμη σκοτιή* he must have meant the crude acceptance of things just as they seem; whereas he believed that the errors of sense should be controlled by reasoned observations, and that the sum of facts thus established, such as weight, heat, mobility, etc., furnishes the material for the *γνώμη γνησίη*.

Ein neuer Brief Hadrians (Ulrich Wilcken).

The Imperial decree, marked No. 140 among the 'Griechische Urkunden' of the Museum of Berlin, and hitherto attributed by W. to Trajan, turns out to be by Hadrian, with interesting results.

Die Bauinschriften des Heiligthums auf dem Djebel Shêkh Berekât (Wm. K. Prentice).

This epigraphical study reveals a form of worship by which the walls of a Temenos were built (circa 69 A. D.—137 A. D.) in sections, by families and individuals, in striking analogy with Nehemiah, ch. 3. Each section had its inscription Διὶ Μαδβάχῳ καὶ Σελαμάνει κ. τ. λ.; the former identical with Διὶ Βωμῶ, the god worshiped in a similar way at Burdj Bākīrḥā near by (the Syriac word *madhbah* means altar); the latter the same as the Assyrian God Shalmānu; a curious union of a local with a foreign god.

Relief von dem Grabmal eines rhodischen Schulmeisters (F. Hiller von Gaertringen und C. Robert).

This joint publication has for its subject a relief (vid. plate p. 121), which seems to have served as an ornamental facing to the doorway of a tomb near ancient Ialysus. On the left Hieronymus, a teacher, surrounded by his pupils, then follows the world of the blessed with H. again next to Pluto, thirdly Nemesis commanding the wicked to depart to Tartarus. The first scene resembles the two mosaics interpreted as the Platonic Academy (Mittheil. d. röm. Inst. XII, 1897). An epigram on the base of a stele found south of Rhodus, beginning with the

words [r]pá[μμ]a[r'] *ἐδίδαξεν ἔτα πεν[τήκ]ον[θ' ὅδε]* | δύο τ' ἐπὶ τοῦτοις, καὶ εὐσεβῶν [χ]ωρός [σφ' ἔχει] bears such a number of striking analogies with the frieze, that it seems not unlikely that this base once stood at the entrance of the same tomb. Hiller v. G. adds a note on the Tloians.

Eine lateinische Babriosübersetzung (M. Ihm).

Among the few Latin pieces of the Amherst Papyri the most important, No. XXVI, contains a Latin translation of two fables of Babrius, with the Greek text of three, written in the third or fourth century. Apart from a number of gross errors, the papyrus furnishes a glossary of some value.

Miscellen.—Wilhelm Crönert discusses the name and certain inscriptional forms from Ormela, a populous district of imperial times, on the confines of Phrygia and Pisidia, a region carefully explored by J. R. S. Sterrett.—O. Seeck adduces a new point to prove the date 324 A. D. for the overthrow of Licinius, which, however, Mommsen, in a subjoined note, does not admit (vid. *Hermes* XXXVI, p. 602-5); Seeck also discusses recently discovered coins, which show that Constantinople had its name as early as 325 A. D., hence the date 328 A. D. adopted by Th. Preger (*Hermes* XXXVI, p. 336) on the authority of late and untrustworthy Byzantine writers is wrong, but see Miscellen below.—Georg Wissowa declares the monthly sacrifice in Vergil *Ecl.* I, 42 ff., to be a birthday celebration according to a Hellenistic custom.—Max Ihm. Zur römischen Prosopographie.

#### Second Fascicle.

Aus Vergils Frühzeit (P. Jahn). Skutsch tried to show *inter alia* that vv. 31-69 of *Ecl.* X were in the main selections from Gallus (vid. F. Leo above). But vv. 31-43<sup>a</sup>, 65, and 67-68 are direct imitations of Theocritus, whom Gallus probably did not even know (vid. *Ecl.* VI 1). On the other hand in vv. 43<sup>b</sup>-64, all imitation of Theocritus suddenly ceases with the introduction of Gallus' Lycoris. These indeed may be due to Gallus (vid. Servius, v. 46), interspersed, however, with Vergil's own. As regards the Ciris it is clear from passages common to it and Vergil's *Eclogues* and *Georgics*, studied in the light of Theocritus and Homer, that the Ciris was not by Gallus, but by a later poet, who imitated Vergil.

Die griechischen Personennamen bei Plautus (Karl Schmidt).

A contribution to a comprehensive study of proper names in P., begun by Fr. Ritschl and continued by E. König.

Philatas von Kos (Wilhelm Crönert).

Φιλίτας and not Φιλήτας (or Φιλητῆς) was the name of the *Coan* poet.

Karneades' Kritik der Theologie bei Cicero und Sextus Empiricus (C. Vick). It is generally accepted that Cicero's *De Nat.*

Deor. bk. III and Sextus Empiricus' Adv. Mathem. IX 137-193 were drawn from Clitomachus, the expounder of Carneades' philosophy. A comparison reveals that each gives only an extract of Clitomachus and that Sextus on the whole is more reliable. Cicero used his source freely, often carelessly, and not only adds illustrations to suit Roman taste, but expands the Academic arguments. Similar studies of the De Divinatione, De Fato and the Academica are promised, with a view to reconstruct a picture of Carneades' philosophy.

Thymele und Skene (Wilhelm Doerpfeld). In answer to E. Bethe (vid. A. J. P. XXIII, p. 338) D. shows that the terms *ἀγῶνες θυμελικοί* and *σκηνικοί*, which occur in inscriptions anterior to the first cent. B. C. instead of proving that *θυμέλη* meant orchestra and *σκηνή* stage, merely indicate a distinction, recognized by Aristotle, of performances with the *σκηνή* (i. e. play-house) as their ideal centre, from others that were grouped about the *θυμέλη*, placed in the centre of the *ὀρχήστρα*; although both performances alike, in classical and Hellenistic times, took place in the *ὀρχήστρα*. The *θυμέλη* was strictly the raised pavement beside or around the altar, on which the sacrificing priests stood. This pavement was also termed *πρόθυσις*, *ἔδαφος* and *δάπεδον*. *Θυμέλη* was not a general term for foundation like *θεμέλιον* (vid. Hermes XXXII, p. 441); but was restricted to its connection with the *βωμός*, with which it was often synonymous. That *θυμέλη* should also at times have designated the circular orchestra was due to its location and significance; not because it was a general term for foundation or pavement, as Robert and Bethe maintain. This use was neither as common nor as certain as Bethe supposes. The well-known verses of Pratinas he cites, may be merely a case of *pars pro toto*. *Θυμέλη* and *ὀρχήστρα* were never real synonyms. Later, when the orchestra was divided into a raised *σκηνή* and the *κοίστρα*, the terms *θυμέλη* and *ὀρχήστρα* were used indiscriminately, now of the stage now of the lowered half; but this confusion is made clear by D.'s History of the Theatre.

Eine Corruptel im Ion des Euripides (Franz Studniczka). All attempts of ancients and moderns to explain the word *γοργόνες* in Eur. Ion 224 are unsatisfactory. Nowhere else in literature or art are Gorgons associated with the filleted omphalos. On the other hand the golden eagles of Zeus (Pind. Pyth. 4. 4.) were a most important adjunct to establish the claim of the Delphic *ὀμφαλός* over all other *ὀμφαλοί*. So we learn of their presence in Strabo 9, 3, 6, so we find them on the Cyzicene stater and on a marble relief in Sparta (Journ. of Hellen. Stud. IX, 1888, p. 295 ff.). But *γοργόνες* cannot refer to these eagles, Verrall (Ion, p. xlvii) notwithstanding. Still the adjective *γοργός* could be so applied, as it is in Anth. Pal. VII, 161. Hence Studniczka, together with Robert, suggests as an improvement of the text in question:

222 Chor. ἄρ' ὄντως μέσον ὀμφαλὸν  
 γὰς Φοίβου κατέχει δῶμος;  
 Ion στέμμασί γ' ἐνδύτῳ, ἀμφὶ δὲ γοργῶ  
 <χρυσοφαίνων Διὸς οἰωνῶ.>  
 Chor. οὕτω καὶ φάτις αὐδᾶ.

Zur Notitia Dignitatum (Joh. Schoene). Seeck and Mommsen have demonstrated that this was compiled by different hands at different times. Schoene now points out the variations in the bureaucratic formalism of the style, and shows that the Notitia Dig. per Occidentem was later and largely determined by the N. D. per Orientem. The latter is stricter in preserving stereotyped formulas, the former shows a tendency to individuality. The Codex Spirensis, or rather its latest archetype, was probably derived from two documents, a N. D. per Orientem and a N. D. per Occidentem.

Die Zeit des Heauton Timorumenos und des Kolax Menanders (E. Bethe). Thraso in Ter. Eun. vv. 397, 401, a character derived from Menander's Κόλαξ, probably refers to Pyrrhus (vid. v. 783) who did not receive an independent command until 296 B. C., hence the Κόλαξ was one of the late works of Menander. One of the earliest was the Ἐαυτὸν τιμωρούμενος, for in Terence's play the king referred to in v. 117 must have been Alexander.

Zur Frage nach der Composition der sechsten Rede des Dion Chrysostomos (Karl Praechter). This oration exhibits the growth and blending of the Diogenes legends. The introduction can be clearly separated from the rest.

Encheirogastores (G. Knaack).—Ἐλαφίστικος (W. Dittenberger).—Lesefrüchte (cf. Hermes XXXV, p. 533) (Ulrich v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff).

Miscellen.—F. Leo shows that Vidi in the sense of "I have visited" was used as the Perfect of viso.—Th. Preger admits the evidence of the coins adduced by Seeck (see above) to show that Constantinople was so called as early as 325 A. D., but harmonizes this with the statement in Πάτρια (Vol. XXXVI, 338 ff.) that C. became the imperial residence in 328 A. D. For we read in Origo Constantini (ed. Mommsen, Chron. min. I, p. 10, 19), after an account of the overthrow of Licinius (323/4 A. D.): Constantinus autem ex se Byzantium Constantinopolim nuncupavit ob insignis victoriae <memoriam, add. Mommsen>. Hence the naming of C. preceded its selection as the imperial residence by several years.—C. Robert conjectures that the wall painting recently discovered in Pompeii, which represents the favorite love scene between Ares and Aphrodite, contains the figure of Alectryon who had been appointed Ares' watchman.

HERMAN L. EBELING.



## RHEINISCHES MUSEUM. LVII. Parts 3 and 4.

Pp. 320-327. F. Bücheler. Coniectanea. In Porphyrio on Hor. Carm. 1, 2 for '*antea enim* Anieni matrimonio iuncta est' read '*Antemnis* Anieni, etc.'—Ciris 132. 367 for Lachmann's '*Minoa*' read the alternative form '*Minon*'. Ibid. 156: '*etsi*' is defended. It is used like '*quamquam*' in '*quamquam quid loquor?*' In v. 262: change of mood from '*oportet*' to '*lateat*' is worthy of the author.—In Cic. ad Att. XIII 25 extr. for '*tam enitar ergo at*' read '*tam ἐν παρέργῳ—at*'.

Pp. 328-336. F. Solmsen. Die Berliner Bruchstücke der Sappho. S. gives the text of the first two fragments. The third is hopeless. Of the first fragment, one is tempted to say in its own words: *ὦ μ' ὡς δεῖνα πεπόνθαμεν, | Ψάφ', ἥ μὲν σ' ἀέκ[ων] ἀπυλιμπάνω*. The second, which, by the way, reappears in Jurenka's recently published '*Römische Lyriker*' is worth a volume of essays on '*Das Gefühl für die Natur bei den Alten*'. Solmsen is quite alive to the charm of Sappho's poetry, but his remarks deal chiefly with matters grammatical, such as digamma, augment, form of the imperative middle.

Pp. 337-362. L. Gurlitt. Facetiae Tullianae. Cicero was the wittiest man in Rome, and, like most other witty men, he was sometimes tempted beyond the limit of becoming mirth. These occasional coarsenesses the partisans of Cicero have tried to veil over or explain away, but such processes are not in the interest of truth. Cicero himself says ad Fam. IX 22: *Amo verecundiam vel potius libertatem loquendi*, where '*libertas loquendi*' means 'the right of free expression in private intercourse'. We cannot expect the same self-restraint in the letters that we have in the speeches (ad Fam. IX 21, 1); and Gurlitt discusses a number of Cicero's freedoms, among them ad Att. XVI 11, 1, where he has emended '*hasta*' (= *φαλλῶ*) and stands up for '*φαλλῶ Luciliano*'. (See Philol., 1898, p. 403).

Pp. 363-391. R. A. Fritzsche. Der Magnet u. die Athmung in antiken Theorien. At the close of the long account Lucretius gives of the magnet (VI 906-1089) Munro says: 'After dwelling at inordinate length on the early parts of this question he hurries on at the end, and finishes abruptly, as if he felt, what is indeed the truth, that he had after all quite failed in clearing up the mystery'. But Fritzsche proceeds to show that the failure is on the part of the expositor and not on the part of the poet, and unfolds the antique view of the action of the magnet and the process of respiration.

Pp. 392-421. M. Manitius. Aus Dresdener Handschriften. I. Scholia of the X Century on the Epitoma rei militaris of Vegetius, not very old and some of them nonsensical. II. Scholia on Statius' Thebais, which go back either to a fuller text of Lactantius Placidus than we have or to more abundant extracts.



Pp. 422-436. Karl Fuhr. Zu griechischen Prosaikern. I. Corrections. Plato, Gorg. 522 A: πόσον οἶσι ἀν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; read πόσον τι κτέ. Cf. Dem. 23, 210: πηλίκον τί ποτ' ἀν στενάξειαν οἱ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι; The TI is elicited from the ποιεί of T, TI being often changed into Π. Isokr. 5, 46 for σκεψαίμεθα read σκέψαι. σκεψαίμεθα is a thoughtless assimilation to διεξέλθοιμεν. II. ΕΘΗΚΑΝ and ΕΔΩΚΑΝ in the orators. Of the 49 forms of the 1. aor. 42 are found in the Demosthenean Corpus. In the oldest speeches (27-31), there are sixteen forms without κ and only one with παρεδώκατε (28, 8). In the Leptinea we find ἔδομεν and ἔδοτε three times, ἔδωκαμεν and ἔδωκατε six times. Meantime, Demosthenes has learned to avoid the cumulation of three shorts. Incidentally this shows that our tradition of the Demosthenean text is far from being bad. III. Notes on Sudhaus's ed. of Philodemos with emendations and restorations.

Pp. 437-448. R. Kunze. Unbeachtete Strabofragmente. The considerable break at the close of the seventh book of Strabo is all the more felt because it concerns such important regions as Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace; and Kunze tries to make the loss good so far as possible from Eustathios' Commentary on Dionysios Periegetes (Müller's Geogr. Graeci Minor II p. 201 sqq.).

Pp. 449-459. Joannes Raeder. Analecta Theodoretiana. A discussion of the MSS of Theodoretus by way of supplement to the author's dissertation 'De Theodoreti Graecarum affectionum curatione' (1900).

Pp. 460-480. Miscellen.—Gustav Wörpel detects in Kallimachos, Hymn 1, 79: ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες κτέ, an allusion to the deification performances of Ptolemy Philadelphos; Theophanes Kakridis maintains that the Amphitruo of Plautus is a 'comoedia contaminata' and Schultess indulges in a number of marginal notes on Horace. Perhaps some lovers of Horace will regret that his margin was so broad. Carm. 3, 4, 10 he reads for 'Apuliae' 'apud viam' and 3, 6, 22: 'matura virgo', becomes 'matura vix et.' R. Wunsch has an interesting note on the 'defixio' or κατάδεσμος in the Ciris 369-77, in which he tries to prove that the witchcraft of Carme follows the orthodox ritual. Roszbach restores the latter part of the inscription on the Delphic tripod mentioned Plin. N. H. VII 210 thus: τὰν δεκάταν <ταύταν>. ἃ δ' ἄξιον ὄνον ὄνασε. Neuhaus discusses Trog. Pomp. Prol. X, Kirchner comments on CIA II 966 and Radermacher translates Ar. Ran. 265: κἄν με δῇ δι' ἡμέρας, 'auch wenn er (oder man) mich für einen Tag einsperst', δῇ being from δέω 'I bind' with regular contraction.

Pp. 481-497. A. Brinkmann. Ein Schreibgebrauch u. seine Bedeutung für die Textkritik. Not only are marginal notes taken up into the body of the text, a familiar and fertile source

of corruption, but the same thing happens to catchwords that call attention to these notes and such directions to the reader as *κατω* and *ανω*.

Pp. 498-505. L. Ziehen. *ΙΕΡΑ ΔΕΥΡΟ*. In Philostrate. Vit. Apoll. Tyan. IV 18, 155 *ἱερὰ δεῦρο* is a cry, which like *ἀλαδε μύσται*, has given its name to one of the days of the Epidaurian festival.

Pp. 506-516. v. Domaszewski. Untersuchungen zur römischen Kaisergeschichte. This paper deals with the assassination of Caracalla and the celebration of the decennial of Gallienus.

Pp. 517-533. A. Enmann. Die älteste Redaction der Pontificalannalen. According to Mommsen it was in the fifth century of the city, or, about the time of the Samnite wars that all the extant annalistic material was collected in the bosom of the pontifical college and supplemented by the early history of the Republic and the Story of the Kings. According to Enmann, who accepts Mommsen's views as to this earliest redaction, the working member of the pontifical college was the first plebeian Pontifex Maximus who was consul in 474 A. U. C. (280 B. C.), Tiberius Coruncanius; and the glory of founding the national history of Rome and Latin prose literature belongs to him and not to his townsman, Cato.

Pp. 534-548. Max Fränkel. Epigraphische Beiträge. I. CIG 1511. The war referred to in this important list of contributions to the Lacedaemonians is clearly the Peloponnesian War and the time is about 406, when Kallikratidas (Xen. Hell. 1, 6, 7 sqq.) made his urgent appeal for help. II. The Aphaia IS. CI Pel. 1580. The *oikos* of Aphaia was not a *ναός*. It was only a chapel. Artemis was the great divinity of Aigina.

Pp. 549-558. P. v. Winterfeld. Satzschlussstudien zur Historia Augusta. Peter's contention that large sections of Spartianus's Vita Hadriani are based on the emperor's autobiography is doubtless correct but v. Winterfeld goes farther and maintains that the absence of the rhythmical close of the sentence, so characteristic of the Scriptores historiae Augustae, shows where Spartianus has excerpted the original documents.

Pp. 559-598. Friedrich Reuss. Zur Ueberlieferung der Geschichte Alexanders d. Gr. No more tangled, no more thankless controversy, thinks Reuss, than the controversy about the sources of the history of Alexander the Great, and, by way of clearing the ground, he undertakes to explode the Timagenes hypothesis. Timagenes, an Alexandrian, who lived at Rome towards the close of the republic and in the beginning of the empire, is supposed by Landgraf to be the source of the 'Epitome rerum gestarum Alexandri magni': published by Wagner in the J. f. cl. Phil., Supplbd. 26, pp. 91-167. Nothing is known to us of a History of Alexander by Timagenes, and

there is no evidence that Livy IX 17 alludes to him, that Trogus Pompeius took his *Historiae Philippicae* from him. Livy's harsh judgment of Alexander is not due to Timagenes; and Curtius' criticism of the great king is due to Livy, not to Timagenes, and the same may be said of Trogus, whom Curtius may have known and may have used. In short, we know too little of Timagenes, his likes and his dislikes, to build elaborate combinations on the scant notices that survive. Timagenes having been disposed of, Reuss sets up Eratosthenes as the common source of much that we find in Plutarch and Arrian. What they are supposed by some to have taken from Strabo goes back to the geographical work of the great *πένταθλος* of Alexandria. Finally, Kleitarchos, a very popular writer among the Romans, drew on Aristobulos, not Aristobulos on Kleitarchos.

Pp. 599-609. F. Wilhelm. Zur römischen Elegie. I. Jealousy is an inexhaustible theme in Roman elegy, and the chastisement of the mistress recurs perpetually. This special feature is not necessarily taken from Greek comedy immediately. It may have come from the elegiac poets of Alexandria, who in their turn borrowed from Menander and the rest. II. A discussion of Tibullus I 2 and the consolation that lovers seek in drink.

Pp. 610-623. L. Radermacher proves the existence of *Μυκήνησιν*. O. Neuhaus. Der Vater der Sisygambis. Sisygambis was not a daughter of Artaxerxes II but of his brother Ostanes.

Pp. 624-640. Miscellen.—W. Schmid concedes the attractiveness of Hense's guess that in Soph. Antig. 524 foll. Ismene appears in a new mask, but maintains that the mask represented not the flush of grief but the bloody traces of her nails, the *ἀμυχὰι παρειῶν*.—A. Körte. Ein Gesetz des Redners Lykurgos.—H. Schöne. Ein Blattversetzung bei Galen.—W. Sternkopf. Zu Cicero ad Q. fr. II 3. In A Kal. Febr. omit A.—A. Schulten. Zur lex Manciana.—H. Lietzmann. Prodecessor, not 'praedecessor'.—A. Zimmermann maintains that Roman names in Pop(b) and Pup(b) are baby names, 'Lallnamen'.

B. L. G.

## BRIEF MENTION.

Maeterlinck opens his 'Trésor des humbles' with a rhapsody on silence, prompted by that all-too vocal Preacher of Silence, Thomas Carlyle. But apart from Maeterlinck's esoteric doctrine, the significance and the power of silence are proverbial. Indeed, Goethe seems to think that we exaggerate its potency:

Es ist ein eigner, grillenhafter Zug,  
Dass wir durch Schweigen das Geschehene  
Für uns und Andere zu vernichten glauben.

Still 'todt schweigen' is a recognized process in German polemics; and I have long sympathized with the unfortunate French pamphleteer who wrote a reply to the silence of his adversary. Why all this obviousness? Simply because the course of my studies has led me of late to consider more particularly certain groups of syntactical silences in Greek; and I have been tempted to give some of my meditations on this subject the Farraresque title, 'The Silences and the Voices of Greek Syntax'. Every investigator, it is true, notes the emergence and disappearance of constructions, but emergence and disappearance do not mean birth and death; and the absence of a construction does not mean that it is not yet born. What is set down to non-development may be due to suppression. Hence the especial interest of the syntactical silences of Homer. How these silences are to be interpreted will depend largely on one's aesthetic code. How far back shall we push the reign of conscious art, how far the evolution of the epos? Thus a mere syntactical inquiry brings us face to face with the Homeric Question; so that in reading M. BRÉAL's brilliant brochure, *Un problème de l'histoire littéraire*, I have been reminded more than once of such problems as the absence of the historical present, of the articular infinitive, of the consecutive sentence, to cite only some of the most familiar instances.

---

Homeric theory is a rough shore, and one shudders when one thinks what might have happened, if one had followed the fashionable guides of fifty years ago and had insisted on landing:

ἔνθα κ' ἀπὸ μινούε δρύφθη σὺν τ' ὁστέ' ἀράχθη,

whereas your floater can pass readily from the unitarian preaching of TERRET (A. J. P. XX 87) to the remorseless analysis

of ROBERT (A. J. P. XXII 467), or else allow himself to be rocked *κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις* by M. BRÉAL's attractive handling of the Homeric Question, in which the silences of Homer receive due attention. In the brief summary, the brief neutral summary I shall give here, the brilliance of M. BRÉAL's essay will be lost, but the practical lesson will abide. On M. BRÉAL's theory the young student will be able to enjoy his Homer without the importunate intrusion of many problems that are forced on the schoolboy before he can fairly enter on the most precious literary heritage of the ages. In short, M. BRÉAL's student will be as happy as some of us were in the first half of the last century when we read Homer, Vergil, Ariosto and Tasso without much concern for literary theories.

---

M. BRÉAL does not believe with Schlegel that the epos simply grew, nor with Jakob Grimm that it made itself. He refuses to be mystified by 'organic growth' and the word 'dynamic' has no charm for him, nor does he show any acquaintance with Professor Gummere's lucubrations. Even the excavations of Hissarlik, Mykenai, Tiryns leave M. BRÉAL cool, if not cold. Ever since Schliemann began to dig, the grave-digger's song in Hamlet has been the burden of the Homeric scholar. But 'a pickaxe and a spade, a spade', is followed by the call for a 'shrouding sheet', and that shrouding sheet has shrouded much besides the 'solar theory'. Nothing more tragic to me than the traces of Schliemann's eager demolition of the real Troy, the real Troy of to-day. Now, according to M. BRÉAL, the great lesson taught by these layers of pre-Homeric civilization is the nearness of Homer to our own times. What used to be very distant is but the past of yesterday.

---

The true Homer, continues M. BRÉAL, is to be sought not in the narrative, nor in the imaginative part of the poems, but in those portions in which the poet addresses himself to men and not to grown-up children, desirous of being diverted and amused; and he thinks it quite as extravagant to suppose that Homer's audience believed the fairy tales of the Homeric narrative as to suppose that the Italians of the fifteenth century accepted the adventures of Orlando as a chapter of their history. And so, in the teeth of Homeric scholars, he contends that we are not to discard the *Προσβεία πρὸς Ἀχιλλεῖα* and the *Ἑκτορος λύτρα* in favor of any *Ur-Iliad*. Not that M. BRÉAL believes that there has been no interpolation. Much has been added to the original stock, whole books, in fact, mere repetitions of old phrases, old situations. But the passages that forward the action, that bring about the necessary conclusion, that paint situations or reveal



characters—these are not additaments, and M. BRÉAL protests against the criticism that would rob us of the best things in Homer under the pretext of carrying us back to the primitive form.

---

The primitive effect, according to M. BRÉAL is due partly to the *mise en scène*, partly to modern theories; and the *mise en scène* has to do with the silences of Homer. Of the great antiquity of writing there can be no question. True, only a few years ago it might have been said that the incontestable existence of writing in Egypt and Assyria proves nothing for Greece. But Evans has made that position forever impossible. The mention of writing is suppressed, and suppressed in order to keep up the heroic atmosphere. The obscure mention of those 'characters of hell', the *σήματα λυγρά*, shows nothing but the embarrassment of the poet. Statues and paintings are found in the palace of Minos centuries and centuries before Homer. Why does Homer simply leave us to infer their existence? For they must have existed in his time. The Apollo of Chryses was doubtless a statue, and the knees of Athene, on which Andromache spread the precious *πέπλος* (Il. 6, 303), were the knees of a statue. Decorative art abounds. Why should there be no religious art? Why the elaborate adornment of the shields of Achilles and not a single statue of a deity? As there is no direct mention of sculpture, so there is no direct mention of painting. But *χρυσόθρονος Ἡρῆ* and *κυανοχαίτα Ποσειδάων* and the nimbus about the head of Achilles are evidences that painting was known to Homer. So the Homeric poems affect to be ignorant of coins. It is pure affectation. Coins had been in use three thousand years before the Christian era and M. BRÉAL refuses to accept payment in kind. It is a mere tradition of the school; and so imperative is the tradition that in the youngest part of the Iliad, the twenty-third book, tripods and basins are employed as the medium of exchange and not money current with the merchant.

---

Fénelon's 'aimable simplicité du monde commençant' is a pretty phrase, but it is nothing more. Odysseus builds his bridal couch with his own hands, and proceeds to adorn his backwoods bed with gold and silver and ivory and purple. He is as inconsistent as Vergil in his description of the humble cottage of good Evander, as Fénelon himself in his description of the grotto of Calypso. The equipment does not match the abode in either case. Nausikaa, the divine washerwoman, is the daughter of a king who is surrounded by a splendid court and holds games like those of Olympia and of Delphi. It is time for us to stop laughing at Mme. Dacier, who, in translating the

Iliad, saw everywhere nobles and princes. She was nearer the truth, she was more in touch with the spirit of Homeric society than those who make of the Greek and Trojan warriors contemporaries of an age of blood, the coarse types of a period of barbarism and murder.

---

The heroes of the Iliad were not only valorous as became warriors of such lofty lineage. They were eloquent. The eternal antithesis of word and deed is present in Homer. Cheiron *δικαιότατος Κενταύρων*, the master of Achilles, and the undying type of the teacher, taught both, taught what was afterwards known as *μουσική καὶ γυμναστική*. The life of the *ἀγορά* is fully established. The ceremonial is fixed. The herald puts the staff in the hands of the orator who has the floor. The styles of the various speakers, Menelaos, Odysseus, Nestor, are characterized by Homer himself. *ἀγορεύειν*, 'to harangue' becomes so common a word for speaking that Penelope 'harangues' her nurse in secret. There are schools and schoolmasters. As Achilles is the pupil of Cheiron, Telemachos is pupil of Mentor, Aineias of Alkathoos. The Iliad is full of types and models. It is a mirror of magistrates, of kings. < When Robert Stephens dedicated his Homer to Francis I, *ἀγαθῷ βασιλεῖ τ' ἀγαθῷ τ' αἰχμητῇ*, he justly recognized the typical character of Agamemnon >. We are not far from gnomic poetry in Homer.

---

But after all there is a decided antique coloring, and great part of this is due, as M. BRÉAL insists, to the style of fighting. The military art of Homer is very different from what we find in the literary remains of the seventh and sixth centuries, Archilochos, Alkaios, < not to say > Tyrtaios, < who is not in very good repute just now >. The cavalry arm is notoriously absent. We have only war chariots, and these war chariots are descended in more or less direct line from the monuments of Egypt and Assyria. Even the swift-footed Achilles mounts a chariot occasionally. Agamemnon, Menelaos, Idomeneus, become heroes after the Egyptian pattern. The consequence is that at a time when large and disciplined armies were operating in Asia, the Homeric battles resolved themselves into a series of single combats. < ROBERT recognized the fact that some of the Homeric armour was Brummagem stuff > (A. J. P. XXII 468). According to M. BRÉAL it is all Brummagem. The minute description of contemporary equipment belongs to a much later stage of art.

---

In the Homeric style there are two factors, the one the poet, the other tradition. To the poet we owe the greatness of the

framework, the truth of the characters, the harmony of the whole; to tradition the measure of the verse, the abundance of the vocabulary, the wealth of grammatical forms, the use of formulae for all the affairs of life, standing epithets and consecrated phrases. These things are the sediment of ages, and the hexameter alone is a proof of a long development. It is one of the strictest of verses, as Wilamowitz has remarked. It admits none of the licenses of folk-poetry, protraction, correption, syncope. The structure of the hexameter alone is fatal to any Lachmann ballad theory. The language itself has no counterpart in any spoken dialect. It is full of diverse elements, Ionian, Aeolian, Cypriote. However fashioned, it had long been a mixed language, a 'Kunstsprache'. The rhapsodes may have modified the original form to suit their audiences, but that does not solve the difficulty. So for two centuries, says M. BRÉAL, French troubadours composed their poems in a Limousin dialect, larded with Catalan, Provençal and Italian forms. The digamma, of which so much has been made since Bentley's time, fails as a test of the age of the different books, fails as a proof of antiquity. There are dialects in which the digamma was preserved long after the period assigned to Homer. And the text is uncertain. Witness Plato (A. J. P. XXIII 233), witness the Greek papyri. One scholar goes so far as to maintain that we cannot be certain that we have a single verse that runs as it did in the original text.

---

M. BRÉAL's next contention pertains to the difference between 'Volksepos' and 'Kunstepos', and here he emphasizes especially the jerkiness of the ballad and the sustained flow of the Homeric poems, the continuity of the narrative, the serenity of the thought. But in claiming this distinguishing excellence for Homer, M. BRÉAL does not undertake to say that Homer had no predecessors. Others had sung the stories of Meleager and Bellerophon. He does not undertake to say that there are no interpolations. The temptation of the rhapsodists to interweave local legends was too great. A Cretan audience was only too ready to welcome the adventures of Idomeneus. The style was copied and the soldering was more or less successful.—A Cretan audience—but what was the character of that audience? Are we to say, as has been said, that the *Odyssey* is the sailors' poem, the *Iliad* the soldiers'? No, if by these characteristics we are to explain the origin of the poems. The common people do not figure much in Homer. <D—n the public, said an American capitalist.> ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί is about as much notice as the herd gets in the Homeric poems. It is court poetry with which we have to deal <in the *Odyssey*>. The singers are court poets and queens preside over the performances. The audience is cultivated. It does not need a mythological dictionary. It is

liberal. It does not take its gods too seriously. It is frankly amused at the 'spats' of Zeus and Here, at the trap set to catch Ares and Aphrodite, at Athene's mocking comment on the misadventure of the Goddess of Love in her encounter with Diomed.

---

The tone is free, but it is never low or vulgar. The invectives exchanged by the two chiefs in the Iliad are words spoken not only in anger but by anger; and anger is always vulgar. Achilles recovers his poise. Agamemnon makes the *amende honorable*. Hektor and Aias are as courteous as any mediaeval knights. No wonder that Hektor became a type of chivalry in the middle ages. The warriors of Homer are as enamored of glory as if they were Frenchmen. 'Military honor' was not invented then; *aldós* must serve for it in Homer <as *αλαχύνη* serves for it in Thukydidēs>. As for the portraits of women, I am quite in accord with M. BRÉAL in his admiration of Homer's mastery. Helen is a real woman as well as a real goddess. Andromache I have personally known as a Confederate heroine, and the man that does not understand the moods of Penelope does not know the elements of a study that is even more interesting than the study of Homer.

---

But what was the audience? we ask again. It was made up, says M. BRÉAL, of the *ἀριστοί*, of the old families, say of Smyrna and Miletus, of adventurers by land and sea, successful freebooters, rich merchants, ship-owners, active, intelligent men, curious, cultivated men who knew life and loved the arts. The poems were recited at the great festivals. <The epos season might roughly be compared with the opera season>. As has been said, M. BRÉAL thinks that this audience was not very exacting as to the historical basis. Nor, if M. BRÉAL is right, need we be. True, there must have been some historical basis, some expedition that set out for Europe against a powerful Asiatic Kingdom. About this adventure crystallized a number of legends, the fellows of which we find again in other peoples of the Indo-European race. There are some vague topographical traditions, and King Priam, with his wealth, his wives, his sons-in-law and daughters-in-law is a typical Grand Turk. As for the poet himself we know nothing. Absolute silence as to his country, as to his time. The Lydians are not mentioned. Carians are *βαρβαρόφωνοι*. Phrygians are mentioned because they are allies of the Trojans. The Phoenicians are sly merchants. Even the Greeks have no one name. It is as if it were dangerous to call names. As for Homer's time, M. BRÉAL rejects the statement of Herodotos. He will not allow two centuries, or even one, between Homer and Alkman. He has no sympathy with attempts to reconstruct the 'Ur-Ilias', to



lop off the branches and strip off the foliage of this Ygdrasil of poetry. True, on this theory the Iliad ceases to be incomprehensible in itself and unique in its class. Those who are inclined to mystery, he says, will perhaps regret a poetry that emerges from the popular soul like the lotus from a pond of India, but those who have clear ideas will not enjoy the Homeric poems less for having been composed in a period of culture and art, in the midst of a population fond of legend and poetry.—The Iliad is only the first and the most beautiful of epopees.

---

The first volume of KROMAYER'S *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland* (Berlin, Weidmann) opens a series of monographs that will attract wide and respectful attention. It is the fruit of an expedition undertaken in the year 1900 by two military men, Col. JANKE and Capt. GÖPPEL, and by the scholar whose name the volume bears. The period embraced extends from Epaminondas to the intervention of the Romans and the battle-fields studied are Mantinea (362); Chaironeia (338); Sellasia (221) and Mantinea again (207). Of course, this is not the first attempt to study ancient battle-fields with the help of autopsy, but it is only too true that most of the work in this domain has been chimney-corner work. What were the history of a modern campaign without maps? And yet we are left by the ancient historians to fight the battles of the past without these visual resources. No wonder that Frederick the Great thought little of the value of Caesar's military memoirs. True, there are noteworthy exceptions to this mere book-work, and Herr KROMAYER pays a deserved tribute to Napoleon the Third, to Stoffel, to Grundy. In fact, the present activity in this topographical study is one of the causes of the limitations of the present undertaking. The earlier periods, the period of the Persian War and the period of the Peloponnesian War have already enlisted the energies of competent men and where so much is to be done, there is no sense in duplication.

---

The advantages of the study of Greek battle-fields are great, and Herr KROMAYER does not fail to emphasize them. One great trouble that we have to encounter elsewhere is the difficulty of ascertaining where such and such a battle was fought. The historian has a serious bit of work to do before the cartographer can set up his drawing-board. Think of the dispute over the battle with Ariovistus, over the defeat of Varus. In Greece we are better off. Greece is a land of ancient culture, thick-sown with towns. The name of the place fixes the battle-field within a few square kilometers. Then there are few plains. The mountains are so steep and rocky that they may be left out of the



account; and the zone of hills is narrow. Moreover, in the dry and thirsty land of Greece, water becomes an important element and helps to determine the battle-field, and if we ask, whether the millennia that have intervened may not have changed the face of the earth beyond recognition, we have the assurance of Moltke that all the changes of civilization, of desolation, affect only the epidermis of our great Mother, not her features. 'The Bedouin', says Moltke, 'waters his horses and camels at the same sources and pastures his herds on the same green stretches as did Abraham and Mohammed.' 'The Akropolis of Athens', adds KROMAYER, 'presents to us the same rocky surface that it did to Perikles, and the walls of Mykenai look down on the same unclimbable scaur.' Nature has wrought her will, it is true, but undisturbed by man. There is some comfort to be derived from two thousand years of neglect.

---

Greece, then, seems to be especially favored for researches of this kind and the period that KROMAYER and his associates have selected especially important. It is a 'congenial' period. 'The inner and outer conditions of the life of the modern state are more like those of the last period of Greek history than those of all that go before'. This gives an American citizen of the old school the shivers, however it may delight the student of the military art, which, it seems, does not become a real science until there is no freedom to fight for.—Chaironeia has been a name of evil omen to republican life for all these centuries, and Milton has branded it forever with the name of 'dishonest victory'. But that does not keep the work of KROMAYER and his associates from being honest work and the book is full of enlightenment. Very interesting is what is said of Diodoros, the butt of so many critics, very interesting the effort to extract a nucleus of fact from the floscules of Ephoros, the great source of Diodoros.

---

The 'so-called' iterative optative is a favorite theme of discussion. Somebody has recently written a tract of 50 pages on the iterative optative in Thukydides, and in the last volume of the *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (XXXIII 101), there is a rehandling of the well-worn subject by Dr. JAMES TURNER ALLEN. That there is no notion of iteration in the optative itself, that the notion arises from the combination with an imperfect tense or iterative past tense, and that we might as well speak of an iterative subjunctive in combination with a universal present, that we might as well speak of an iterative perfect indicative, an iterative pluperfect indicative in Latin, is, or ought to be, sufficiently clear by this time (L. G. § 567). Iterative optative is a dangerous expression, I grant, and optative in iterative

sentences would be safer, but there is danger in the use of many of the convenient phrases that we employ in the school-room. When we say that *ἐσται* with subjunctive 'becomes' *ᾗ* with optative after a past tense, we are simply dealing with descriptive, not with genetic syntax. The *ᾗ* of oratio obliqua is never lost. It is the original *ᾗ* with the subjunctive that 'becomes' *ᾗ* with the optative, as I set forth many years ago (A. J. P. III 442); and 'becomes' itself is a so-called 'becomes'. So of the process called 'repraesentatio'. We say that the original subjunctive construction is retained after *ἴνα*, *ἐσται* and the like, after a past tense by 'repraesentatio'. And then some one points out triumphantly that the iterative optative is always retained. Yes. But why? On the simple principle that you cannot eat your cake and have it too. And this profound maxim I impressed on my beginners in Greek wellnigh fifty years ago. You cannot have *repraesentatio* and a distinct reference to the past in the same breath. As to the origin of the 'Modusverschiebung' I have nothing more to say here (A. J. P. XXIII 129). That the iterative or frequentative optative did not originate in the conditional sentence, if we may judge by Homer (Monro, H. G. § 311) is an old story, but old, old stories have a fascination for the grammatical soul and I find myself too often guilty of the same vain repetition that I find fault with in others.

---

When the apostle says: 'I am a debtor both to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, both to the wise and the unwise', he is not rhetorical, he is effusively natural. The combination of opposites or complements to form a totality is common to all languages, if one dare generalize in such matters. So we of English speech inherit a host of such expressions as 'man and woman' = 'mankind', 'up and down' = 'everywhere', 'small and great' = 'everybody', 'rich and poor' = 'society'. We make a goodly number to suit emergencies and, as is the shameless way of our piratical speech, we help ourselves to foreign prefixes, if need be, such as 'anti-' and 'non-', 'revolutionist', and 'anti-revolutionist', 'union' and 'non-union', 'Catholic' and 'non-Catholic'. The psychological process of this polarization, as it has been called, is not uninteresting, and the manifestation of it in different languages is not un instructive. Why are the poles of the same contrast reversed, say in English and in German as 'soul and body' 'Leib und Seele'? Why are polarizations familiar in one language and not familiar in another? Why do the Germans say 'Er kennt Gott und die Welt' whereas we have nothing exactly equivalent? Then there is the emergence of contrasts such as *λόγος* and *ἔργον*, the fixing of synonyms by 'antonyms', as they have been called. There is the use of the pair when only one is strictly appropriate, as in the passionate words of Kreon, Antig. 1108-09: *ἴτ', ἴτ' ὀπίσθους, οἱ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἀπόντες*. In this light it is not so absurd after all to say, 'Now

parents that have children dear and eke ye that have none'. These are all points that have always attracted the student of semantics, and it is not surprising that with the increasing interest in the psychological side of syntactical studies, the last few years should have brought us two treatises on the subject: one by Henrich, *Die sog. polarische Ausdrucksweise im Griechischen*, 1899; the other by Dr. ERNST KEMMER (Würzburg, Stuber, 1903). The former has not reached the Journal; the latter is No. 15 of SCHANZ'S *Beiträge zur historischen Syntax der griechischen Sprache*. The author labors or seems to labor heavily in the elaborate psychological part. In what is for me the practical part, the material will be welcome to the student of Greek, but Dr. KEMMER lacks the lightness of touch that is so desirable in handling the mass of facts. One thinks what a master like BRÉAL would have made of the subject, and sighs.

---

H. L. W.: Students of Latin epigraphy have long needed a collection of the most important and interesting inscriptions in two or three handy volumes which one could carry on a journey or use during a summer vacation as a substitute for the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*. The first volume of such a collection was issued eleven years ago by H. Dessau (*Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, I, Berlin, 1892) and contains 2956 inscriptions classified in ten chapters each of which—with one or two exceptions—is concerned with a special class of individuals. The first part of the second volume (Berlin, 1902, pp. 736) now brings the total number of inscriptions to 7210, adding four chapters, *Tituli sacri et sacerdotum* (XI), *Tituli pertinentes ad ludos* (XII), *Tituli operum locorumque publicorum. Termini. Tituli nonnulli aedificiorum privatorum* (XIII), *Tituli municipales* (XIV). Scattered through these chapters are many inscriptions not yet published in the *Corpus*, notably the archaic inscription of the Roman Forum discovered in 1899 (No. 4913). As in the first volume, the text is accompanied by a brief but scholarly and helpful commentary. It is sincerely to be hoped that the remainder of the second volume as well as the third, which is to contain the indices, will appear long before another decade has elapsed.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Thanks are due to Messrs. Lemcke & Buechner, 812 Broadway, New York, for material furnished.

### AMERICAN.

Aeschylus. *Persae*; *Septem contra Thebas*; ed. by A. Sidgwick. New York, *Oxford University Press* (American Branch), 1903. cl., @ 75 cts.

Birthe (The) of Hercules; with an introduction on the influence of Plautus on the dramatic literature of England in the sixteenth century, by M. W. Wallace. Chicago, *Scott, Foresman & Co.*, 1903. 183 pp. 8vo, \$2 net.

Cæsar's Gallic War. Bks. 1-4; ed. by C. E. Bennett. Boston, *Allyn & Bacon*, 1903. 31+85 pp. il. 12mo, cl., \$1.

Censorinus. *De die natali*. [Also] *Life of the Emperor Hadrian*, by Aelianus Spartianus. New York, *Cambridge Encyclopedia Co.*, 1903. 150 pp. 8vo, cl., \$1.50.

Cicero. Eight orations, ed. by C. H. Forbes. New York, *Appleton*, 1903. 67+495 pp. il. pls., maps. 12mo, cl., \$1.40 net.

Eusebius. *Preparation for the gospel*; tr. by E. H. Gifford. New York, *Oxford University Press* (American Branch), 1903. 2 v., 31+458; 1+459-948 pp. 8vo, cl., \$8.30.

Horace. *The Odes and Epodes of Horace*; ed. by C. L. Smith. Second edition. Boston, *Ginn*, 1903. 87+443 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.50.

Juvenal. *Saturarum libri v.*; ed. by H. L. Wilson. New York, *University Publishing Co.*, 1903. 78+115+178 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.40.

Plato. *The Republic*. Bk. 3; tr. by Alex. Kerr. Chicago, *C. H. Kerr & Co.*, 1903. 2+66 pp. 12mo, pap., 15 cts.

Suetonius. *Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero*; with introd. and notes by J. B. Pike. Boston, *Allyn & Bacon*, 1903. 24+315 pp. 12mo, cl., \$1.25.

Virgil. *Æneid*. Bks. 1-6; ed. by J. B. Carter. New York, *Appleton*, 1903. 35+134 pp. il. 12mo, cl., \$1.40 net.

Weissenborn (Edmund). *Homeric life*; tr. by G. C. Scoggin and C. Gray Burkitt. New York, 1903. 3+144 pp. il. 12mo, cl., \$1.

### ENGLISH.

Abbott (G.) *Macedonian Folklore*. London, 1903. 384 pp. 8vo, 9s.

Cooke (G. A.) *Text-Book of North Semitic Inscriptions*. London, 1903. 8vo, 16s.

Fausbøll (V.) *Indian Mythology according to the Mahabharata*. London, 1903. 8vo, 9s.

Smith (J. P.) A compendious Syriac Dictionary. Founded upon the Thesaurus Syriacus of R. Payne Smith. Part 4. London, 1903. 4to, 15s.

## GERMAN.

Abhandlungen des archäologisch-epigraphischen Seminars der Universität Wien. Hrsg. v. E. Bormann u. E. Reisch. XIV. Heft. (Neue Folge, 1. Heft.) Lex. 8. Wien, A. Hölder. XIV. Hadaczek (Karl). Der Ohrschmuck der Griechen u. Etrusker. Mit 157 Abbildgn. (vii, 84 S.) 1903. m. 5.20.

Aufrecht (Thdr.) Catalogus catalogorum. An alphabetical register of Sanskrit works and authors. Part III. (iv, 161 S.) gr. 4. Leipzig, O. Harrassowitz, 1903. m. 10.

Ausfeld (Carol.) De Graecorum precationibus quaestiones. [Aus: „Jahrb. f. class. Philologie“.] (S. 503-547.) gr. 8. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner 1903. m. 2.

Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. semitischen Sprachwissenschaft; hrsg. v. Paul Haupt v. Frdr. Delitzsch. V. Bd. 1. Heft. gr. 8. Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs' Verl. 1. Meissner (Bruno). Neuarabische Geschichten aus dem Iraq. (ii, lviii, 148 S.) 1903. m. 10.

Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie. Alfred Schöne dargebracht v. seinen Schülern. (43 S.) gr. 8. Kiel, R. Cordes, 1903. m. 1.50.

— zur neueren Philologie. Jakob Schipper zum 19. VII. 1902 dargebracht. (vii, 501 S.) gr. 8. Wien, W. Braumüller, 1902. m. 12.

Biedenkapp (G.) Babylonien u. Indogermanien. (v, 165 S.) gr. 8. Berlin, H. Costenoble, 1903. m. 2.

Calpurnii Flacci declamationes. Ed. G. Lehnert. (xxii, 64 S.) 8. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1903. m. 1.40.

Cauer (F.) Ciceros politisches Denken. Ein Versuch. (vi, 148 S.) gr. 8. Berlin, Weidmann, 1903. m. 3.60.

Cohn (G.) Die Gesetze Hammurabis. Rektoratsrede. (44 S.) gr. 8. Zürich, Art. Institut Orell Füssli, 1903. m. 1.50.

Commentationes philologiae Ienenses, edd. seminarii philologorum Ienensis professores. Vol. VII. fasc. I. (ii, 197 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner 1903. m. 9.

Dieterich (Albr.) Eine Mithrasliturgie. Erläutert. (x, 230 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1903. m. 6.

Dissertationes philologiae Vindobonenses. Vol. VII. 3 partes. gr. 8. Wien, F. Deuticke, 1903. each, m. 2. 1. Huemer (A.) De Pontii Meropii Paulini Nolani re metrica. (78 S.)—2. Woehrer (Justin). De A. Cornellii Celsi rhetorica. (79 S.)—3. Kappelmacher (Alfr). Studia Juvenaliana. (41 S.) 1903.

Eddica minora. Dichtungen eddischer Art, zusammengest. u. eingel. v. A. Heusler u. W. Ranisch. (cx, 160 S.) gr. 8. Dortmund, F. W. Ruhfus, 1903. m. 5.

Ennianae poesis reliquiae. Iteratis curis rec. J. Vahlen. (ccxxiv, 306 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1903. m. 16.



*Ephemeris epigraphica, corporis inscriptionum latinarum supplementum*, cura Th. Mommseni, O. Hirschfeldi, H. Dessau. Vol. IX. Fasc. 1. (iii, 185 S. m. 1 Taf.) Lex 8. Berlin, *G. Reimer*, 1903. m. 9.

Galenii libellus de captionibus quae per dictionem fiunt ad fidem unius qui superest codicis editus. Tradidit Carol. Gabler. Diss. (xvi, 36 S.) gr. 8. Rostock, *H. Warkentien*, 1903. m. 1.60.

Gellii (A.) Noctium atticarum libri XX. Post Mart. Hertz ed. Carol. Hosius. Vol. II. (372 S.) 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 2.40.

Épœs. Abhandlungen zur indogerman. Sprachgeschichte, August Fick zum 70. Geburtstage gewidmet v. Freunden u. Schülern. (iv, 272 S.) gr. 8. Göttingen, *Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht*, 1903. m. 10.

Grammatik, historische, der lateinischen Sprache. V. Gust. Landgraf. III. Bd. Syntax des einfachen Satzes. 1. Heft. Einleitung in die Geschichte der latein. Syntax (Golling); Literatur zur histor. Syntax der einzelnen Schriftsteller (Landgraf u. Golling); Tempora u. Modi; genera Verbi (Blase). (xi, 312 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 8.

Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft. Hrsg. von Iwan v. Müller, 27. Halbbd. gr. 8. München, *C. H. Beck*. Gruppe (Otto.) Griechische Mythologie u. Religionsgeschichte. 2. Hälfte. 2. Lfg. (S. 769-1152.) 1903. m. 7.

Hildegardis causae et curae. Ed. Paul. Kaiser. (v, 254 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 4.40.

Hilfsbücher zur Kunde des alten Orients. 1. Bd. gr. 8. Leipzig, *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.* 1. Winckler (Hugo.) Keilinschriftliches Textbuch zum Alten Testament. 2. neu bearb. Aufl. (iv, 130 S.) 1903. m. 3; geb. m. 3.50.

Holder (Alfr.) Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz. 15. Lfg. (Sp. 1537-1792.) gr. 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 8.

Hoppe (Heinr.) Syntax u. Stil des Tertullian. (vii, 228 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 8.

Immisch (Otto.) De recensionis Platonicae praesidiis atque rationibus. Progr. (iv, 61 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.*, 1903. m. 1.20.

— Philologische Studien zu Plato. 2. Heft. De recensionis Platonicae praesidiis atque rationibus. (iv, 110 S.) gr. 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 3.60.

Inschriften, ägyptische, aus den königl. Museen zu Berlin. (iv S. u. S. 73-135 in Autogr.) hoch 4. Leipzig, *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.*, 1903. m. 6.50.

Inscriptiones graecae. Vol. XII, fasc. V, pars I. gr. Fol. Berlin, *G. Reimer*. XII. Inscriptiones insularum maris Aegaei praeter Delum. Fasc. V, pars I. Inscriptiones Cycladum praeter Tenum. Ed. Frider. Hiller de Gaertringen. (vi, 227 S. m. Abbildgn. u. 1 Taf.) 1903. m. 24.

Inscriptiones graecae ad illustrandas dialectos selectae. Scholarum in usum ed. Fel. Solmsen. (viii, 90 S.) 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 2.

Krause (Ernest F.) De Apollodoris comicis. (57 S.) gr. 8. Berlin, *E. Ebering*, 1903. m. 2.

Krumbacher (K.) Das Problem der neugriechischen Schriftsprache. Festrede. (226 S.) 4. München, *G. Franz' Verl. in Komm.*, 1902. m. 5.

Libanii opera. Rec. Rich. Foerster. Vol. I. Fasc. I. Orationes I-V. (ix, 320 S.) 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 5.

Loeff (A. van der). De ludis eleusiniis. Diss. (viii, 143 S.) gr. 8. Leiden, *S. C. van Doesburgh*, 1903. m. 3.50.

Ludwich (Arth.). Textkritische Untersuchungen üb. die mythologischen Scholien zu Homer's Ilias: IV. (Progr.) (20 S.) gr. 4. Königsberg, *Akadem. Buchh. v. Schubert & Seidel*, 1903. m. 0.30.

Mein (A.) De optativi obliqui usu Homérico. Pars I. (28 S.) gr. 8. Bonnae, 1903. Leipzig, *Buchh. G. Fock*. m. 0.60.

Menna (Philippus). De infinitivi apud Plinium minorem usu. Diss. (152 S.) gr. 8. Rostock, *H. Warkentien*, 1902. m. 3.

Minucii Felicis (M.) Octavius. Recens. et praefatus est Herm. Boenig. (xxxi, 116 S.) 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 1.60.

Muss-Arnolt (W.) Assyrisch-englisch-deutsches Handwtrrb. 13. Lfg. Berlin, *Reuther & Reichard*. m. 5.

Pausaniae Graeciae descriptio. Recogn. Frider. Spiro. Vol. I. Libros I-IV continens. (xxi, 420 S.) 8. m. 2.80.

— Vol. II. Libros V-VIII continens. (389 S.) 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 2.40.

Persii Flacci (A.) Satirae. Edidit Geyza Némethy. (390 S.) gr. 8. Budapest, *Verlagsbureau der ungar. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1903. m. 8.

Pindarus. Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina. Recens. A. B. Drachmann. Vol. I. Scholia in Olympionicas. (xxvi, 395 S.) 8. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*, 1903. m. 8.

Prenzel (Kurt). De Thucydidis libro octavo quaestiones. Diss. (51 S.) gr. 8. Berlin, *E. Ebering*, 1903. m. 2.

Richter (Elise). Zur Entwicklung der romanischen Wortstellung aus der lateinischen. (x, 176 S.) gr. 8. Halle, *M. Niemeyer*, 1903. m. 4.40.

Thera. Untersuchungen, Vermessgn. u. Ausgrabgn. in den J. 1895-1902. Hrsg. von F. Hiller v. Gaertringen. II. Bd. gr. 4. Berlin, *G. Reimer*. Cloth. II. Dragendorff (H.) Theraeische Gräber. Mit 5 Taf. u. 521 Abbildgn. im Text. (x, 328 S.) 1903. m. 50.

Thesaurus linguae latinae. Vol. II. Fasc. 5. (Sp. 961-1200.) Imp. 4, Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*. Subskr.-Pr. m. 7.20.

Vahlen (J.) Über die Rede des Lysias in Plato's Phaedrus. [Aus: „Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.“] (29 S.) gr. 8. Berlin, *G. Reimer in Komm.* 1903. m. 1.

Veröffentlichungen, wissenschaftliche, der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft. 4. Heft. Fol. Leipzig, *J. C. Hinrichs' Verl.* 4. Weissbach (F. H.) Babylonische Miscellen. Mit 1 Lichtdr., 3 Fig. im Text u. 15 autogr. Taf. (iv, 52 S.) 1903. m. 12; f. Mitglieder der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft. m. 9.

Westermann (G.) De Hippocratis in Galeno memoria quaestiones. Diss. (50 S.) gr. 8. Berlin, *E. Ebering*, 1902. m. 2.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, Notes and Emendations to. By a Graduate of Cambridge. London, *David Nutt*, MCMIII.

Bevier (Louis). Brief Greek Syntax. New York, *American Book Co.*, 1903. 90 cts.

Boxler (A.) Précis des institutions publiques de la Grèce et de Rome anciennes. Paris, *Victor Lecoffre*, 1903.

Caesar's Gallic War. With Introduction, Notes, Appendix and Vocabulary. By Harry F. Towle and Paul R. Jenks. (Gildersleeve-Lodge Latin Series.) New York, *University Publishing Co.*, 1903. \$1.25.

Cambridge Philological Society, Proceedings of the. LXI—LXIII. London, *C. J. Clay & Sons*, 1903.

Conway (R. S.) The pre-Hellenic Inscriptions of Praesos. Reprinted from the Annual of the British School at Athens. No. VIII. 1901-1902.

Crane (R. T.) The Utility of an Academic or Classical Education. 2d ed. Chicago, 1903.

Demetrius on Style. The Greek Text of Demetrius de Elocutione. Ed. after the Paris MSS, by W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, *At the University Press*, 1902.

Dictionnaire Étymologique de la langue allemande, sur le plan de celui de M. Kluge, mais d'après les principes nouveaux de la Méthode Évolutionniste par Paul Regnaud. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. livr. GÄHNEN—SCHNÜFFELN. Paris, *Albert Fontemoing*, 1902-1903.

Dissertationes Philologiae Vindobonenses:

Vol. VII. Pars I. A. Huemer. De Pontii Meropii Paulini Nolani Re Metrica.

Pars II. Iustinus Woehrer. De A. Cornelii Celsi Rhetorica.

Pars III. Alfredus Kappelmacher. Studia Iuvenaliana.

Vindobonae et Lipsiae, *F. Deuticke*, MCMIII.

Dizionario Cesariano. De Bello Gallico—De Bello Civili da M. Chicco-G. Ferrari. Torino, *E. Loescher*, 1903. 3 L.

Excerpta Historica iussu Imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti confecta. Edd. U. Ph. Boissevain, C. de Boor, Th. Büttner-Wobst. Vol. I. Excerpta de Legationibus. Ed. Carolus de Boor. Pars. I. Excerpta de Legationibus Romanorum ad gentes. Pars II. Excerpta de Legationibus Gentium ad Romanos. Berolini, *Apud Weidmannos* MCMIII. 8 m.+12 m.

Fowler (Harold N.) A History of Roman Literature. New York, *D. Appleton & Co.*, 1903.

Goodspeed (Edgar J.) Greek Papyri from the Cairo Museum. (*Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*. Vol. V.)

Gregor (L. R.) Die Harzreise with some of Heine's best known short poems. Boston, *Ginn & Co.*, 1903.

Griechische Schulgrammatik von Curtius-v. Hartel. 24te Aufl. bearbeitet von Florian Weigel. Wien, *F. Tempsky*, 1902. geb. 3 K. 10 m.

Indice generale degli Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica. Firenze, *Suber*, 1903.

Magoun (H. W.) Some Problems in Prosody. Reprint from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. January 1, 1903.

Morgan (M. H.) *Miscelliones*. An Address before the New York Latin Club. Reprint from the Latin Leaflet.

Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte u. Deutsche Literatur und für Pädagogik. Herausg. v. J. Ilberg u. B. Gerth. Siebenter Jahrg., 1903. XI. u. XII. Bandes 4. Heft. Leipzig, *B. G. Teubner*. 4s.

Peterson (W.) The Cluni Codex of Cicero. Reprint from *Classical Review*. April, 1903.

Radford (R. S.) Use of the suffixes -anus and -inus in forming possessive adjectives from names of persons. (*Gildersleeve Volume*.)

Personification and the Use of Abstract Subjects in the Attic Orators and Thukydides. (J. H. U. Diss.) Baltimore, 1901.

Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Herausg. von Franz Bücheler u. Hermann Usener. N. F. LVIII. 2. Frankfurt a. M., *Sauerländer*, 1903.

*Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*.

M. Tulli Ciceronis Rhetorica. Recog. brevique adnotatione critica instruxit A. S. Wilkins. Tomus II. Brutus—Orator,—De Optimo Genere Oratorum.—Partitiones Oratoriae. Oxonii, *E Typographeo Clarendoniano*. 3s.

Studi di Storia Antica. Pubblicati da Giulio Beloch. Fasc. IV. Evaristo Breccia. Il diritto dinastico nelle monarchie dei successori d' Alessandro Magno. Roma, *Ermanno Loescher & Co.*, 1903. L. 7.

Williams (T. Hudson). A discussion of some questions in Theognis. Cambridge, *At the University Press*, 1903.